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
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THE PROBLEM OF APPROACH
IN A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in Psychology

Division of Social Sciences

University of Regina

by

Robert Joseph Masek

Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada

October, 1980

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ABSTRACT

This study investigated the role "approach" (Giorgi, 1970) plays in a psychology of how "the unconscious" exists. Among those historical versions of this theme Freud's was depicted as being both the most influential and heavily criticized interpretation of this theme. The psychoanalytic unconscious, however, was shown to be greatly informed by both the approach and theoretical superstructure of psychoanalysis. Therefore, criticisms of psychoanalysis were reviewed in an effort to determine the nature of possible revisions called for as they may apply to the unconscious. These criticisms and revisions were examined through Giorgi's (1970) interpretation that all scientific theorizing and practice involves an approach-method-content structure. Specifically, criticisms by some behavioral psychologists, positivistic philosophers of science, and many psychoanalysts emphasized revisions at the method and content levels, leaving the approach relatively unexamined. Phenomenological psychologists and philosophers, however, argued that revisions must begin with the approach. They argued that psychoanalysis stands on a dated natural science approach which leads to empirical difficulties in how human phenomena are viewed, theoretically understood, and engaged in clinical psychological practice.

Accordingly, it was proposed that an alternative approach originally designed to clarify human phenomena could function

to reduce these problems, provide greater empirical clarity, and improve the quality of clinical practice. Therefore, an alternative phenomenological approach, using lived experience as evidence, was presented and utilized in four ways. First, this approach stood as a contemporary statement of a phenomenological position in a psychology of the unconscious. Important theoretical changes since the work of Husserl and Heidegger were, thereby, included in this approach. Second, this approach functioned as a basis for examining and revising some empirical inconsistencies in how the unconscious is approached and understood in psychoanalytic psychology. Third, both pre-Freudian and selected phenomenological psychologies of the unconscious were examined and selectively revised by recourse to this approach. Finally, the presentation of a human scientific interpretation of how human dynamic unconsciousness exists was directly based on this approach.

Results of this revision were shown to avoid many of the empirical inconsistencies and problems identified earlier in this study. Overall, the clinical determination of unconscious processes was shown to be possible by recourse to the evidence of perceptual experience. Thereby, many problems associated with a natural scientific approach to dynamic unconsciousness were shown to be overcome. Possible implications of this revised psychology of the unconscious were offered for the areas of clinical psychological practice and supervision.

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Finally, this work is dedicated to the memory of my late father and mother.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Nature and scope of this work

Historically, Freud's interpretation of the unconscious stands as the most influential as well as the most criticized interpretation of human unconsciousness in psychology. However, prior to Freud's first paper, in 1912, which dealt with this theme, phenomena now interpreted as "the unconscious" existed and received various interpretations (Ellenberger, 1970; MacIntyre, 1958; Van den Berg, 1974; Whyte, 1960). The literature on these pre-Freudian interpretations of unconsciousness are in agreement that Freud's interpretation must be distinguished as unique from those views that preceded him. Van den Berg (1974), for example, has argued that human social and personal existence underwent a collective transformation in the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this change, social and individual existence became divided, and the division was reflected in the individual's existence and personal identity. The self, henceforth, was no longer experienced as cohesively singular and unitary, but, instead, as divided, existing as a plurality of selves and identities. Hysteria became the psychiatric prototype of this divided existence. Van den Berg suggests the term human plurality to generically account for these pre-Freudian phenomena, which Freud was to

later interpret as representations of the unconscious. Human plurality emerged and was historically visible in psychiatry, psychology, the arts, science, philosophy, literature, and social reality long before Freud first interpreted some of these phenomena within the specialized attitude of his scientific background, and made popular a knowledge of their personal, social, and clinical significance. I will review some of these phenomena and their varying interpretations in Chapter IV, "A Psychology of the Unconscious." For now I wish only to emphasize that, presently, the socially institutionalized, popular meaning of many of these phenomena as representations of "the unconscious" must clearly be traced to Freud (Ellenberger, 1970; Shakow & Rapaport, 1968). Broadly, it is to Freud's enduring credit to have recognized within a scientific framework that a person's existence is not reducible to his or her awareness of it, and that human will has limits. These insights have had a powerfully institutionalized influence on what it means to be a self, seen both personally, socially, and professionally.

Having thus been cast within Freud's scientific approach, these formulations of human plurality continue their expression as "the unconscious" within psychology. For example, introductory psychology textbooks, which express a paradigmatic picture of the field (Kuhn, 1970), continue to include the unconscious as a necessary datum of psychological knowledge (Shepard, 1977). Likewise, among the diverse theoretical persuasions that inform dynamic clinical psychology and psychiatry, the unconscious, however

conceived, inhabits the therapeutic milieu (Guntrip, 1971; Monroe, 1955; Searles, 1975; Wolman, 1967; Wyss, 1966). Similarly, some notion of human plurality is operative in third force psychotherapies, which have reacted against the determinism within orthodox, clinical psychoanalysis (May, 1972; Perls, F., Hefferline, R. F., & Goodman, P. 1951; Rogers, 1965). The existence of human plurality has been identified as central to many theories of psychopathology (Boss, 1966; Honig, 1973; Jacobson, 1974; Page, 1971). Many areas of psychological assessment are directly predicated to reveal unconscious perspectives of a person's existence (Beck, 1966; Rapaport, Gill, Schafer, 1968; Schachtel, 1966; Semeonoff, 1976). Existing reviews of the voluminous number of controlled studies on psychoanalytically inspired hypotheses testify to the popularity of unconscious themes among experimentalists (Eysenck, 1973; Fisher & Greenberg, 1977; Hilgard, 1956; Kline, 1972). Within psychoanalysis, the unconscious is designated the place of "... the true psychic reality," and the very heart of psychoanalytic inquiry (Freud, 1938, p. 542). Indeed, the unconscious occupied such a central place among the various psychoanalytic schools of thought that Boss (1963) argues that generic psychoanalysis stands or falls with the notion of the unconscious.

In summary, many phenomena now seen retrospectively as unconscious existed long before Freud and psychoanalysis. However, with Freud, the meaning of many of these phenomena became powerfully institutionalized within a specific horizon: the "approach" (Giorgi, 1970) underlying and expressed through the science of Freud's background and time. Thereby, the

unconscious became inextricably intertwined with the metapsychology of psychoanalysis. For better or for worse, the unconscious thereby became a dubious resident within the scope of psychology as a science.

I have identified the status of the unconscious in psychology as dubious. The sense of this is that it is largely the institutionalized interpretation of the unconscious, shared by orthodox and derivative schools of psychoanalysis, that has held such an equivocal and often criticized status in the field of psychology (Boss, 1963; Fischer, W., 1970; Miles, 1966; Skinner, 1953, 1956; Van Kaam, 1966). The various phenomena at which this interpretation aims continue to be indisputably present, theoretically beguiling, and clinically significant to a number of practicing clinicians, experimentalists, and theoreticians of psychology. Thus, the continued appearance and appreciation of these phenomena in psychology and everyday life have continued, while their psychoanalytic interpretations have received extensive criticism and calls for revision.

In fact, as Schakow & Rapaport (1968) point out, psychoanalysis has been seen as one of the most popular and most criticized systems of thought since its inception before the turn of the century. Broadly, a majority of these criticisms arises from an examination of psychoanalysis within the horizon of its scientific status. Specifically, psychoanalysis has been evaluated by reference to the degree to which it meets the intentions and criteria of being scientific. Any revisions called for stem from a reference, however implicit, to this

underlying approach toward what constitutes science. This is true for traditional and phenomenological psychologists alike.

Accordingly, this dissertation also begins with a criticism of the scientific approach within psychoanalysis, insofar as that approach affects the theme of the unconscious. A central assumption in this work is that the disjunction between unconscious phenomena and their theoretical interpretation is a problem directly related to the approach implicit in psychoanalytic metapsychology. I will argue that this disjunction will be reduced by examining the unconscious within an alternative approach drawn from contemporary phenomenological thought. The movement from Freud's approach and that of phenomenology is, at the same time, the movement from a dated natural scientific approach to one leading to a human scientific conception of the unconscious. In such an approach, any statement about what a phenomenon is, how it exists, and what the researcher/therapist's relationship to it is, should be grounded in how that phenomenon was originally given in perceptual experience, prior to the assumption of pre-existing theoretical interpretations. This demand has been recognized as an important empirical basis within a phenomenological approach (Colaizzi, 1973; Fischer, C., 1975; Giorgi, 1970).

The need to update and clarify the theme of the unconscious is reflected in both psychoanalytic and phenomenological psychology. For example, research has shown that orthodox psychoanalysis and its derivative schools remain within an approach that has perpetuated this disjunction between theory and lived perceptual experience (Boss, 1963; Binswanger, 1975;

Fischer, W., 1970; Lyons, 1963; Van Kaam, 1966). Moreover, the classic phenomenological revisions of the unconscious within larger scope works by Binswanger (1975), Boss (1963), and Ricoeur (1970), are predicated on a phenomenological approach which draws indirectly from the early work of Husserl and directly from his pupil Heidegger. Since the dates of these psychological revisions of the unconscious, phenomenological thought has undergone considerable self-criticism and revision in the hands of Merleau-Ponty (1966b, 1968), Levinas (1969), and Strasser (1969). However, no psychological work has thematically examined and revised the theme of the unconscious within an updated approach drawn from this contemporary phenomenological thought.

A revision of this nature has also an eminently practical value. For example, May (1967) has indicated that psychoanalytic psychotherapies often effect both remarkable transformations and little change in the lives of people, without any clear, empirically grounded conception of how these results came about. Likewise, dynamic psychological assessment always pivots around some conception of a person's unawareness of his or her living, and assessment results and insights are subject to the same questions. Accordingly, it is proposed that a clearer articulation of the theme of the unconscious will not only foster greater clarity about the clinical relationship, but will also increase the quality of that work, for clinician and client alike.

II. THE PROBLEM OF APPROACH AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

2.1. Plan of the chapter

All scientific theories possess some essentially philosophical conception of the phenomenon being studied. As a rule, this conception exists at an implicit, unrecognized level. Nonetheless, if made explicit, this viewpoint on the phenomenon suggests what it is, how it exists, and what the researcher/therapist's relationship to it is. For example, Van Kaam (1966) refers to this as the prescientific vision of reality, Kuhn (1970) as the paradigm, and Giorgi (1970) as the approach implicit in all psychological theory and practice. Hereafter, I will use the term approach throughout this work.

Psychoanalysis also possesses an approach, usually referred to as the metapsychology (Smith, 1975). Insofar as the psychoanalytic unconscious is situated within the scientific approach of psychoanalysis at large, this chapter will begin by examining the system of psychoanalytic theory and scientific approach that informs Freud's conception of the unconscious.

Accordingly, I will first offer a frame of reference through which the meaning of science may be examined. This interpretive lens is Giorgi's (1970) recognition that all science is a human activity composed of three reciprocally

related features--approach, method, and content. This presentation is made with a two-fold intention, to review and make explicit the kinds of revisions called for by critics and defenders of psychoanalysis, and to introduce some terms to be used throughout this work.

Next, this interpretation of science will be directly used to examine psychoanalysis as science. Freud had some definite views on the scientific status of psychoanalysis, and these will be presented.

Following this, existing criticisms of psychoanalysis will be shown to be of two kinds. On the one hand, behavioral psychologists and logical empiricist philosophers of science demand explicitly that psychoanalysis revise itself within the existing natural science approach. For this group, science is always the model of natural science. Likewise, within the community of psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners, revisions called for emphasize an implicit acceptance of the natural science approach. Taken together, these criticisms will be shown to ask for revisions at the content-methodological levels, and leave untouched an examination of the implicit approach. On the other hand, a second group of criticisms will be presented that call for revisions at the level of approach. These criticisms arise from phenomenological psychologists and philosophers. In contrast to the revisions sought by the first group, i.e., to further emulate a natural science approach, phenomenological psychologists and philosophers have argued that the unquestioned presence of the natural science approach is precisely the limiting condition

in the ability of psychoanalysis to faithfully respond to human existence, and empirically articulate psychoanalytic insights in a human science approach. The much criticized disjunction between Freud's (1912, 1915) interpretation of what he called "the unconscious" and the phenomena at which it aims would, thereby, be eliminated by a phenomenological approach.

Accordingly, this dissertation is within the scope of phenomenological psychology, and seeks a positive revision of the orthodox, psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious within a phenomenological approach. As such, the aim of this work is not a critique of psychoanalysis, per se. Rather, orthodox psychoanalysis has produced the most influential conception of the unconscious, and the initial foundation for dynamic, clinical psychologies. The unconscious is inseparable from psychoanalysis, which, in turn, is predicated on its approach. Psychoanalysis and its approach are, therefore, necessary starting points to which this work now turns.

2.2 Science interpreted as approach-method-content

Science has increasingly come to be seen as an historically informed, dynamic, socially situated activity (Fischer, C., 1974; Giorgi, 1970, 1973d; Kühn, 1970; MacLeod, 1975; Radnitzky, 1973). Giorgi (1970) has articulated in detail a frame of reference through which this dynamic, human nature of science may be conceptualized. This is his interpretation of scientific activity in terms of its approach-method-content

structure. Since the first publication of this interpretation (1965), this frame of reference has undergone considerable expansion.

My purpose here is to make a current statement about this frame of reference so that it may be used as a lens through which the selected criticisms and calls for revision concerning psychoanalysis may be viewed and understood. This plan will help delineate the kinds of revisions called for, whether they appear at the approach, method, or content levels. I will begin by giving an overall characterization of this frame of reference, and then describe each of its features.

2.2.1. Overall characterization

Any theorizing or research taking place within the scientific attitude may be seen as embodying three reciprocally related features; approach, method, and content (Giorgi, 1970). Of these three terms, the latter two are most easily identified. "The content refers to the subject matter or phenomenon under investigation... The method refers to the specific procedures or techniques that are actually utilized..." (1967a, p. 89). The dialogue between the scientist and the content must be understood as taking place within a field that is informed not only by the personal history of the scientist, but also by significant socially institutionalized horizons. In short, content always exists within a situation in which only some perspectives are explicit and immediately apparent at given points in time. Therefore, the situation has been identified as the preferred subject of investigation or theorizing

(Giorgi, 1973c). In the broadest sense, the method appears as an outcome of this dialogue between scientist and situation. In fact, method is the result of this "...exchange between the phenomenon as it appears and the attitude one adopts toward it" (Giorgi, 1973c, p. 5).

The concept of approach makes explicit that scientific activity always draws from pre-scientific life. Broadly stated, the approach is constituted by "...the attitudes and presuppositions, both implicit and explicit, that a scientist brings to his subject matter" (Giorgi, 1969, pp. 15-16). More specifically, this includes some conception, however implicit, of "...the fundamental viewpoint toward man and the world that the scientist brings or adopts with respect to his work as scientist" (Giorgi, 1970, p. 89). Thus, earlier formulations of the approach tended to emphasize that approach was "...essentially a philosophical problem that implicates a number of philosophical presuppositions" (Giorgi, 1970, p. 125). The approach, although not usually thematic, nonetheless, operatively guides the activity of the scientist and is always embodied in scientific work. More recent publications have added to the existing conception of approach by recognizing that philosophical/scientific presuppositions co-exist with and are informed by socio-economic as well as spiritual horizons (Bickley, 1974-1975; Leiss, 1972; Kracklauer, 1974; Kvale, 1973; Romanyshyn, 1971, 1973).

Overall, dealing with the approach is predominantly a problem of making explicit these institutionalized, taken for granted horizons that inform scientific activity. The critical

problem is making these influences explicit, and examining the extent to which they prefigure the scientific work. Approach is not an addition to the existing paradigm of science, for all science has an approach, however implicit. The concept of approach demands, however, that these limiting, taken-for-granted conditions be made explicit, examined, and included within the activity of doing science (Giorgi, 1970).

I have presented and discussed the concepts of approach, method, and content with the intention of bringing this interpretation of science to bear on some existing criticisms of psychoanalysis. Specifically, in what follows, the scientific status of psychoanalysis and the later calls for revision will be examined by a question. Is the revision called for at the level of approach, method, or content? Since these features are so obviously co-dependent and intertwined, this delineation is one of emphasis.

2.3 Freud and his critics: the scientific status of psychoanalysis interpreted as approach-method-content

2.3.1. Freud's views

Freud defined psychoanalysis in a three-fold manner. Psychoanalysis is a method of investigating usually inaccessible psychological phenomena, a therapeutic means of treating neurotic disorders clarified through that method, and a general body of information obtained by this investigation and/or treatment (Freud, 1943).

While Freud always saw psychoanalysis as a branch of

science, fulfilling the intentions of science, he nonetheless believed that the paradigmatic methodology of experimental science was not the proper vantage point from which to evaluate the observations and insights of psychoanalysis. This equivocal position is illustrated in the following statements.

Psychoanalysis is not, in my opinion, in a position to create a Weltanschauung of its own. It has no need to do so, for it is a branch of science, and can subscribe to the scientific Weltanschauung (Freud, 1964, p. 181).

In reply to the experimental psychoanalytic studies sent to him by the American psychologist Rosenzweig, Freud, in 1934, had this to say.

I have examined your experimental studies for the verification of the psychoanalytic assertions with interest. I cannot put much value on these confirmations because the wealth of reliable observations on which these assertions rest make them independent of experimental verification. Still, it can do no harm (in Shakow & Rapaport, 1968, p. 129).

Freud's position toward psychoanalysis as science is clear, and to my knowledge never changed. Psychoanalysis is a hybrid. It clearly rests upon a natural science approach, but its findings are not best evaluated by the concepts and procedures of the established scientific method. Rather, Freud believed psychoanalysis should be evaluated by its own methods,

i.e., an analysis of the transference and countertransference, and the viewpoint provided by psychoanalytic supervision.

2.3.2. Methodological revisions in empirical theory

History shows that Freud's views on the scientific status of psychoanalysis have not gone unchallenged. Experimental studies on psychoanalytic insights have continued, and a major thrust of the criticisms against psychoanalysis have demanded that it revise itself into an experimentally capable, scientific theory. This has meant revising itself to meet the methods of experimental science.

For example, psychoanalysis has received a strong critique on methodological grounds by behavioral psychologists (Miles, 1966; Skinner, 1953, 1956). These psychologists argue that psychoanalysis proposes and seeks to deal with unobservable entities, which in principle are unverifiable through behavioral methodology. While these people may point to specific content, i.e., the unconscious, psychic energy, as an example of this, the priority is on psychoanalysis revising itself to meet the established scientific method.

Similarly, Kendler (1964) has argued that psychoanalysis lacks a methodologically empirical foundation, and that the resulting data of analysis are a mass of interacting variables which cannot be controlled. Silverman (1964) also points out this methodological ambiguity, and, along with others (Eysenck, 1963, 1973; Glover, 1966; Sarnoff, 1971), indicated that psychoanalytic findings are not the result of experimental tests and

confirmation of hypotheses. Psychoanalysis, moreover, has been charged with being a postdictive rather than predictive system (Eysenck, 1973; Glover, 1966; Goldstein, A., Heller, & Sechrest, 1966; Rapaport, 1960).

Summing up the literature, Hilgard (1956, p. 44) notes that the scientific status of psychoanalysis has been judged by criteria which ask for hypotheses that are

... tentatively proposed and subject to empirical test, controlled experiments, objectively recorded data, experiments on subjects other than patients under treatment, a search for contradictory as well as confirmatory evidence, a repetition of observations by independent investigations, and so on.

These criteria are in keeping with the line prescribed by logical empiricist philosophers of science (see Hook, 1964). Nagel (1964), for example, maintains that as a theory claiming to be scientific, psychoanalysis must be capable of empirical verification through established scientific systems of proof. On this issue, psychoanalytic theory has been seen as less capable than astrology (Eysenck, 1973), and intrinsically unscientific as it now stands (Eysenck, 1963, 1973; Kendler, 1964; Nagel, 1964).

Eysenck (1963), for example, has argued that the very nature of psychoanalytic theory allows it to discount contradictory findings through such hypotheses as "reaction formation." This is a consequence of the very foundation of

psychoanalysis, which renders it unscientific. Eysenck places psychoanalysis among the verstehende, "common sense" psychologies, which aim at understanding human beings. He contrasts these aims with erklärende psychologies which "...explain their conduct on a scientific basis" (1963, p. 222). He argues that psychoanalysis "...consequently...is essentially non-scientific and to be judged in terms of belief and faith rather than in terms of proof and verification" (p. 226).

Eysenck leaves one with the conclusion that the understanding of human beings is incompatible with scientific proof. This equation of proof with scientific explanation has received considerable criticism (Beshai, 1971; Giorgi, 1970; Needleman, 1963).

In conclusion, I wish only to indicate that in the literature reviewed, judgements of the scientific validity of psychoanalysis are made in reference to a priority on established, scientific method. In the cases reported, revisions are emphasized at that level.

An understanding of the scientific status of psychoanalysis is expressed from the viewpoint of its defenders, as well as from that of its critics. Many psychologists and psychoanalysts argue that psychoanalysis is scientific in that it embodies the same methodological priorities as other sciences. Moreover, when revisions are suggested they also remain within the same natural science approach and embody the same methodological criteria used by critics of psychoanalysis.

For example, psychoanalysis has been described as

expressing such scientific features as the hypothetico-deductive method, control, observation, and prediction (Arlow, 1964; Hartmann, 1964; Kubie, 1956, 1964; Lagache, 1966; Silverman, 1964). Specifically, these psychologists point to the compatibility of the analytic and experimental settings. They argue that the situation of psychoanalysis is founded on the maintenance of a constancy of conditions such that the behavior of the analysand may be treated as a dependent variable contingent on the analyst's input, viewed as an independent variable. The anonymity of the analyst's presence is compared to experimenter anonymity, and these unchanging, controlled conditions are said to permit unbiased, comparative observations on single and multiple cases over a period of time. Moreover, the assumption of psychic determinism has been cited as embodying the same criteria for causality as those applying to the physical sciences (Arlow, 1964; Rapaport, 1960).

Arlow (1964) sums up this defense when he says:

Every aspect of psychoanalytic technique is oriented towards preserving the objective, neutral, uncontaminated relationship of the field of observation (p. 203).

It constitutes by far the closest approach to a controlled experimental situation that has as yet been devised to study the total functioning of the human mind (p. 204).

[It is]... a rational and objective procedure governed by strict methodological considerations,

and operating within accepted canons of the scientific method (p. 211).

Thus, defenders of psychoanalysis argue that it meets the established criteria of science. As with the criticisms of psychoanalysis, the priority is on the methods of science, and a questioning of the suitability of the natural science approach for human phenomena is ignored.

Revisions suggested by supporters of psychoanalysis urge a refinement of psychoanalytic theory to further meet these established criteria. Three directions are denoted in these revisions.

First, a greater degree of "systematization" of psychoanalytic theory along the lines done by Rapaport (1960) has been emphasized (Brenner, 1968; Hartmann, 1964; Sarnoff, 1971; Starke, 1973). At base in this form of revision is the assumption that if psychoanalytic theory can be systematically operationalized, then acceptance within the academic-scientific community will be realized. Systematization here is systematization in reference to experimental methodology. In the case of Rapaport's work, this type of revision draws from contemporary learning theory, as does the reformulation by Breger & McGaugh (1965).

A second direction is shown in the increased tendency to emulate the concepts and practices of the successful natural and biological sciences. For example, Hartmann (1964) has noted that progress in physics, chemistry, and biology has led to demands that psychoanalysis reformulate its theories in accord with these developments. Thus, when Kubie (1956, p. 46)

announces that "...we need help from the exact sciences in making our own concepts more precise...", he is speaking of a further emulation of natural science concepts and procedures without regard for the fundamental differences in the phenomena studied by psychoanalysis and the natural sciences.

Lastly, revisions sought through an emulation of natural science exactness have been extended to the use and emulation of technology. For example, Kubie (1964, p. 75), believes that

...the application of principles based on models derived from modern electronic engineering, communications engineering, mathematical machinery, digital and analogic computers, and electronic devices in general, will clarify much that at present is confused and muddy in psychoanalytic theory, concepts and terminology, and eventually will furnish us with further techniques for critical self-examination.

This section has examined psychoanalysis from the viewpoint of the scientific research interest, or what Radnitzky (1973, p. 234) has termed the "pure psychoanalytic situation." That is, psychoanalysis has been examined as a knowledge-gathering, empirical theory having experimental validity. The scientific status of psychoanalysis was examined through comments from both its critics and adherents. Taken together, these comments characterize psychoanalysis as assuming both natural scientific approach and methods. Calls for revision, whether they be in theory or specific content, bear a reference to the authority of established scientific method. Consequently,

whether announced by certain critics or defenders, revisions in psychoanalysis take for granted that science is natural science with a priority on method, and modifications remain within that approach.

2.3.3. Methodological-content revisions in psychoanalysis as emancipatory practice

The preceding section examined the scientific status of psychoanalysis as an empirically capable, research oriented discipline. This section examines psychoanalysis from a different horizon. Rather than critiques based on scientific method and research interests, these criticisms of psychoanalysis deal with matters of therapeutic interest. Here, as Needleman (1975) points out, the overriding concern is the health of the analysand, and intention which distinguishes psychoanalysis from pure science and places it back within the values of applied medicine. Similarly, Radnitzky (1974, p. 248) has termed this interest of psychoanalysis as the "therapeutically oriented psychoanalytic situation." Knowledge here is useful only insofar as it contributes to health. Therefore, the varied modifications of psychoanalysis expressed in its divergent schools are understood here by examining them in reference to their emancipatory interest, i.e., health. This angle is chosen because the differential schools of psychoanalysis began chiefly from a praxis rather than academic context, and modifications originate from practitioners in that situation.

Seen this way, criticism and revision have a long history within the historical community of psychoanalysis (Ellenberger, 1970; Guntrip, 1969, 1971; Monroe, 1955; Ruitenbeek, 1967; Wyss, 1966). Central in these developments is a concern over what is to be the accepted subject matter. Consequently, when revisions in technique and content occur, these revisions remain essentially within the pre-given approach and attitude toward the phenomena (Boss, 1963; Guntrip, 1969; Skirbekk, 1976; Van Kaam, 1966).

These revisions arise chiefly from clinical practice, and while they remain within the existing approach, they nonetheless owe their origin to concrete, pre-theoretical experience within the therapeutic situation. Hartmann (1964, p. 142) sees this connection when he says that "progress in the development of analysis is mostly based on clinical discoveries."

For example, Ellenberger (1970, pp. 605-606) reports that Adler's revisions through such concepts as inferiority, compensation, and the significance of sex roles arise from the observation that his patients possessed an unusual frequency of secondary sex characteristics of the opposite sex. This led him to posit a "psychological hermaphroditism" which he saw as a factor in experienced inferiority, and in compensatory strivings of the masculine protest. His revision of the classic understanding of the Oedipal situation stems from these kinds of observations.

Similarly, Jung's work with psychotics at the Burghölzli Clinic revealed the limits of orthodox psychoanalysis in under-

standing the significance of symbolic content in therapy. As he states it,

This analytic-reductive procedure did not, however, furnish such enlightening results in regard to the rich and surprising symbolism in patients of this kind as we had been accustomed to expect from the same method in cases of hysteria (1960, Vol. 3, pp. 179-180).

From occasions like this, Jung became convinced of the centrality of symbolism in the lives of his patients, and his doctrine of the archetypes and the synthetic-prospective method are revisions that arise primarily from practice in the interest of his patients' health.

Among the ego-psychologists, Hartmann (1970) has urged a focus on conscious ego processes rather than instincts in psychoanalytic work. The therapeutic impetus for this change is a recognition of the widespread significance of conflict and adaptation as "...the process of coming to terms with the environment" (1970, p. 7). For Hartmann, a focus on instincts does not allow the analyst to comprehend adaptation as well as the shift to ego processes.

The work of Horney, Sullivan, and Fromm urges a focus on the interpersonal, social dimensions of human functioning (Guntrip, 1973; Hall & Lindzey, 1970). For example, Horney (1937) came to see that the experience of herself and her patients could not be fully comprehended by Freud's emphasis on individual, personal experience reduced to biology. For her, personal transformation meant acknowledging living as

socially contextualized. As she (ibid., p. viii) states it, ...neuroses are generated not only by incidental individual experiences, but also by the specific cultural conditions under which we live. In fact, the cultural conditions not only lend weight and color to the individual experiences but in the last analysis determine their particular form. It is an individual's fate, for example, to have a domineering or a self sacrificing mother, but it is only under definite cultural conditions that we find domineering or self sacrificing mothers, and it is also only because of these existing conditions that such an experience will have an influence on later life.

Finally, the British object-relations tradition (Fairbairn, 1952, 1963; Guntrip, 1969, 1971; Winnicott, 1965, 1971, 1975) has argued that pre-Oedipal differences in the quality of the parent-child relationship take a priority over instincts and ego processes in psychoanalytic work. Winnicott's experience as a pediatrician and child therapist presented anomalies not comprehended by the orthodox position. Following Melanie Klein's work from 1921-1945 (1975, Vol. 1), Winnicott deemphasized the significance of the Oedipal occasion and focused on relationships occurring much earlier in a manner different from orthodox psychoanalysis. Similarly, Fairbairn's emphasis on pre-Oedipal relationships derives from his therapeutic experience. After conducting several cases of "successful"

orthodox analyses, Fairbairn found that structures associated with pre-Oedipal infantile dependence remained. This led him to a radical reconceptualization of the person, psychopathology, and psychotherapy, which in some respects is similar in its foundations to a phenomenological approach (Alapack, 1975; Guntrip, 1969).

2.3.4. Reflection on methodological revisions in empirical theory and methodological- content revisions in therapeutic practice

Revisions expressed within the therapeutic context are not as easily distinguished in terms of approach-method-content as they were when research was the guiding interest. This is so because the paradigm for scientific experimentation had already been well established (Boring, 1957; Heidbreder, 1961). Consequently, questions concerning the nature of the phenomena, and the methods utilized were generally uniform and able to be taken for granted. "Scientific" was in reference to scientific method, and the revisions called for in the empirical theory of psychoanalysis were emphatically methodological.

On the other hand, developments within the practicing psychoanalytic community were and are essentially pre-paradigmatic. Each of the divergent theorists presented began from anomalies which could not be accounted for by the psychoanalysis of Freud. Put another way, a univocal definition of what constitutes good analytic therapy in the interest of health does not exist, whereas the meaning of good science is heavily institutionalized.

Nevertheless, distinctions in approach-method-content do exist among the revisions in therapeutic theory and practice. In the therapeutic setting, revisions began with a concern over what was to be the subject matter of analytic work, and modifications in technique and method derive from that. Distinguishing this "what" at either the approach or content level asks for an abstract distinction, since the relations between approach-method-content are reciprocally dialectical (Giorgi, 1970). Therefore, these revisions must be seen as participating in both aspects of this dialectic.

For example, these revisions clearly ask for the inclusion of new content, i.e., compensation, symbolism, infantile dependence. Moreover, approach is affected since each of the theorists experienced the significance of different aspects of the situation, or different situations. These theorist/practitioners, therefore, possessed differing conceptions of the phenomena present to them. However, approach in these terms is modified in only a limited sense.

To illustrate this, two perspectives of the concept of approach must be distinguished, following the work of Giorgi (1969, 1970, 1973c). One meaning of the term approach indicates differing conceptions of the phenomenon being studied as these conceptions are implied in differing theories. Van Kaam (1966), for example, would refer to these conceptions as differing pre-scientific visions of the phenomenon implicit in differential theories of psychology. Accordingly, in this examination, Freud's psychoanalysis views the person as predominantly a psychobiological phenomenon, Adler's person is a social

phenomenon; Jung's person is mytho-symbolic, and so on. Each of these theorist/practitioners conceives of its subject differently; consequently, in this limited sense, approach is affected. However, the term approach has a second, broader meaning. Following Husserl (1969, 1970a), phenomenological scholars and scientists have recognized that scientific activity takes place within a cultural context having taken for granted philosophical, social, economic, spiritual, and personal assumptions that inform the practical work of the scientist and citizen. Husserl referred to these cultural influences and their effect on experience and action with the term the "natural attitude" of everyday life. Phenomenology is both an attitude and method for clarity about and emancipation from these influences. Insofar as all the revisions in therapeutic practice are systematic theories which remain within what Giorgi (1970) has detailed as the natural science approach, itself an expression of the natural attitude, approach in this broader sense is not affected by these revisions. This is why Boss (1963, p. 80) criticizes these post-Freudian revisions by saying that,

They all, however, are still unable to make sufficiently explicit, and to portray adequately, the unclarified and implicit understanding of man, which is at the basis of psychoanalytic practice from the moment of its inception.

In summary, both revisions in the empirical theory of psychoanalysis and those taking place in the interest of clinical practice have overlooked this larger meaning of

approach. Consequently revisions in psychoanalytic theory have been limited to method and content. Approach has been affected by virtue of its implication in the divergent, differential post-Freudian theories; however, in the larger, cultural sense of the term, no significant revisions have occurred in the approach. This problem must, therefore, be overcome in this work's later, specific revision of the psychoanalytic unconscious.

2.4 Revisions in the approach of psychoanalysis

2.4.1. The problem of approach in psychoanalysis

The concept of approach has already been described as essentially a philosophical question. My own interpretation of this coincides with Merleau-Ponty's (1963) understanding of philosophy as attitude. Here, philosophy is not some specialized methodological discipline cut off from other disciplines. Rather, philosophy is an "...ability to withdraw and gain distance in order to become truly engaged, which is, also, always an engagement in the truth" (p. 60).

This attitude, I believe, aptly describes the phenomenological endeavor to clarify the tacit assumptions and guiding influences within the psychoanalytic approach. In this section I will maintain that Freud failed to sufficiently do this, and that consequently the data and theory of psychoanalysis remain limited by the approach upon which psychoanalysis was founded.

Seen historically, Freud's psychoanalysis is both a specific method of treatment for psychological disorders as well as a comprehensive, systematic psychology of the individual, society, and culture (Hall & Lindzey, 1970; Holt, 1974; Rapaport, 1960; Shakow & Rapaport, 1960). Freud's original intentions were aimed at practice, to alleviate the disorders of a suffering humanity. From these intentions, the writings of Freud show more and more time devoted to the theoretical clarification of psychoanalytic practice, and his later essays extend beyond the therapeutic aims to a comprehensive, general psychology (Freud, 1959, Vol. 4; Jones, 1957, Vol. 3). These later papers deal with what Freud in 1901 first called his metapsychology, a concept already mentioned as sharing similarities to the term approach.

The metapsychology which Freud adopted prefigured, the nature of psychoanalytic thought, and limited its ability to deal with the human subject. In the introduction to the Abstracts of Freud's completed psychological works, Holt (1974) argues that this duality of intentions, between the praxis concern with a suffering humanity and a metapsychology capable of being included into science, is a dualism running through Freud's work as a whole. In Holt's (p. 3) words, there exists a "...pervasive, unresolved conflict within all of Freud's writings between two antithetical images." On the one hand is what Holt calls the humanistic image of man, visible in Freud's therapeutic concerns, personal letters, and writings on culture. On the other hand is Freud's devotion to metapsychology, in the form of a comprehensive, systematic foundation "...modeled on

a mid-nineteenth century grasp of physics and chemistry."

This effort is supported by what Holt calls Freud's mechanistic image of man.

I maintain, with others, that this mechanism arises from the metapsychology of psychoanalysis, which never fully liberated itself from Freud's 1895 Project for a scientific psychology (Boss, 1963; Guntrip, 1969; Ricoeur, 1970; Smith, 1975; Solomon, 1974). The aim of the Project is a quantitative explanation of human functioning in terms of energy and specifiable material particles corresponding to psychological states. Amacher (1965) has superbly detailed the influence of Freud's neurological education, and his commitment to the mechanistic physiology of Helmholtz and Brücke, in the establishment of the approach underlying psychoanalysis. It is well known that Freud abandoned the Project as a formal effort; nevertheless, its status as approach continues to inform the structure of psychoanalytic thought.

This interpretation of the significance of the Project is well established in the literature. For example, Solomon (1974, p. 28) has argued that the neurological theory of the Project is:

...what Thomas Kuhn has called a paradigm of psychoanalytic theory. Even where it is not mentioned as such, it provides the model of explanation, it circumscribes the data and their interpretation, and it gives form to the psychoanalytic model which is typically but wrongly supposed to be derived from clinical observation.

Moreover, as Solomon (p. 28) goes on to show, the editors of Freud's Standard Edition have recognized this influence of the Project on the completed works when they say, "But in fact the Project, or rather its invisible ghost, haunts the whole series of Freud's theoretical writings to the very end."

This conflict between the approach and humanistic aims of psychoanalysis is the basis for the phenomenological criticism that psychoanalysis addresses exquisitely human data through an approach originally designed for non-human things.

Two interrelated problems result from this. On the one hand, developments in the theoretical superstructure of psychoanalysis may progress without essential changes in the metapsychological base. For according to Shakow (1969, p. 104), the metapsychological assumptions "...are not highly dependent on the psychoanalytic method, or on the primary data." Thus, a separation can and does exist between the approach and articulated theory of psychoanalysis. The other problem arising from this conflict is the separation between theory and clinical practice. This has already been identified as "...the notorious gap between psychoanalytic theory and practice" (Boss, 1963, p. 58). The latter author notes that while the therapeutic aim of psychoanalysis is directed toward human understanding and transformation, the metapsychological theory is cast in a "speculative superstructure" informed by dated natural science assumptions applied to human existence (p. 75). This same point is argued by Schafer (1976, p. 20), who argues similarly that "...there is a large gap between the metapsychological language and the assumptions about people, their problems, and

the transformations that guide and inform the work of clinical psychoanalysis." Thus, disjunctions between theory and practice also have their roots in the problem of approach. The approach affects not only what data are deemed significant in clinical practice, but also how they are theoretically conceived (Giorgi, 1970).

This work, therefore, maintains that a congruence between the theory and practice of psychoanalysis can only be achieved by a theoretical revision at the level of approach. This is important for several reasons. First of all, the theory of analysis is codified, institutionalized, and passed on to successive generations of analysts, psychologists, and psychiatrists. The experience of conducting or participating in the analysis, left unreflected, is not institutionalized and passed on (Giorgi, 1973a). Considering Holt's (1974) remark that the mechanistic image of man underlies Freud's metapsychology, the priority of a revision at the level of approach is absolutely necessary. This is especially necessary in so central a theme as the unconscious. The written word of psychoanalysis is its articulated theory, which not only guides the practice of contemporary analysts, but also contributes heavily to the training of future analysts.

2.4.2. Justification for the criticisms
of the philosophical and explanatory
nature of the psychoanalytic approach

Criticisms of the philosophical character and explanatory nature of the psychoanalytic approach are well established in

the literature (Alapack, 1975; Barton, 1974; Binswanger, 1975; Boss, 1963; Buytendijk, 1967; Fischer, W., 1970, 1971; Giorgi, 1970, 1970b, 1975; Guntrip, 1969; Keen, 1970, 1975; Kohut, 1977; Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 1966, 1968a, 1968b; Needleman, 1975; Ricoeur, 1970; Schafer, 1976; Skirbekk, 1976; Smith, 1975; Van den Berg, 1955, 1972, 1974; Van Kaam, 1966). In contrast to the revisions discussed earlier, these phenomenological psychologists, and analysts concerned with approach, have produced a significant body of literature which expresses an appreciation for the insights and transformative power of psychoanalysis along with the criticism that psychoanalytic thought and practice is hindered by the approach it subsumes.

These human scientists hold that, as with the establishment of psychology as a science, psychoanalysis uncritically adopted an approach which became institutionalized in the early development of the natural sciences. The consequence of this event for both psychology and psychoanalysis is the application of an approach originally designed for thing-like existences of the natural world to human existence.

Accordingly, in what follows I will first present a general characterization of this approach, drawing from the literature cited above. This characterization will highlight the philosophical features and explanatory nature of this approach. This plan is chosen for two reasons. First, this direction will add understanding to the later appearing criticisms and calls for revision when the psychoanalytic approach is considered as a "puzzle-solving" paradigm. Second, this presentation of the Cartesian approach will be compared

to the alternative in a phenomenological approach in Chapter III, and to specific features of the psychoanalytic unconscious, found in Chapter IV.

2.4.3. Philosophical features of a natural science approach in psychoanalysis

As already indicated, criticisms of the philosophical underpinnings of psychoanalysis are well established in the literature. I will, therefore, not review these sources individually here. A general summary, instead, reveals that criticism centers on an implicit conception of human existence in the following terms.

The object of psychoanalysis is objectified, psycho-biological man, as seen through the approach of Cartesian inspired natural science. Accordingly, the subject is seen as existing separate and distinct from the world; consciousness, body, and world are viewed as originally divorced entities. The latter two terms comprise the res extensa of Descartes.

Following Ricoeur (1970), the energetics of libido, and its flow, may be seen as a metaphor of the subject-world relationship. Beginning from the position that subject and world are originally divorced, auxiliary hypotheses are necessary to account for the given unity of relationships found in perceptual experience. For example, libido and object, although pre-existent prior to their relationship, achieve unity and connection through the hypothesis of cathexis. Further separations of consciousness (idea) and body (affect)

are, likewise, pre-existent and separate until united through cathexis. This approach not only substantively divorced subjectivity from body and world, but also localized the original unity of these relationships and their meaning within an objectivized psychic apparatus. Thus, relationships having meaning became internalized as internal objects within the intrapsychic subject. Mechanisms require energy; therefore the hypotheses of discharge, repression, and sublimation are invoked to account for the quantitative distribution of the endopsychic, energy economy. The inner world of the individual (subjectivity) is seen as separate and distinct from an outer, objective world, and projection becomes another auxiliary hypothesis necessary to account for the perceptual meaning of the world and other people. Psychobiological determinism is another important assumption within this approach. History, here, acts not as ground, in the Gestalt psychological sense, but as discrete determiner. For example, the nature of experience, behavior, and motivation is already prefigured by the collision of biologically based, instinctual aims with environmental circumstances in a fixed sequence of psychosexual development. Accordingly, the relations between the person, his past, other people, and life activities is significantly determined by the events taking place during that historical development. Thus, psychic determinism is a central assumption within psychoanalysis, and has the status of cause within this Cartesian approach. Conflict is another theme in psychoanalysis conceived in a Cartesian manner. Conflict is an everyday feature of human existence, and psychoanalysis certainly

addresses itself to this theme. However, with dualism being a paramount feature of Cartesian science, psychoanalysis, consequently, views conflict in a two-factor, binary manner. For example, the psychoanalytic approach abounds with such dualisms as: life instinct - death instinct, libido - aggression, pleasure principle - reality principle, cathexis - anti-cathexis, id impulse - ego defense, ego cathexis - object cathexis, conscious - unconscious, manifest content - latent content, symptom - cause. Thus, postulates of duality in Cartesian science are obvious here.

The Cartesian approach also informs how the analyst relates to the analysand. Fundamental to this approach is the assumption that the "real" nature of things is to be found outside the standpoint of a person's perceptual experience. Subjectivity and the appearance of things are fluctuating, unreliable indexes to the real nature of things. Instead, following Galilean-Cartesian science, this approach begins with nomothetic method which focuses on unchanging, privileged aspects of a phenomenon. Accordingly, psychoanalysis as method begins with an "independent schema" (Lyons, 1963), through which the nature of the phenomena as sexual or aggressive is determined in advance, and the real is discovered behind the fluctuating multiperspectivity of phenomenal appearances. For example, sexuality and aggression constitute the real nature of causes behind the appearances of symptoms, the privileged latent content meaning in the manifest appearance of dreams, and the real motivations expressed behind parapraxes. Transference and free association are fundamental contents in the

analytic setting to be seen similarly in this way. In short, whereas Galilean-Cartesian scientists hold the mathematical perspectives of their phenomena as the invariantly real, the orthodox psychoanalyst substitutes unconscious sexuality and aggression.

The emancipatory aims of psychoanalysis within the interpersonal, therapeutic relationship are also influenced by this approach. For example, the free movement of bodies, fluids, and electricity occupy a central area in the physics of Descartes' time, and is described through the term dynamics. Correlatively, impediments to that movement are termed resistance. In the psychodynamics of orthodox psychoanalysis the emancipation of unconscious energy and meaning is a central aim in the health of the analysand. Accordingly, the physicalistic metaphors of Descartes also find their place in how this emancipation is conceived. This is evident in a description of how the intrapsychic economy of the analysand functions, as well as how the analyst tacitly views the interpersonal relationship to the analysand. For example, in Freud's earlier writings, the emancipation of energy and meaning was viewed intrapsychically. Resistances were situated in the interaction of opposing forces and structures within the psychic apparatus. Intrapsychic blocks and repression between one part of the apparatus and other parts described this resistance and struggle. Later writings by Freud, however, carried this approach over to an explanation of the resistance occurring between the analysand and analyst. Opposition between forces and structures then became situated interpersonally, and transference and

countertransference became key themes to be identified as positive or negative, terms borrowed from magnetism and nerve functioning. Finally, the idea of independent observer separate from a world existing in itself co-constitutes the psychoanalyst's disengaged stance of anonymity and the control of personal experience (countertransference) in the relationship to the analysand. When viewed within the assumptions of clinical psychoanalytic methodology, anonymity and countertransference control have obvious benefits for the analysand in the therapeutic process. Nevertheless, these themes are reflective of presuppositions within a Cartesian science approach.

In summary, this section has presented a general picture of the pre-theoretical, philosophical approach implicit in psychoanalysis, and has drawn this from the previously cited literature. Selected examples were drawn from orthodox psychoanalysis. Derivative analytic schools are also situated within this approach, although their specific modifications in content and technique do differ. However, to emphasize again, the Cartesian approach informs the entire scope of generic psychoanalysis in one degree or another (Barton, 1974; Boss, 1963; Schafer, 1976; Van den Berg, 1974; Van Kaam, 1966). Themes of positivism, reductionism, genetic bias, determinism, and independent observer are consequences descriptive of this approach (Giorgi, 1970). This will be further clarified by now turning to consider the explanatory nature of the psychoanalytic approach.

2.4.4. The explanatory nature of the psychoanalytic approach

The previously described approach necessitates another feature of the psychoanalytic approach, its explanatory mode of dealing with the data. Explanation arises from a metaphysical position in psychology through which subject and world are originally separate and distinct. A consequence of this presupposition is the necessity to then explain how the lived unity of relationships between consciousness, body, and world are achieved. Hence, in dualistic theories of sensation and perception some auxiliary organizational agency is required to account for this unity (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b; Straus, 1963). Freud (1939), for example, describes the functioning of the psychic apparatus in this manner within Chapter 7 of The interpretation of dreams.

This explanation of an assumed dualism takes the form of a cause-effect analysis, which posits something extra-conscious that always underlies the phenomenon, is never directly perceived, but is nevertheless deduced (Jaspers, 1972). For example, Jaspers (p. 305) says that "in thinking about causes in psychology we need elements which we can take as cause or effect, i.e., a bodily event as cause, an hallucination as an effect." In fact, for Jaspers, the dominance of the discrete causal presupposition and the presupposition of that cause as unperceptible and underlying the phenomenal appearances are two propositions basic to all explanatory theories. Foucault (1976, p. 6) has termed these two propo-

sitions the "essentialist prejudice." For example, he points out that historical medicine grasped a specific illness as an entity, which is inferred from the symptoms through which it is manifest. However, the "essentialist prejudice" exists when the essence of that illness is believed to be an entity that is anterior to and unseen, being judged as somewhat independent of the symptoms which it causes. The Cartesian assumptions of essence existing apart from existential appearances, and the invocation of cause as outside perceptual experience are obvious here. The approach underlying this "[explanatory]... science demands the reduction of phenomena to fact, fact being understood as a phenomenon devoid of consciousness and human selfhood" (Giorgi, 1970, p. 73).

The nature of explanation, and its place in psychoanalysis may be more clearly understood in the detailed analysis done by Needleman (1975). Needleman indicates that the natural sciences form an explanatory system, and he places psychoanalysis within that context. Explanation is to be sharply distinguished from descriptive approaches with their interest in understanding. For example, an approach aimed at understanding begins from an approach of metaphysical monism, i.e., Being-in-the-world. The unity of this intentional (Husserl, 1969) relationship requires description as an appropriate methodological beginning. For example, in a theory of perception no explanation nor organizational principle is required since no dualisms pre-exist. Accordingly, there is no need to move outside perceptual consciousness in order to explain it. Structure and organization are autochthonous to

experience (Gurwitsch, 1964). Therefore, as Needleman (1975) goes on, an approach aimed at understanding seeks to describe the object (presence) as it was actually present to the experiencing subject(s) during the time it was originally experienced. Furthermore, description occurs prior to, and temporarily sets in abeyance, ontological judgments and pre-existing theoretical interpretations concerning the phenomenon in question. In contrast, explanatory systems always both reduce and transcend the phenomenal appearances. Understanding, indeed, does take place within an explanatory system, however, "...only insofar as it [understanding] is related, reduced, transformed into that which we have previously understood" (Needleman, 1975, p. 39). This reductive, transcending nature of explanatory, natural science is further clarified when Needleman (p. 38) says that explanation either

...seeks to reduce phenomena to what it believes to be ultimate laws or ultimate reality. [or] it records, along with the phenomenon all interpretations of that phenomenon, so that what it gives us is not the phenomenon that really lies before us, but the phenomenon as encrusted with phenomenon-transcending references and interpretations, i.e., the phenomenon as already reduced.

To re-emphasize, reduction and transcendence follow from the earlier mentioned presuppositions that the real nature of the phenomenon lies outside or behind its perceptual appearance, and exists as extra-conscious in the realm of res extensa or

pure corporeality. Accordingly, the phenomenon, as given is transcended, and privileged perspectives are determined in advance and reduced through method.

The nature of the scientist's relationship to the object of study is also a factor in explanatory systems. With the priority on method, and the assumption that the real nature of the phenomenon exists independent of the scientist's subjectivity (secondary qualities of object), then the scientist seeks "... to keep the self out of its world as it investigates 'the' world" (Needleman, 1975, p. 41). Subjectivity is seen as a contamination to researching the object; therefore, scientific objectivity and explanation consist in its control and exclusion (Colaizzi, 1973; Keen, 1975; Leiss, 1972).

The explanatory schema outlined above has a continuous, historical influence, as an aspect of the approach informing early physics, nonholistic biology, medicine, and psychoanalysis. Psychological scholars have documented in detail this influence throughout these disciplines, noting how the presuppositions of dualism, reductionism, transcendence, and cause, as extra-conscious yet accessible through method, have inhabited psychoanalysis and these precursor disciplines (Amacher, 1965; Binswanger, 1975; Izenberg, 1976; Needleman, 1975; Zilboorg, 1941). Furthermore, other sources have accomplished equally detailed analyses of the role of explanation in psychoanalysis as a general psychology (Boss, 1963; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1954; Gill, 1963; Hartmann, 1964; Jaspers, 1972; Needleman, 1975; Rapaport, 1960).

Accordingly, I will not repeat these historical analyses

of how explanation developed through science into psychoanalysis, nor will I review the many, specific explanatory features in psychoanalytic general psychology. I have already alluded to some of these features in my section on the Philosophical features of the natural science approach in psychoanalysis. Instead, I will present two examples to illustrate how explanation functions; first in Freud's innovation to make psychoanalysis the subjectivity within a natural science approach, and second, to examine the explanatory role of the economic, dynamic, structural, genetic, and adaptive assumptions as necessary features of psychoanalytic metapsychology.

2.4.5. Explanation in the establishment of psychoanalysis

Explanation was central to the initial establishment of psychoanalysis. However, the approach pre-given for scientific study posed a contradiction in the study of subjectivity in the clinical situation directly encountered by Freud. The objective world, Descartes' res extensa, was studied only insofar as it was stripped of subjectivity. How, then, could subjectivity, held scientifically unreliable in the Galilean-Cartesian tradition, become a legitimate focus for scientific study? This is the question posed by Needleman (1975).

Freud replied to this problem by initiating what Kuhn (1970) has called a paradigm change. Freud (1959, Vol. 4) began by noting that the prevailing introspective study of individual consciousness could not fully account for the phenomena of psychopathology and everyday life psychological anomalies.

Accordingly, psychologies taking this position made the assumption that the mental (psychische) was identical to consciousness as awareness, and were incomplete in accounting for the clinical phenomena Freud faced. To close this gap between existing approach and anomolous phenomena, Freud redefined the mind. He argued that the mental was not synonymous with consciousness, but must include unconscious regions, conceived of as extra-conscious causes producing the appearances of behavior and languaged experience in psychopathology and everyday life. Hence, Freud (1959, Vol. 4, p. 99) posited the unconscious as "...a necessary and legitimate hypothesis," which allowed him to explain psychological phenomena previously unaccounted for.

In redefining the mental through the inclusion of the unconscious, Freud brilliantly transposed the causal antecedents of consciousness and behavior into the world of things (Umwelt), understood through the explanatory matrix of Cartesian science (Binswanger, 1975; Boss, 1963; Needleman, 1975; Smith, 1975). Pre-1920 psychoanalysis emphasized the unconscious (das Unbewusste) as a topographical locale containing instincts as the corporeal givens. Philosophically, instincts are extra-conscious, independent elements within the biological realm of res extensa. For example, Fischer, W. (1970, p. 5) emphasizes this explanatory, natural scientific conception of the unconscious when he says:

...the stuff of the unconscious (instincts)
...are the biological, quantitative, corporeal
givens of human nature... they are legitimate
constructs of natural science. Thus, that which

had been labeled as merely subjective, as un-
amenable to the formulations of science, can in
fact, be grounded in constructs that are
completely acceptable to the scientific community.
Moreover, in Freud's 1915 essay on The unconscious he is quite
emphatic in stating that the instincts are causal determiners,
yet are perceptually independent from consciousness in that
they can never be directly known. Thus, the conception of the
unconscious within this explanatory system assigns the
unconscious to the "privileged position" of the real behind the
appearances, the true reality, but the nature of this reality
is divorced of and from human subjectivity and selfhood
(Needleman, 1975). This is nowhere more boldly stated than
in Chap. VII of the Interpretation of dreams, when Freud (1938,
p. 542) gives the unconscious the privileged status of the
real, and italicizes its ultimate unknowable nature.

The unconscious is the true psychic reality;
in its inner nature it is just as much unknown
to us as the reality of the external world,
and it is just as imperfectly communicated to
us by the data of consciousness as is the
external world by the reports of our sense
organs.

The above distinction between internal and external reality,
conceived as pre-existing dualities, is not mere metaphor.
Freud (1938, p. 548) is quite explicit on this point when he
says that "...we should still do well to remember that psychic
reality is a special form of existence which must not be

confounded with material reality."

In review, psychoanalysis was erected on an approach drawn from the presuppositions of Cartesian science. Given this framework, the relationships between the appearance of symptoms, behavior, and languaged experience necessitate explanation as a conceptual mode of accounting for clinical psychoanalytic phenomena. Proposed criteria for explanation include the themes of cause-effect, both a reduction and transcendence of the phenomenally given, and deterministic agent (the unconscious) as extra-conscious. These features characterize the centrality and necessity of explanation in the establishment of psychoanalysis.

2.4.6. Explanation in psychoanalytic metapsychological postulates

Explanation also has a central place in what Freud called his metapsychology. Used in this context, metapsychology is not synonymous with a general, philosophical Weltanschauung. Metapsychology, instead, designates systematic accounts of psychological phenomena from diverse and varying explanatory points of view within the superstructure of psychoanalytic theory.

For instance, by 1915 Freud (1959, Vol. 4, p. 114) had specified the necessity for three such viewpoints, saying "I propose that when we succeed in describing a mental process in all its aspects, dynamic, topographic and economic, we shall call this a metapsychological presentation." Later, three other viewpoints were added to these original three. For

example, The ego and the id (1962a), first published in 1923, supplied a completed formulation of the structural determinant. Similarly, a genetic determinant was implicit in the 1905 publication of the Three contributions to the theory of sex. The genetic determinants were further refined and elaborated in the work of Abraham (1927), and in the developmental considerations within the ego psychology of Hartmann, Kris & Loewenstein (1946). Finally, an adaptive viewpoint was suggested in 1911 through Freud's (1959, Vol. 4) Formulations regarding the two principles of mental functioning. The principle of adaptation achieved greater attention in the period following 1923, when Freud's work focused on the ego and the problem of object-relations, and the global adaptive problems posed in Civilization and its discontents (1962b). Hartmann's (1970) work is a comprehensive, systematic account which focuses on the problem of adaptation, and its role in the superstructure of psychoanalytic thought.

The meaning, historical development, and role of these explanatory postulates in Freud's general psychology have already received a detailed, systematic presentation (Gill, 1963; Rapaport, 1960). Accordingly, I will not repeat these analyses here.

Instead, following Radnitzky (1973), I want to emphasize that the metapsychological postulates within the scope of a general, explanatory psychoanalysis further express the criteria for explanatory natural science, as when explanation was examined earlier in the establishment of psychoanalysis. Globally, these criteria emphasized both a transcendence and

reduction of the given phenomena, and moved to extra-conscious determinants as a basis for scientific theory construction. In this process, method assumed a priority, and was a consequence of the adopted approach.

Accordingly, specific metapsychological postulates possess these criteria, and function as explanatory theorems and laws, or in Rapaport's (1960) terms, as determiners in the explanatory, Cartesian inspired approach of psychoanalysis. Radnitzky (1973, p. 151) makes this clear when he says:

If one places the problem of explanation in the center, if one concentrates on producing a theory of explanation, one will regard the problem of explicating "Theory," "Laws," etc. as a type-problem that is opened up by the study of explanation; and one will conceive the theory of explanation in such a way that it incorporates a theory about theories and laws. If one makes this gambit, it will be natural to regard theories primarily as instruments for producing explanations...

Furthermore, Radnitzky (1973) terms this form of explanatory model building positivistic. In this form of theory-construction model, the nature or meaning of the phenomenally given is always referenced and subordinated to criteria stipulated by the sub-theories within the overall explanatory supertheory.

This positivistic model is illustrated in the relationship between the overall explanatory aim of psychoanalysis and its metapsychological postulates. For example, Freud (1943,

p. 338) clearly states this aim when he says that "Psychoanalysis aims at and achieves nothing more than the discovery of the unconscious in mental life." This goal is a consequence of the role of explanation in the establishment of psychoanalysis--the explanation of behavior, languaged experience, and psychopathology by unconscious factors. I will term this the superstructural, explanatory goal of psychoanalysis.

Following Radnitzky's (1973) earlier mentioned example, specific metapsychological postulates function as substructural explanatory theorems or laws, and are necessitated by the overall aim of explanation. Furthermore, the relationship between the sub- and superstructural explanations is bound by the common assumption of a throughgoing psychological determinism (Holt, 1968; Gill, 1963; Rapaport, 1959). Allied to this assumption is another, termed overdetermination. That is, all the specific metapsychological propositions must be present and in accord with each other in the superstructural account of any given behavior. Rapaport (1959, p. 105), for example, says that "the determiners of behavior in this theory are so defined that they apply to all behavior and thus their empirical referents must be present in any and all behavior." Accordingly, an ensemble of fixed determiners of a psychological phenomenon form the substructure in the explanatory matrix of the psychoanalytic approach.

Each of the substructural determiners expresses the earlier stipulated criteria for explanation in a Cartesian approach. In now moving to demonstrate this, I will, following Holzman (1970), list six metapsychological postulates as I had

done earlier. A general summary of each of the propositions will draw from the earlier cited work (Gill, 1963; Holt, 1968; Rapaport, 1959, 1960). Moreover, this summary is in accord with Freud's (1969) final statements in the 1940 Outline of psycho-analysis.

Explanations within the topographic model form the super-structural goal of psychoanalysis. The central assumption is that experience and behavior, hereafter referred to as "experi-ation" (von Eckartsberg, 1971a, p. 78), is unconsciously determined through inherent corporeal instincts, and a topographical distribution of energy and meaningful impulses. I have already described this explanation in my section on the role of explanation in the establishment of psychoanalysis. Therein, the criteria of transcendence, reduction, and extra-conscious cause were made explicit.

The dynamic postulate requires that psychoanalytic explanation include an account of psychological forces and their conflict. In short, all experi-ation is drive-determined. This proposition stresses that motives are the result of biologically based, extra-conscious drives inherent in the organism. Further, a distinction is made between the pre-given drive force (libido) and the object to which it cathects. Freud's (1969, p. 6) final statement on the instinctual drives makes a clear declaration that the drives are twofold, "eros and the destructive instinct." Thus, the phenomenon is reduced to sexuality and aggression, and transcended by this binary approach and its role in explanation. A dynamic formulation would also include the role of ego defenses and control as in

repression.

The economic proposition demands that any psychoanalytic explanation include the role of the regulation and distribution of psychic energy, in general, and its drive origin, in particular. Energy is somatic in origin; "...it streams to the ego from various organs and parts of the body" (Freud, 1969, p. 8). Energy is also quantifiable in nature, and obeys such natural physical and neurological laws as entropy, conservation, discharge, and least action. Approached this way, energetic sources and distribution within the intrapsychic economy are extra-conscious determiners of experiaction. Experiaction is reduced to the action of this substructural proposition, and the meaning of the clinical phenomenon is transcended through the assumptions of this postulate. For example, through this proposition, depression may be explained as the inhibition or anti-cathexis of aggressive libidinal energy.

The structural proposition specifies that all experiaction has structural determiners. The early topographic model was replaced in 1923 by the ultimate drive determiners of the id, and the defensive and inhibitive functions of the ego and superego. The id, thereafter, became the source of psychic energy. Further, the ego executed a coordination and regulation of corporeally conceived drives (primary process) with superego limits and reality demands to achieve (secondary process) deferment and acceptable expression of instinctual impulses. The ego, in short, was seen as mediator between the stimulation of the external world, superego limits, and internal id impulses. These hypothetical structures arise in ontogenetic development,

and Freud (1969, p. 20) speaks of localization when he equates the id structure with the unconscious, and the ego with the pre-conscious. As determiner, the id is corporeal, and, therefore, extra-conscious; co-determiners of experience, the ego and superego, are also partially unconscious. The interaction of these assumed structural entities forms the basis for an explanation that both reduces and transcends the phenomenally given. The phenomenon is reduced to the privileged position of sexuality and aggression perspectives of the id as determiner, and the co-determining entities of ego and superego. The latter two, respectively, present reality stimulation from the external world, and prohibitive limits gained from early familial and social object-relations. For example, seen structurally, a psychoneurotic symptom is a compromise solution to the problem of an id impulse, superego censorship, and the ego defense employed against the original id impulse.

The genetic determinant was first explicitly titled as such by Gill & Rapaport (Gill, 1963). Nevertheless, an account of experience from this perspective pervades the scope of Freud's earliest essays on infantile sexuality to his final Outline in 1940. This proposition stipulates that experience is referenced and explained through antecedent conditions in psychosexual development. The assumption here is of a fixed, epigenetic sequence of developmental stages in the early life of the person. Within these stages libido and bodily erogenous zones are cathected and significant themes arise in the life of the child. The stages, oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital are biologically pre-given reference points for libidinal progression,

fixation, and regression. In short, history is in this explanation treated as a determinant of present experience. For example, a neurotic depressive style is determined by a fixation at the oral stage, an obsessive compulsive style by anal determinants, while the hysterical style is reflective of a fixation at the phallic stage. The specific theme of frugality may be explained through a reduction to late-anal retentive defenses. In such an explanation, the meaning of the phenomenon is reduced to an extra-conscious stage of psychosexual development, and the "real" meaning of the phenomenon lies behind its appearance. Further, the phenomenally given is transcended by the assumptions surrounding this determinant.

Finally, the adaptive explanation draws from the determination of experience by reality. In psychoanalytic metapsychology, reality is defined as an external source of stimulation, including the person's bodily proprioception, but excluding the unconscious, somatic id source of drive and affect. Rapaport (1959, p. 97) has pointed to the multiperspective issues raised by the issue of adaptation. Seen psychologically, the question is of the role played by stimuli in determining experience; seen biologically, the question involves an explanation of the relationship between organism and environment, and philosophically the question is "...how one can know of, and act in accord with his environment when his thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of his own nature." Freud's last conception of this determiner places a priority on the role of the ego, reality testing, and the significance of anxiety as a signal of real danger. For example,

id impulses are defended against, because if expressed, a non-adaptive, dangerous situation would be the consequence. Freud (1969, p. 3) indicates the reality testing, mediating role of the ego when he says that adaptation is successful when the ego is capable of satisfying the demands of the id, of the superego, and reality. Elsewhere, Freud (1969, p. 42) includes the socio-cultural situation context for adaptation, saying "We must therefore not forget to include the influence of civilization among the determinants of neurosis." Accordingly, psychoanalytic parlance uses the term reality in a number of ways.

Nevertheless, the overall criteria for Cartesian explanation apply to the postulate of adaptation. Explanation is required because Freud begins from dualities between id impulses--reality consequences, external stimuli--ego, internal stimuli--ego, id impulses--superego restrictions, and person--culture. From this starting point, Freud was required to then explain the phenomenal unity between these factors. A principle of organization is always a necessary feature of dualistic theories of human experience (Murray, 1971). Freud used the ego to accomplish this organization and coordination of forces and entities conceived of as already pre-existent within and without the psychic apparatus. This organization, however, is extra-conscious to the subject's experience of adaptation. Nonetheless, ego activity receives a priority as determiner in Freud's writings on adaptation. Adaptation, as an experienced process, is thereby transcended by this intrapsychic schema, and reduced to extra-conscious organizations of dualistic forces and opposing structures. Accordingly, intrapsychic

reality holds the privileged position as determiner of phenomenal reality in the psychoanalytic explanation of adaptation.

2.4.7. Summary of focus on the psychoanalytic approach

Before proceeding to directly examine the criticisms and calls for revision in approach, a general summary should both clarify the ground covered by this focus on the psychoanalytic approach as well as the further direction of this chapter.

Revisions called for by behavioral psychologists, logical positivist philosophers, and defenders of psychoanalysis take for granted the natural scientific basis of psychoanalysis, and emphasize changes in the method-content areas. The cultural meaning and influence of approach was left unexamined by these calls for revision. Before turning to examine calls for revision at the approach level, I presented material on the approach of psychoanalysis. This presentation was done to both facilitate a clearer understanding of specific criticisms and calls for revision in approach, and provide a basis of comparison for the later appearing alternative in a phenomenological approach, which occupies Chapter III. The psychoanalytic approach was identified as arising from early Cartesian natural science. The philosophical features of this approach were shown to pervade the initial establishment of psychoanalysis, examples drawn from its theory and practice, and in the super- and substructural assumptions of the psychoanalytic explanatory paradigm. With this material as background, I will now turn to examine the specific criticisms

and calls for revisions in the psychoanalytic approach.

2.4.8. Revisions in approach as puzzle-solving paradigm

The consequences of this borrowed approach for psychoanalysis are depicted in criticisms of its approach when considered as a paradigm capable of assimilating and of providing an effective account of human phenomena faithful to human existence. Considered this way, the approach affects both the theoretical comprehension of the phenomena and the quality of clinical practice. Paradigm, here, is meant as a shared constellation of beliefs and rules capable of integrating the phenomena it studies within the parameters of the paradigm. Kuhn (1970, pp. 35-42) calls this the "puzzle-solving" ability of a paradigm. Meant this way, paradigm is not to be equated with method. Instead, paradigm is the pre-scientific vision of the phenomena, the "...incommensurable ways of seeing the world" (ibid., p. 4), which co-determine the choice of contents, how they are conceived, and the methods and techniques utilized.

For example, Giorgi (1970, p. 72) has reviewed criticisms of psychoanalysis and concluded that the intentions, techniques, or methods of psychoanalysis have not been emphasized; instead, criticisms center on "...an almost total rejection of Freud's theory of man." Psychoanalysis is depicted by Giorgi as being incapable of supplying a faithful and inclusive account of human phenomena in an approach that responds to human existence. Similarly, the psychoanalyst Kohut (1977, p. xviii) has concluded that the approach of psychoanalysis "...leads to an erroneous outlook on man." He says:

... with regard to the classical psychoanalytic conception of the nature of man-- however powerful and beautiful it might be-- I have become convinced that it does not do justice to a broad band in the spectrum of human psychopathology and to a great number of other psychological phenomena we encounter outside the clinical situation.

Kohut's criticism is directed at how phenomena are conceived, which also implicates what features of the phenomena are rejected or assimilated within that approach as puzzle-solver. Agreeing with Boss (1963), Van den Berg (1974), and Van Kaam (1966), Kohut sees these limitations expressed throughout orthodox and contemporary psychoanalysis. Schafer (1976) makes a similar point in advocating a complete abandonment of metapsychology in favor of a descriptive "action language" of experiential. May (1959) points to the ambiguity remaining in a knowledge of the therapeutic situation with the adoption of a Cartesian inspired approach. He notes that all of the original members attracted to an alternative, phenomenological approach were analysts trained in the psychoanalytic schools of Freud and Jung. The cultural approach common to these schools did not allow a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena that were clinically encountered. As May (p. 3) states it:

...they could not, so long as they confined themselves to Freudian and Jungian assumptions, arrive at any clear understanding of why these

cures did or did not occur or what was happening in the patient's existence.

Likewise, Ellenberger (1959, p. 95) makes a similar criticism in his historical survey of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. He concludes that a phenomenologically grounded approach became necessary because "... the classical psychological frame of reference, inherited from the eighteenth century, was no longer adequate for the exploration of many psychopathological conditions." Accordingly, Ellenberger shares with May (1959) a criticism of the ability of the analytic approach to validly conceive of its phenomena, including the very effectiveness of the therapeutic process. These points have already been made historically by the pioneer work of Jaspers (1972) and Minkowski (1970). Barton (1974) is also concerned with these issues in his detailed examination of psychoanalysis. He (p. 9) holds that psychoanalysis, like all systematic orientations having this approach, expresses an order and structure; however "... because [psychoanalysis] is not experientially-phenomenologically grounded, the order is a subtly imposed one," and its conception of the phenomena and therapeutic events is often cloaked in ambiguity and arbitrary interpretation. This has radical implications in the understanding of the data that arise in the psychoanalytic setting. For example, Barton holds that the postures and physical arrangement of the analytic setting contribute to co-constitute experiences of dependency, childhood memories, loneliness, and apprehension. He maintains that these typical themes in analysis are usual and expected if one takes into account the cultural meaning of such situations as lying down in the

company of strangers, disclosing one's self to an undisclosing other, and being seen in a prone position by one who sits upright and is not seen. Barton, however, argues that these typical psychoanalytic themes are often, in principle, reduced to biographical conflicts occurring intrapsychically and independent of the cultural horizons inherent in the analytic setting. Barton's position does not deny biographical conflicts. His point is that the approach of psychoanalysis precludes considerations other than the biographical, intrapsychically conceived. Seen as paradigm, this approach does not do justice to the full range of meanings present in the analytic setting. "[It]...overlooks much of the life world, and does so in principle" (p. 247). Barton explains that this is the result of an approach drawn from the early development of the natural sciences, and acquired in the analytic training. The adoption of this approach fosters a lack of insight into the manner that the theory, setting, and participants co-constitute the data and transformations occurring within the analytic setting. Barton's criticisms, accordingly, focus on both what is included as well as how that content is conceived, when approach is considered as problem solving paradigm. His critique has import for the theory, research, and practice of analytic schools of thought. May (1959) concurs with this conclusion. He notes that those psychologists and psychoanalysts criticizing the psychoanalytic approach believed that it "... not only seriously blocked research but would in the long run also seriously limit the effectiveness and development of therapeutic techniques" (p. 5).

In summary, the introduction of the phenomenological view-

point as an approach for analytic insights was grounded in the felt necessity to become more empirical. The orthodox, analytic approach was seen to be incapable of handling all the data of psychopathology, psychotherapy, and other psychological phenomena, and of, therefore, providing a clear understanding of the client's difficulties. This lack of clarity led to an ambiguity concerning the effectiveness of psychotherapy. In the terms of Kuhn (1970), the existing analytic approach was incapable of assimilating all the data, and this crisis signalled the emergence of an alternative phenomenological approach. Thus, the intention in moving toward a phenomenological approach was not to become less scientific but more (Giorgi, 1970). This was accomplished by making explicit the assumptions and guiding view of human existence that had limited the existing paradigm, and by seeking an alternative approach drawn from phenomenological thought. Boss (1963, p. 29) argues this well when he says:

If all science--including the science of healing with all its ramifications--rests on philosophical presuppositions, it follows that it is possible, in principle, to acquire a new and better understanding of man on the basis of new and more adequate suppositions.

Elsewhere, he goes on to add that:

There is no way out of the confused situation of our contemporary psychology in general and psychoanalytic theory in particular than to re-evaluate one basic psychoanalytic conception after another in the light of a more

adequate understanding of man (ibid., p. 80).

2.4.9. Summary of the phenomenological critique of analytic approach as paradigm puzzle solver

In summary, phenomenological psychologists have wished to salvage the essential insights of psychoanalysis through a critical re-grounding in an approach drawn from an approach originally designed to clarify human existence. These psychologists do not emphasize a total rejection of psychoanalysis as unscientific, as do behavioral psychologists. Moreover, phenomenological psychologists do not argue for a reform in the direction of further meeting the established criteria of the natural sciences, as do behavioral psychologists and positivistic philosophers of science. Finally, phenomenological psychologists are not emphasizing revisions largely at the level of content, as developments within the analytic community have suggested.

Instead, phenomenological psychologists argue that the most fundamental reform must be at the level of approach. They argue that psychoanalysis proceeds from a dated, natural science approach originally derived from the world of things and uncritically applied to human existence. This event has led to numerous consequences. For example, the humanistic intentions of psychoanalysis are split from, yet continue to be informed by, a mechanistic theory; changes in the theoretical superstructure may progress without a change in approach; a gap exists between theory and practice, and the theory and practice of psychoanalysis proceed without an approach capable

of assimilating and responding to all human phenomena as they humanly present themselves. Accordingly, as it now stands, the approach of psychoanalysis is open to charges of determinism, both the reduction and transcendence of lived-experience as it presents itself, and the elimination of subjectivity and the perceptual appearance of things in favor of methodological determination. Inasmuch as the unconscious is so central in psychoanalysis, yet conceived through this approach, a revision in approach is warranted.

Accordingly, a straightforward conclusion can be drawn from this chapter. The structure of psychoanalytic thought is well in need of revision at the level of approach. Moreover, any revision in the theme of the unconscious must begin with an approach originally designed for human existence. Phenomenological thought historically arose from these intentions. This work, therefore, now turns to present a phenomenological approach in Chapter III.

III. FEATURES OF AN ALTERNATIVE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

3.1 Overall plan of the chapter

The previous chapter presented some limitations in psychoanalytic theorizing and practice, and it was argued that those problems arose from the borrowed natural science approach implicit in psychoanalysis. In this chapter I will present some features of an alternative approach drawn from phenomenological thought.

I will first show that phenomenological thought originally grew out of an historical necessity to clarify human, rather than natural, existence. Following this, some general features of a phenomenological approach will be presented. These features comprise the philosophical nature of that approach, and will be presented in the same way that Chapter II explicated the philosophical features of the explanatory natural science approach in psychoanalysis. This plan is chosen so that the phenomenological approach may be contrasted to the earlier presented material on the natural science approach and may later serve as the basis for my reformulation of the unconscious in Chapter IV.

Next, a phenomenological understanding of the body will be presented. The unconscious is always situated in some approach

toward how we exist in a bodily way, and how we come to know the other person. Freud's approach, for example, was drawn from psychobiology. In that approach, the unconscious existed within the person, and only through the psychoanalytic method could the existence of the unconscious be inferred from a deciphering of its disguised representations. Human existence as bodily existence provides access to intersubjectivity and a direct knowledge of the other person in a phenomenological approach. Accordingly, these features will be presented and compared to a knowledge of the other person which is always indirect and inferential in the psychoanalytic approach.

Finally, the primacy of the other person in the constitution of perceptual meaning will be addressed, and included within an updated phenomenological approach. Husserl, like Freud, emphasized the role of the individual in the constitution of perceptual meaning. Both situated this activity within the individual, and their positions place a priority on transcendental consciousness and the unconscious, respectively. In contrast to these common positions, the later works of Levinas (1969), Merleau-Ponty (1968), Stein (1970), and Strasser (1969) place a priority on the other person in our coming to know the world perceptually. This newer material suggests many criticisms of Husserl and Heidegger, from whom the classic reformulations of the unconscious by Binswanger (1975), Boss (1963), and Ricoeur (1970) draw their phenomenological approach. Accordingly, I will present the role of the other person in the genesis of perceptual meaning, to serve as a basis for criticizing the approach within the classic reformulations of the unconscious, and to provide a

new, updated phenomenological approach from which the unconscious will be understood in Chapter IV.

3.2 Historical origins of phenomenological thought as clarification of human existence

Many excellent works have already treated the historical beginnings of phenomenological thought (Ellenberger, 1959; Farber, 1966; Giorgi, 1970; Husserl, 1970a; Keen, 1972, 1975; May, 1959; Merleau-Ponty, 1966b; Spiegelberg, 1960). My intention in this section is not to summarize these efforts, nor to add anything new to them. Rather, I will show that the origins of phenomenological thought, per se, arose from a common intention. This was the desire to be not less empirical, not less scientific, but more so, in the sense that any reflective discipline may approach a possible ideal of certainty about criteria for evidence. In the origins of phenomenological thought, this ideal is approached through the now famous phenomenological reduction and the return to actually lived-through, perceptual experience.

According to Merleau-Ponty (1966b), phenomenology existed operatively as a style of thinking long before it became articulated as the various philosophies which are now identified as phenomenological. Moreover, by its very nature, the style of phenomenological thought is highly multiperspective as it is expressed in philosophy and the social sciences (Natanson, 1973). In short, no univocal definition of phenomenology as a system or method exists, although common trends may be discerned (Alapack, 1972; Giorgi, 1970, 1975c; Keen, 1975;

Spiegelberg, 1960; Zaner, 1970). One such trend having implications for the problem of approach is found in the formal beginning of phenomenology by Edmund Husserl.

In the hands of Husserl, formal phenomenological thought arose as a reaction to an historical, cultural crisis in attitude and knowledge, expressed in philosophy, science, and the everyday life of the citizen situated in the Western world. Husserl (1970a) argued that despite the technical success of these disciplines, the knowledge they expressed had become speculative, constructionistic, and without a truly empirical foundation for evidence in human activity. Science and philosophical knowledge, he maintained, had become objectivistic, alienated from its roots in human subjectivity, and dominated by a neo-Kantian speculation on the one hand, and a dogmatic positivism on the other. Psychology, in turn, had turned into "psychologism," the study of objectified man, informed by an approach drawn from the naturalism of Descartes, Hume, and Locke. This state of affairs has been termed a crisis in human rationality (Bruzina, 1971). The relationship of this crisis to everyday life is depicted by Kockelmans (1967, p. 269), when he says:

In this approach the world loses its characteristic of world in which man always lives already, in which man finds himself. Instead, this approach stresses that which came into being as a result of man's knowledge. The world of the sciences, therefore, turns more and more into an artificial world in which we find less and less of all that which is not of man's own

making. In such a world man turns into an artificial object that is nothing but the result of its own scientific self project.

In response to this situation, Husserl (1969, 1970a) argued that the work of the theoretician or scientist always begins from practical, prescientific life experience. Scientific discourse always arises from this source, and while science seeks inter-subjective (objective) knowledge which transcends this standpoint, scientific knowledge is always relative to the lived world. For example, Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. viii) conveys the sense of this point clearly when he says:

All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless. The whole world of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second order expression.

Husserl, however, maintains that since the time of Galileo the program for achieving objective knowledge has been divorced from human subjectivity and the lived world. According to Husserl (1970a), an examination of Western culture since this time indicates first a denial, then a gradual occlusion and replacement of immediate, lived experience by the objective

constructions of scientific knowledge, which were approached as if they existed apart from human subjective participation. Most important for the issue of approach was Husserl's diagnosis that in this process science was uncritically losing touch with its own foundation as a human activity. Accordingly, its aims as an empirically grounded, self-critical discipline were severely limited. Therefore, the phenomenological reduction and return to lived perceptual experience as primary evidence were inaugurated as a propaedeutic necessary for Western science and thought to function on a truly empirical, self-questioning basis. In short, phenomenological thought grew out of the need to be more empirical, and is an original clarification of existence in human terms.

The situation which originally called forth phenomenological thought mirrored, as Chapter II pointed out, the concern for grounding psychoanalysis in a lived, empirical approach. I will now turn to present some general philosophical features of a phenomenological approach.

3.3 Philosophical features of a phenomenological approach

Phenomenology is not a closed system. Considered as an historical movement, phenomenological thought shows such diversity among its proponents that one is tempted to side with Spiegelberg (1960, Vol. 1, p. xxvii) in exclaiming "... that there are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists." This, he admits, is stretching the point. Nevertheless, the variety of phenomenological thought as it is expressed in "pure phenomenology," "transcendental phenom-

ology," "existential phenomenology," and "dialogal phenomenology" has to be recognized (Strasser, 1967). A central theme, however, does inhabit this diversity, and distinguishes phenomenology from other philosophical positions. This is the theme of intentionality as "...engagement in the world" (Thevenaz, 1962, p. 90). In presenting the nature of this engagement I will, at the same time, be laying bare the pre-suppositions and features of a phenomenological approach.

The very cornerstone of phenomenological thought is the notion of intentionality, or the original, perceived unity of person/world relations. In Husserl's (1969) work, intentionality means that any experiential act reveals the presence of an object, whether that object be perceptually existent or existent in imagination. In short, consciousness is always "...a consciousness of something" (Husserl, 1969, p. 119). In no case may I see, hear, feel, taste, smell, remember, or imagine, without something being present through these modalities of experience (Erlebnis). Correlatively, no object may be said to exist without having been present in some manner to perceptual consciousness. Thus act and object, consciousness and world, bear a reciprocal relation to each other and are inseparable.

The insight that existence is intentional (Luijpen, 1960) receives full expression in the existential phenomenological account of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger (1962), for example, uses the original term Dasein to communicate that Being-in-the-world, like intentionality, is not reducible to psyche or to worldly object. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1968)

has remarked that Being-in-the-world is neither thing nor idea. Moreover, it is not an interaction between consciousness and the object, between receptor tissues and stimulus characteristics, because this position (transactionalism) also presupposes a distinction between consciousness and object (Murray, 1971).

Being-in-the-world is a unitary, dialectical structure, first lived as a prepersonal engagement in the world, prior to the distinctions of subject/object, consciousness/world, individual/society. The fundamental rule of Being-in-the-world is a meaningful relationship to something. For example, Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 456) says that "Man is but a network of relationships ..." The sense of these relationships as structure is clearly described by Van Kaam (1966, p. 7) when he says:

The subject "I," the self that I am, cannot occur other than as the source of activity which is in some way oriented to the world as it appears. The self cannot be conceived, affirmed, experienced, or imagined without the world or some aspect of the world to which the self is directed or in which it is involved. Expressions such as I think, I do, I feel, I imagine, I anticipate, I dream, and I own all imply a being-in-the-world, always presuppose something which is more than the isolated self alone.

As suggested, Being-in-the-world is dialectical. Man and the world comprise a unity of "reciprocal implication" (Luijpen,

1960, p. 176). As consciousness changes, so too does the world. For example, Goldstein (1965) has shown, in his studies of the brain-damaged, how brain injury is always reflected in changes in the experienced world. To understand the brain-damaged means to have access to what that world must be like for the person. Likewise, as the world changes, consciousness changes. This is shown through the emphasis behavioral psychologists have placed on the manipulation of the material aspects of a situation (Skinner, 1974). The dialectical nature of Being-in-the-world is best summed up by Von Eckartsberg (1971a) when he argues that humans both shape and are shaped by reality. In this dialectical account, the person is not merely a passive receptor molded by preexisting external stimuli, nor a totally active architect of the experienced world. These dichotomous views of the person have polarized the history of psychology (Allport, G., 1967; MacLeod, 1975), and are evident in Freud's account of people, which oscillates between the poles of vitalism and mechanism (Holt, 1968).

To see perceptual experience as structure is to challenge the Cartesian distinction between matter and consciousness. This is what Merleau-Ponty (1966a, 1966b, 1968) has done in his criticism of empiricist and intellectualist understandings of perception. He points out that the structure of perception, as Being-in-the-world, cannot be reduced to a causal analysis. Perceptual acts cannot be defined as isolated, apart from the contents they reveal. Contents always presuppose a human act of orientation. Perceptual experience is, therefore, not

caused by mind or world, physiology, or isolated, materially defined stimuli. Experience is originally a co-constituted structure. As such, it is to be described, not explained by isolating determinants, since no determinants exist in isolation.

Accordingly, Freud's distinction between preexisting libido and object is situated within a Cartesian approach that requires the auxiliary hypothesis of cathexis. The unity of perceptual experience is not original but constructed, then explained through the psychoanalytic account of the psychic apparatus. Moreover, the themes disclosed through perceptual experience are explained by recourse to the determiners cited in Chapter II. By contrast, a phenomenological approach would describe this unity as it presents itself, and treat human biographical history as horizontal context, which contextualizes rather than causes the meaning of a perceived event. Used this way, horizon as context is similar, but not identical, to the Gestalt psychology concept of "ground," which acts as context for what is perceptually "figural" (Gurwitsch, 1964).

3.3.1. Special consideration of the body in a phenomenological approach

The role of the body merits a special place within a phenomenological approach. This is the body as lived in perceptual experience, and is to be distinguished from the body of anatomy and physiology. The latter concept of the body is a second order derivation of the lived, phenomenal body (Buytendijk, 1974). Likewise, the "body image" (Fisher, S., 1970), investigated in experimental psychology, is not synonymous with the

lived body. The lived body provides perceptual access to the world, signifies position and orientation spatially, and allows people a social, intersubjective existence through expressive behavior. I will take these points one at a time, and will integrate other features of a phenomenological approach within this presentation. When the social nature of bodily existence is addressed, I will preface this account with a traditional view of behavior and experience in bodily existence.

Access to existence is possible by the incarnation of consciousness through the body in a phenomenological approach (Buytendijk, 1974; Merleau-Ponty, 1966a). Merleau-Ponty (ibid., p. 82) has written:

The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be interinvolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to them.

The body provides access to the world insofar as it is through the body that the world is present through perceptual experience (Merleau-Ponty, ibid.). Here, the body functions as vehicle between consciousness and world. This is, therefore, not the disembodied Cartesian consciousness which suggests that thought is prior to, and a condition for, existence. Rather, through the body, consciousness is incarnate and perceptual; its relations with the world are always primordial and prereflective. Merleau-Ponty, therefore, refers to this embodied consciousness as a tacit cogito. The following statement by Buytendijk (1974, p. 19) clearly illustrates the overall sense of this prereflective engagement.

Our conscious personal relation to things is based continuously on an unconscious pre-personal relation which is realized by the body. Our body pre-establishes a qualitative, formed, important and significant context with spatial and temporal dimensions, with things and situational structures, without us knowing personally anything about it.

The role of the body as access to the world may be summed up as follows: only in and through perceptual experience does a world exist for people. Perception is always perception of something. This intentional nature of perception is already pre-established through a functioning intentionality of body involved in a world prior to reflective awareness. Nevertheless, the world is only empirically known by a reflection on this prereflective engagement.

The second feature of the role of the body is that it signifies position and orientation in a world. Only by virtue of a bodily position is the world disclosed from a certain viewpoint to an experiencing person. Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 144), for example, has said that "...the body is our anchorage in a world." It is only from this bodily standpoint of the perceiving person that both perceiver and world are said to be finite and situated. For example, a person is not located in space, as matches may occupy the space of a box. Space exists always in reference to a perceiving person's standpoint. For this reason, corporeal space is not reducible to the space of a physically defined, measurable location, but is originally a spatiality of situation, lived by a person

with intentions. High and low, near and far, large and small, inside and outside, are all dimensions of the everyday world that bear reference first to the standpoint of the situated, positioned person (Straus, 1963).

This finite, situated viewpoint also applies to the experience of objects and other people. While perceived as a gestalt, the object or other person is never fully disclosed in a description of perceptual experience. To a person situated in time and space, the thing or other person is always perceived in perspective, as a presence in profile (Husserl, 1970a; Merleau-Ponty, 1966b). Thanks to bodily movement the world is also a changing, multiperspective world. Bodily movement affords the opportunity for the senses to reveal other dimensions of the world, and the perceived object or person is always in the process of perceptual adumbration (Gurwitsch, 1964). This is not the passive reception of pre-existing stimuli, as in an empiricist account of perception. The body's engagement with the world is participatory, and meaning-disclosing (Zaner, 1964). For example, a person's history and intentions always provide a contextual horizon, and co-constitute the meaning of the perceived in a given situation. Therefore, the movement of the body and the adumbration of the perceived is also situated within the meaningful context of temporality and lived space (Keen, 1975).

Finally, the body is the means whereby a person expresses a public, social existence, and intersubjectivity is possible between people. This aspect of bodily existence is extremely important to a psychology of the unconscious. For example, the therapeutic setting is an interpersonal situation, where

a perception and knowledge of the other person is of major interest in the determination of a client's unawareness of themselves. Some approach to how the other exists and is known always underlies this determination. The approach underlying psychoanalysis does not permit a direct knowledge of the other person, and the analytic account is not upheld by empirical observation. I will show how this is so by focusing on a traditional approach, and will make explicit why it does not adequately account for the existence of the other person and the possibility of intersubjectivity. Following this, a phenomenological approach toward this problem will be offered.

3.3.2. A traditional approach toward the other person

Traditional approaches toward how the other exists and is known make that existence either pure subjective interiority or behavioral exteriority. The person is viewed as subject or object. Classical conceptions arise from a "natural attitude" that sees consciousness and body, experience and behavior, as mutually exclusive antinomies (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b). The person is said to exist either on the basis of his experience of himself or by the external viewpoint on his behavior. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 42) has stated the problem in this manner:

Classical psychology unquestioningly accepted the distinction between inner observation, or introspection, and outer observation. "Psychic facts"--anger or fear, for example--could be

directly known only from the inside and by the person experiencing them. It was thought to be self evident that I can grasp only the corporeal signs of anger or fear from the outside and that I have to resort to the anger or fear I know in myself through introspection in order to interpret these signs.

One consequence of this position is the view that consciousness, subjective intentions and desires, are accessible to only one person--the self, as defined from an introspective viewpoint. It follows that I cannot directly know the other, since the existence of consciousness always remains interior and invisible to the observer (Alapack, 1972; Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, 1968; Strasser, 1969). Let us see how this is so by examining the above position more closely.

By this approach, I cannot know the other's being, his or her intentions, desires, moods, directly through my perceptual experience of them. I have hypothetical access to the other only as he or she is represented through the appearance of bodily gestures and expressions taken as signs. By recourse to my experience of myself and my body, I decode and interpret the other's behavior in order to know that person. The other is thus never known directly. Access to the other takes place only indirectly through this inferential projective, mediating process.

Psychoanalysis has termed this process identification, and, as an approach to knowing the other, it runs through the history of psychoanalytic thought. For example, in 1915 Freud (1959, Vol. 4, pp. 101-102) maintained this approach when he said:

By the medium of consciousness each one of us becomes aware only of his own states of mind; that another man possesses consciousness is a conclusion drawn by analogy from the utterances and actions we perceive him to make, and it is drawn in order that this behaviour of his may become intelligible to us. (It would probably be psychologically more correct to put it thus: that without any special reflection we impute to everyone else our own constitution and therefore also our consciousness, and that this identification is a necessary condition of understanding in us).

Some seventeen years later Franz Alexander (1967, pp. 228-229) echoed this approach when he said:

Psychoanalysis, however, is not an introspective method, although it has to utilize introspection in understanding the personalities of others, because in psychology the presumption of all such understanding of others is a knowledge of our own mental processes.

Finally, this approach guides current developments in contemporary English object-relations psychoanalysis. Guntrip (1969, pp. 370-371) reflects this position in the following statement:

Our understanding of others is, at the intellectual level, an inference based on our knowledge of ourselves... we can know

others "on the inside" by identification,
as Home stressed, because we know ourselves
directly "on the inside".

3.3.3. Criticism of traditional approach toward knowing the other person

In our everyday, lived relations with others we do not doubt seriously the existence of subjectivity in others, nor do we doubt a shareable intersubjective world. This is not the issue. Rather, as Strasser (1969) indicates, the problem is with the tradition of explanations that have been offered to account for these lived relations. It has been shown, for example, that the overall development of psychology and psychoanalysis has been guided by a Cartesian platform, in which the relationship of consciousness and body was assumed to be bifurcated and substantively different (Giorgi, 1970; Straus, 1963; Van Kaam, 1966). The body was not a lived, expressive body (Leib), incarnate with subjectivity. Rather, the body was the physical, machine-like body (Körper) of Descartes and La Mettrie, devoid of subjectivity. This has led behaviorism and reflex psychology, for example, to focus on bodily behavior because behavior is thought to be public and visible, while consciousness or subjectivity is not. Similarly, introspection focuses on the direct report of conscious experience to the neglect of the body as expressive of subjectivity (Rachlin, 1970). To repeat, the central assumption underlying this trend is that subjectivity and bodily behavior are discontinuous, being substantively different. Behavior is said to be public, and, therefore, open to investigation, while subjec-

tivity is private and inaccessible to an observer. Knowledge of the other person is, at best, hypothetical, inferential, and always indirect.

A number of problems may be identified with this traditional account. First of all, this approach toward interpersonal existence is decidedly solipsistic (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b, 1968; O'Neill, 1970; Strasser, 1969). For example, if I can only know of the other person what I already know of myself, then, in this idealistic system, my difference from the other, and the novelty and surprise they may present me with, is difficult to account for. Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 356) shows the solipsism in this position when he says: "If the perceiving I is genuinely an I, it cannot perceive a different one." May (1967) has questioned the fruitfulness of this philosophical position as an empirical basis for psychoanalysis when he asks how one may be sure that they are truly seeing the other person rather than a projection of their own self knowledge and theory. May (1967, p. 371) argues, for example, that projection is taken as the model for interpersonal perception in psychoanalysis. Yet projection is the distortion of a usual, normative experience and knowledge of the other person, which May terms "encounter." Accordingly, May argues that the approach of psychoanalysis is not capable of empirically dealing with encounter, for the analytic approach substitutes a theory of pathological person perception for the norm of person perception. This objection has been repeated elsewhere (Alapack, 1975; Laing, 1969; Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, 1964b, 1968; Strasser, 1969; Van den Berg, 1974).

Allied to this problem of being able to account for the

existence of the other is the problem of intersubjectivity. If I can only know my own consciousness, then how can intersubjective truths and shareable meanings exist? Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 355, my emphasis) phrases the point as follows:

My awareness of constructing an objective truth would never provide me with anything more than an objective truth for me, and my greatest attempt at impartiality would never enable me to prevail over my subjectivity...

A traditional, idealistic or intellectualist approach toward human intersubjectivity takes recourse to a priori existent instincts or a faculty or trait-like conception of consciousness to explain intersubjectivity (Husserl, 1970a; Merleau-Ponty, 1966b; Jaspers, 1972). In the case of psychoanalysis, this means that sexuality and aggression exist at an institutionalized, shareable level because these instincts are biologically present prior to a contact with the world. The Cartesian approach is evident here, and was already criticized in my section on the phenomenological criticism of the psychoanalytic approach.

Finally, this position appears untenable when compared with the literature of developmental psychology. For example, very young children are able to recognize and respond to gestures and facial expressions in others long before these children are able to introspect and reproduce these actions through self-knowledge (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a; Schachtel, 1959; Werner, 1948). These authors point out that the child perceives gestures and expressions as meaningful intersubjective gestalts and physiognomies. The complicated introspective

decoding process posited by the traditional account of intersubjectivity is, therefore, not supported by empirical, psychological observation.

3.3.4. A phenomenological account of the existence of the other person

The traditional approach toward knowing the other person stands on the assumption that subjectivity is private and disconnected from behavior. Knowledge of the other person is always projective and indirect. This influences how the therapist or researcher scientifically responds to the person studied. Conceived traditionally, the body of the therapist or researcher provides an unacknowledged "objective viewpoint," and the subjectivity of the observer is carefully controlled from any participation in the situation studied. For example, Rosenthal (1966) has shown that the presence of the experimenter in behavioral research does enter into any definition of the situation studied, and asks for more stringent experimental control. Likewise, psychoanalysis has recognized the possible influence of the analyst's subjective experience of the analysand, and has also checked this influence of countertransference through control. How the therapist or researcher scientifically responds to the person studied flows from this approach toward the role of the body and a knowledge of the other person.

A phenomenological approach does not begin from an assumed split between consciousness and object, subjectivity and body. Subjectivity is not assumed to be an all-constitutive, private entity trapped within an organism and accessible only to that

person. Likewise, behavior is not some exteriority of a person devoid of subjectivity. In a phenomenological account of the body and of knowing the other, a person is never pure object or pure subject. Rather, a person's existence is a potentially shareable existence, made visible through the perceptual viewpoints present to the existence. Moreover, within this process of a person's being perceptually co-defined, his status as subject or object is always relative to those viewpoints present. To be succinct, who I am is not defined exclusively by my experience of myself, nor by the perceptual viewpoints of other people. Rather, who I am is always co-defined by the perceptually present, remembered, and fantasized viewpoints on my existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Strasser, 1969). In this important respect, a person's existence is always necessarily a co-existence (Luijpen, 1960).

To understand this phenomenological position means first breaking from a Cartesian, natural science approach toward the relations between consciousness and body, experience and behavior. This act is, at the same time, a suspension of the constancy hypothesis, and a return to perceptual experience (Gurwitsch, 1964; Merleau-Ponty, 1966a). From this perceptual experience as it is actually present to the experiencing person, phenomenological psychologists have articulated a descriptive picture of how the other exists.

Merleau-Ponty, for example, is recognized as having provided psychologists with the most fruitful alternative approach toward knowing the other person in his conception of the body-subject (De Waelhens, 1967; Giorgi, 1975c; Ricoeur, 1970; Strasser, 1969). This approach radically affirms the incarnation

of subjectivity in and through an expressive body originally related intentionally to a world. This is Merleau-Ponty's understanding of Being-in-the-world, to which the role of the body is central. For example, Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 351) has argued that:

If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and its world, the perception of other people and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer present any difficulty.

An example drawn from the above cited work should make this position clear, and should demonstrate that the direct perception of a genuine other person is possible within a phenomenological approach. Merleau-Ponty (1966b, pp. 150-151) has made the comparison between the relations of subjectivity to bodily behavior and an artist's subjective intentions and the executed painting. The work of art, like the expressive body, is a focal point of perceived, lived meanings. While the artist may begin with a private intention in mind, once that intention is expressed through the work of art, its meaning is no longer private and reducible to the artist's intention. Rather, as perceived at a gallery, the meaning of the painting is now public and multiperspective, owing to the perceptual viewpoints of the people present to it. In the lived world we do not cancel out our meaningful appreciation of the painting because we are ignorant of the artist's intention. Instead, once expressed through the paint and canvas the meaning of the work is co-defined by the viewpoints, including the artist's, which are present to it. In other words, the expressed is never purely personal; expression is also social

and potentially shareable. As soon as the intentions are expressed and public, they are no longer personal. Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 151) states this intertwining between the intention and its expression as follows:

A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning, accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal and spatial situation. It is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of art.

This unity of the intention and the expressed is the heart of the phenomenological approach toward the relations between experience and behavior. The incarnate body is an expressive body, not solely a collection of nerve tracts and reflexive actions (Buytendijk, 1974). Like the painting, the body is a medium through which a person's subjective intentions, needs, moods, and desires become potentially knowable and intersubjective. However, it should be emphasized that the perception of other people is like all perception--finite, situated, and structured into thematic and horizontal moments situated in time and space. Perceptual experience of other people also include genuine moments of ambiguity (O'Neill, 1970).

In contrast, a classical conception of body and mind, behavior and experience, is predicated on the distinction that these terms are substantively separate from each other. Behavior, therefore, is not an index to subjectivity, which continues to occupy a private status. Put another way, the appearance of

behavior is not access to the being of subjective intentions, desires, or affectivity. This disjunction between appearance and being, behavior and subjectivity, is a recognized presupposition of all Cartesian approaches to science (Bernal, 1972; Radnitzky, 1973). Hence, the traditional account, with its auxiliary hypotheses of introspection and projection, flows from these Cartesian assumptions and yields an indirect and derived account of the existence of other people. By contrast, a phenomenological approach holds behavior as access to subjectivity, since the two are not substantively distinguished. Accordingly, in a phenomenological approach, the whole, other person is directly perceivable.

Two examples should further clarify this phenomenological position. Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 356) states this inherence of subjectivity in and through the body with an example of the lived perception of the other. He says:

I perceive the grief or the anger of the other in his conduct, in his face, or in his hands, without recourse to any "inner" experience of suffering or anger, and because grief and anger are variations of belonging to the world, undivided between the body and consciousness, and equally applicable to the other person's conduct, visible in his phenomenal body, as in my own conduct as it is present to me.

Zaner (1964, p. 195) has also commented on behavior as directly expressive of subjective experience. As he puts it:

Only because of this [behavior expressive

of subjectivity] is it then possible for instance for my friend to be able to "tell" how I feel by looking at my gestures, postures, facial expressions, listening to the sound of my voice, and so on. My boredom is the weary aspect of my mouth and eyes; my arms are exasperated. My flushed face is my shame.

These examples should illustrate the phenomenological contention that the lived body is a psychosomatic whole, and that subjectivity is not exclusively private and inaccessible to the observer. The subjectivity of the other is directly perceivable through the medium of the body, and the perception of a genuine other is possible. This conclusion, however, merits qualification. I do not know the other's intentions precisely as they experience them (Giorgi, 1970; Laing, 1969). While I do have access, perceptually, to the other's anger or grief, I may not know precisely what they are angry about or grieving over until I ask them, and in any case I do not experience these themes precisely as the other person does. Accordingly, knowing the other person takes place within a dialectic of presence and absence, visible and invisible. Giorgi (1970, p. 197) puts it this way:

... we would say that from an external viewpoint, experience is the invisible aspect of a situation in which the behavior is visible; and that from an internal viewpoint, behavior is the invisible aspect of a situation in which the experience is the visible.

The preceding argument should make clear that neither

the person's experience of himself or herself nor the observer's experience of the other person is limited to experience and behavior, respectively. Both experience and behavior are perceptually accessible to internal as well as external viewpoints, but in some instances one viewpoint may be privileged over the other. In fact, a phenomenological approach toward knowing a person emphasizes that consciousness and body, experience and behavior, reveal different perspectives of a human being at the same time that they inseparably blend as aspects of that person's existence. Like a work of art, a person's existence is situated between the perceptual viewpoints, internal and external. Euber (1965), for example, speaks of this co-existence as "the realm of 'the between,'" and makes the point that a person exists and can only be known through dialogue. Likewise, Sullivan (1953) places an emphasis on interpersonal, participant-observation and consensual validation, which also situates a person's existence between the perceptual viewpoints of self and others. Alapack (1972) remarks that these viewpoints present to a person's existence "interface" as aspects of the same person. Finally, Merleau-Fonty (1970, p. 40) also speaks to this situated status of a person when he says: "Thus, the instituted subject exists between others and myself, between me and myself, like a hinge, the consequence and the guarantee of our belonging to a common world."

This view of bodily existence as situated has consequences for psychoanalytic practice. For instance, while psychoanalysis is a specific therapeutic methodology, the data of the analytic setting is always co-constituted between the participants. For

example, it has been reported that the orientation of the analyst significantly affects how the analysand expresses the data of the analysis. Freudian patients have Freudian dreams; Jungian patients have Jungian dreams; Adlerian patients have Adlerian dreams (Ellenberger, 1970). Hence, as Barton (1974, p. 10) states it, "The patient must be understood as the 'patient-with-the-therapist,' and therapeutic data are always inseparably co-constituted between these participants. This understanding of the analytic process flows from the offered phenomenological approach toward bodily existence, and is critical of the belief that data are purely derived by method, and have an objective existence apart from this setting of original engagement between the participants.

Another implication of a phenomenological approach toward bodily existence involves an alteration in the meaning of counter-transference. Freud's views about the involvement of the analyst's subjectivity in the therapeutic process were drawn from early nineteenth century science, and a model of the physician's relationship to the physically ill patient (Jung, C. W., Vol. 15, 1966, pp. 33-49). Freud's own remarks on this subject clearly illustrate this contention. For example, he states:

I cannot recommend my colleagues emphatically enough to take as a model in psychoanalytic treatment the surgeon who puts aside all his own feelings, including that of human sympathy, and concentrates his mind on one single purpose, that of performing the operation

as skillfully as possible (Freud, C. P.,
Vol. 2, 1959, p. 327).

Freud further illustrates this control of the analyst's subjectivity when he says that "The physician should be impenetrable to the patient, and like a mirror, reflect nothing but what is shown to him" (Freud, C. P., Vol. 2, 1959, p. 331).

This point requires careful consideration. On the one hand, Freud's views on the subjective involvement of the analyst are recommendations that take place within the horizon of the patient's health, i.e., the emancipatory interest. The safety to say whatever comes to mind without regard for the personal reprisal of the analyst is a thematic feature, taken for granted, within this emancipatory process (Schafer, 1978). Accordingly, some personal reactions of the analyst may be prejudicial, if not destructive, to this emancipatory interest. However, seen from the standpoint of approach or metapsychology, Freud's remarks on the subjective detachment of the analyst from the analytic process arise from the models of early nineteenth century science and medical practice, where the subjectivity of the researcher/practitioner is seen as a contamination to scientific objectivity (Amacher, 1965; Skirbekk, 1976). In this Cartesian approach, subjectivity is separate and distinct from an objective res extensa, and control of subjective involvement is a methodological consequence of these presuppositions (Leiss, 1972). In a phenomenological approach to how people exist and are interrelated experientially, the subjective reactions of the analyst to the analysand may be an important index to how others may experience the person

of the analysand. Accordingly, this approach would view the analyst's subjectivity, like all subjectivity, as a form of meaning-disclosing relatedness to the other. That is, the analyst's subjectivity is not divorced from, but is intentionally related to, something about the client, and has an important informational value. This statement, however, requires qualification. The analyst may trust and communicate this experience provided that his or her reaction is not a typical, biographical countertransference theme that requires control in the interests of the analysand's safety. In fact, at the level of practice, the informational value of the therapist's personal experience has been recognized and actively utilized to provide information about how the client may be seen by others (Mullan & Sangiuliano, 1964; Johnson, 1971; Searles, 1965, 1979). These insights originating in clinical practice have not, however, flowed from or been congruent with an approach that explicitly recognizes the original engagement and inter-relatedness of the therapist's experience with the subjectivity of the client. The offered phenomenological account of the relationship of subjectivity and behavior in bodily existence does support these clinical developments.

A phenomenological account of bodily existence also has consequences for the meaning of interpretation in clinical psychoanalysis and other forms of interpretive therapy. The overall place of interpretation in therapeutic work is clearly stated by Schafer (1976, p. 127). He says:

... the strategy of interpretation is this:
to identify a network of intelligible actions
where none was thought to exist, thereby

expanding the range of acknowledged activity in the analysand's experience of his or her life, and to develop a history of this life as intelligible activity.

In short, the clinical aim of psychoanalytic interpretation is to discover meaning and intelligibility in the often chaotic, seemingly unsensible, and often frightening experience of the analysand. Freud's statement that "... our scientific work in psychology will consist in translating unconscious processes into conscious ones, and thus filling in the gaps in conscious perception..." is a dynamic formulation of this goal to substitute knowledge for ignorance (C. P., Vol. 5, 1959, p. 382). This aim is achieved by the analyst's interpretation of the primary data of the transference, free association, and dreams. Accordingly, psychoanalytic work seeks "the logic of the irrational" (Owen, 1978) as a means of providing self-knowledge in the interest of emancipation.

How Freud conceived of interpretation, however, is drawn from the approach of psychoanalysis. In his (1943) dynamic formulations, meanings unconscious to a person may achieve conscious expression and be language within the psychoanalytic session. As behavior, the reported data of dreams, transference, and free association are present in a disguised or altered form. Freud referred to this as the manifest content. The disguise enabled unconscious intentions and desires an expression which both escaped the scrutiny of superego prohibitions and allowed expression without overwhelming the ego. The psychoanalytic unraveling and interpretation of the manifest content yields the "real" intention or desire, termed the latent content.

Interpretation is, accordingly, a feature of the psychoanalytic method, which functions to decipher the appearances of language as behavior, and uncover the true subjective desire. Central in this process is the Cartesian presupposition that the manifest appearance of behavior is separate and distinct from the real subjective content, and that a special method is required to arrive at this latent subjectivity (Lyons, 1963; Sonnemann, 1954).

Others have appreciated the therapeutic intentions of interpretation, to provide intelligibility, without the presupposition that the manifest appearance is not the meaning. Jungian dream interpretation, for example, makes no distinction between manifest and latent content; herein, the symbol manifest in the dream is the meaning, and is adumbrated in the course of therapy (Jacobi, 1974). A phenomenological approach to bodily existence, in fact, holds the assumption that the expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, the spoken word in speech is the directly perceived meaning, and the behavior is an expression of subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b). Accordingly, in each of these cases, no meaning exists "behind" or "below" disguised, untrustworthy appearances. The meaning, instead, is immanent in the appearance, whether that be a symptomatic complaint, dream data, or the material of transference and free association. True, the expressed meaning may be ambiguous and incomplete in these initial presentations, but that meaning, as thematic, always exists within, and refers to, a horizon, which is not immediately perceptible at that point in time. Accordingly, a phenomenological approach seeks to make explicit that horizontal meaning structure through a

person's description, and finally to arrive at the essential structure of the phenomenon studied (Colaizzi, 1973; Giorgi, 1970). As therapeutic activity, this horizontal adumbration is not unlike the analyst's instruction to free associate, following the analysand's report of a puzzling dream. In each case, the meaning of the dream is sought. However, the derived meaning from phenomenological and psychoanalytic perspectives can be radically different, since each begins from a different approach (Van den Berg, 1974).

Specifically, a phenomenological approach would encourage the therapist to place greater confidence in his or her direct experience of the other and self within the therapeutic setting. This flows from the approach. For example, the direct experience of the other by the therapist is access to the client's subjectivity and to perspectives of the client not given in his or her experience of self. Accordingly, interpretation as methodological disguise-unmasking is deemphasized in favor of description of the experienced as providing a source of intelligibility. Schafer (1976), for example, has emphasized such an alteration in his recommendation that psychoanalysis ground itself in a descriptive "action language," rather than employing hypothetical interpretations arising from psychoanalytic metapsychology. Furthermore, the person of the therapist is always originally and influentially engaged as a part of the context for emergent therapeutic data. Hence, the traditional assumption of anonymity as personal detachment, common to orientations besides psychoanalysis, is deemphasized and replaced by a view of the therapist as participant perceiver, that is, as co-constitutive agent. Here, the

presence and experience of the therapist is made explicit and actively utilized in the co-constitution of therapeutic data.

These changes, arising from a phenomenological approach, have received considerable attention and implementation in empirical, phenomenological studies. For example, Romanyshyn's (1969) study of attitudes demonstrated how empirical method must arise fresh from the dialectical encounter between the person of the experimenter, with his or her intentions and history, and the person of the experimental subject, with his or her intentions and history. Method is discovered in a study of the phenomenon in this context, and should not be conceived as having an objective life apart from this interpersonally engaged situation. Empirical data, accordingly, are always situated and co-constituted within this context. This same appreciation of method within a revised psychoanalysis is implicit in Schafer's (1978, p. 9) statement that "the appropriate analytic attitude is one of finding out--finding out what the analysis itself will be or be concerned with;" whereas "the psychoanalytic method is a study of itself." This, again, takes place between the participants in the analytic setting. Similarly, Alapack's (1972) study of the psychology of the natural athlete depicts the researcher as intimately engaged in the research situation, and the method as an outcome of this engagement of the participants over the studied phenomenon. In addition, Alapack recognizes that descriptive data from subjects are shareably intersubjective between the viewpoints of subject and researcher. Therefore, Alapack describes his empirical methodology as a gyroscopic dialectic, in which the experimenter is not merely a detached, passive recipient

of the subject's descriptions, but also plays an active, co-constituting, creatively provoking role similar to the Rorschach technique of "testing the limits" (Klopfer & Kelley, 1942).

These developments arising in the experimental context have received considerable attention, and are outcomes of a developing refinement in phenomenological approaches. However, within the clinical setting, these innovations have not received equal representation.

3.4 The priority of the other person in the establishment of perceptual meaning:

the insentient other

3.4.1. Statement of the problem

The most extensive phenomenological revisions of the orthodox psychoanalytic unconscious arise as parts of the work of Medard Boss (1963) and Ludwig Binswanger (1975), who draw implicitly the epistemological features of this approach from Husserlian phenomenology. These important reformulations of psychoanalysis, and their treatment of the unconscious, are only as valid as the philosophical approach from which they draw. At present, however, phenomenological thought has progressed and refined itself considerably from its pioneering beginnings. In particular, Husserl's emphasis that the perceptual meaning of an object or other person is reducible to the experiencing person's activity has come to be criticized. A contemporary phenomenological approach drawing from Stein, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Strasser, emphasizes the priority of the world, especially other people, in the originating genesis of per-

ceptual meaning. Levinas (1969), for example, refers to this as the intrinsic exteriority of perceptual experience. At present, however, no systematic examination of the unconscious in psychology has been undertaken which includes these important revisions in phenomenological thought. In short, while considerable advances have taken place in phenomenological thought, the integration of these developments into an explicit approach, and the systematic application of that approach to a psychology of the unconscious, is absent in the literature.

This focus on the genesis of meaning in perceptual experience is essential to a psychology of the unconscious for at least three reasons. First, psychotherapy takes place originally within the arena of experience and interexperience (Laing, 1969, 1970). A focus on the nature of these themes is necessary because the clinical unconscious exists first within an interpersonal, interexperiential, therapist-client relationship. Second, the genesis of the meaning of others and world is a primary question in dynamic psychotherapy and psychological assessment. As Laing (1969) suggests, we act on the world on the basis of how we experience it. Accordingly, understanding human action means first understanding the meaning of a person's world, and comprehending how that meaning came to be. Finally, both science and psychotherapy proceed from some basis in evidence, which gives confidence to empirical certainty about these activities. Hence, this refinement of the approach supporting a psychology of the unconscious provides such confidence by reducing the conflicts between approach and theory, theory and practice, and increases the quality of clinical practice as empirically grounded. Accordingly, the following presenta-

tion will be framed as an empirical refinement.

3.4.2. Empirical developments in the genesis
of perceptual meaning: a movement
toward exteriority

Since its inception, phenomenological thought has undergone increased theoretical refinement and transformation. These changes in theory have already received extensive documentation (Langan, 1970; Spiegelberg, 1960; Strasser, 1967, 1969). One such change having import for this work is the liberation of phenomenological theory from an idealistic emphasis to a radical grounding in the priority of the lived-world, including other people, in the understanding of the nature and origin of perceptual meaning. This historical evolution in theory generates an approach truer to how experience is actually lived. It is, therefore, more empirical and preferred as an approach feature within which a psychology of the unconscious can be examined and reformulated. Consider the following.

A major assumption in forming the developments in phenomenological thought is that human perceptual experience is the primordial, apodictically certain foundation for all evidence and knowledge. Within Ideas, Husserl (1969) speaks of phenomenology as a science of experience, and holds that a rigorous, faithful description of actually lived-through, pre-theoretical experience is propaedeutic to any scientific and philosophical theorizing. This became known as his phenomenological psychology. A theory of evidence, contained within this project, has often earned phenomenology the title: radical empiricism (Spiegelberg, 1965; Thevenaz, 1962; Wild & Edie, 1963).

In a radically empirical approach, human experience (Erlebnis) is the primary evidence to which any scientific or philosophical theorizing, or any conclusions drawn from these activities, is ultimately referred. The radical empiricist maintains a strict adherence to the givens of experience, and any distinctions made in theory must first be reflected in the practical activity of actually lived-through experience. Consequently, no attempt is made to move outside this evidence of experience in order to explain it. Heffer (1974) illustrates this position well when he says:

A genuine empiricism refuses to take any kind of experience as a standard against which all other experiences must be measured. It remains purely descriptive. It accepts all experiences on an equal basis and refuses to establish inconsistent criteria, the use of which could permit any experience whatever to be disregarded as illusory or derivative. In so doing it attains the status, unsuccessfully sought by traditional empiricism, of complete freedom from theories and dogmatic assumptions. There is thus no need to explain any kind of experience in terms of anything else (p. 162).

Husserl (1970b, p. 9), for example, is adamant in his belief that "... we must not make assertions about that which we do not ourselves see." An example of this position is illustrated in a phenomenological account of perception. The traditional notion of sensation, as a necessary precursor to perception, is criticized as an auxiliary hypothesis and abandoned, when

a theory of perception arises from a faithful description of the perceptual process (Merleau-Ponty, 1966a, 1966b).

From this criterion of evidence, more recent developments in phenomenology have argued that Husserl's interpretation of intentionality and meaning constitution maintains an idealistic emphasis. Accordingly, by his own criteria for evidence, Husserl's account of these themes deserves empirical refinement, for it stands as a contradiction within his phenomenology. I want to re-emphasize how crucial this criticism is: it attacks the very foundation of the major phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis and their understanding of the unconscious. For example, these revisions draw the epistemological features of their approach from Husserlian phenomenology. Insofar as the empirical basis of this approach is considered suspect, the corresponding revisions of the unconscious must also be considered suspect. To repeat, these criticisms suggest that Husserl overemphasized the person's activity in the constitution and origination of perceptual world meaning. Let us see how this is so.

In the main, phenomenologists have embraced Husserl's (1969) interpretation that consciousness is always consciousness of something; the nature of consciousness is that it always intends toward and includes an object. Consciousness, moreover, is a generic term, inclusive of modes of consciousness such as imagination, memory, fantasy, expectation, as well as the traditionally recognized senses of touching, tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. Since Husserl, one would surely add synesthesia (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b; Werner, 1948), hallucinating (Binswanger, 1975; Minkowski, 1970; Straus, 1966),

affectivity (Sartre, 1962; Scheler, 1967; Stein, E., 1964; Strasser, 1978), and will (Ricoeur, 1966). Husserl's description of intentionality specifies that after the epoche, every cognition reveals an ego or subject of consciousness, an act (noesis), and an object (noema). Consciousness and object, subject and world, are, therefore, equally co-present simultaneously in intentional experience. As Koestenbaum (1970, p. xxvii) puts it, "To be is to be the object to a subject and the subject for an object at the same time." The evidence for this assertion in Husserlian phenomenology is presumably empirical, and achieved by "an immediate contact with things through intuition" (Kockelmans, 1967, p. 327). In short, act and object, subject and world, are co-present equally and simultaneously in intentional experience, and are discovered empirically by a reflection on pre-reflective, intuitional experience.

Others since Husserl, however, have challenged this formulation of intentionality on empirical grounds (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b, 1968; Stein, W., 1970; Strasser, 1969). Stein, W. (1970), for example, maintains that a reflection on perceptual experience calls into question this definition of intentionality. She says:

As I reflect on this perceptual experience, it seems to me that the object, the thing seen, is all that appears. I discern in my experience neither an act of directedness nor a subject ... I may deduce that there is a unified subject who is spatially located

in relation to the object, but I do not
experience this in visual perception
(p. 218).

I do not take Stein to be recommending a return to naive realism here, nor do I interpret her as challenging the ontological unity that the term intentionality conveys. We must clarify her standpoint in making this assertion. Stein is speaking from within the already engaged perceptual relationship designated as intentional. From this perspective, no act, ego, self is revealed as simultaneously co-present with the givenness of the object or presence. Stein urges that Husserl's widely accepted definition of intentionality, along with the noesis/noema distinction, be rethought. A second point drawn from this quoted statement is equally important to my argument. If "...the thing seen, is all that appears," then, on grounds of evidence, a phenomenological approach should be based on a radical commitment to the world, with no mention of intervening acts or constitutive egos.

A second, highly criticized feature of Husserl's understanding of intentionality concerns the relationship between subject and world, act and object, in the constitution of an object's perceived meaning. Let us make no mistake; for Husserl, the noetic act of perceptual consciousness expresses the ego-logical constitutive powers of the subject in perception. Accordingly, philosophically aware psychologists have viewed Husserl as an exponent of "act psychology," since he emphasizes the activity of the subject in a relationship to the world (Allport, 1967; Boring, 1957; Giorgi, 1970). To illustrate this I will first cite a statement by Peter Koestenbaum in his

Introduction to Husserl's (1967) Cartesian meditations.

Koestenbaum (p. xxii) says:

The act synthesizes the object. The object, in other words, is said to be an intention: the object is meant and intended by the act. The act of apprehension constructs, fashions, constitutes the object [author's emphasis].

In Husserl's early writings, which are cited by both Bosc (1963) and Binswanger (1975), perceptual experience is the result of these acts, which, correlatively, reveal the object as always present through profiles (Abschattungen). Acts, in turn, are ultimately expressive of the transcendental ego. In other words, just as Chapter II designated the unconscious as a determiner of psychic reality, in Husserl's phenomenology the transcendental ego assumes this role in an account of perceptual experience. Kockelmans (1967, p. 324) depicts just how active the transcendental ego is in Husserl's phenomenology when he says:

The ego is here no longer the subject-pole placed opposite an object-pole; it instead becomes that which encompasses everything. Everything now becomes a constructum of and for transcendental subjectivity; the whole world of reality becomes a mere product of its activity ... Husserl's definitive view of the ego links phenomenology inseparably with idealism, a conclusion which, otherwise, is fully accepted by Husserl himself.

Gurwitsch (1964) has also argued that Husserl's theory of

perception does not square with the evidence of experience. Gurwitsch (pp. 265-273) maintains that Husserl retains a dualistic conception of consciousness which requires a reformulation of intentionality. In Husserl's theory of perception a distinction is made between Hyle and Morphe in a given perceptual experience. This distinction is, in fact, a duality existing between Husserl's commitment to hyletic sense data, the raw materials of sensation, and specific meaning bestowing acts of apprehension, interpretation, objectivation, and apperception. Emphasizing the constitutive power of the subject, Husserl maintains that hyletic data may remain invariant while form-bestowing, noetic acts may change, with a corresponding change in the perceptual meaning of the object. Gurwitsch concludes that this is a sense data theory of perception which requires Husserl to invoke the constancy hypothesis and an organizing, synthesizing ego as auxiliary hypotheses. Drawing from Gestalt Psychology, Gurwitsch sets forth a non-egological theory of perception more in keeping with the fidelity of how perceptual experience presents itself. While he eliminates this organizing ego, Gurwitsch, nonetheless, retains the act within his perceptual theory. He, in turn, is subject to Stein's, W. (1970) criticism that the act is not a given within experience. Gurwitsch has titled his major work The field of consciousness, which emphasizes this activity of the subject, also, as a starting point for a phenomenology of perceptual experience.

This interpretation of phenomenology as a field theory is an outgrowth of Husserl's views on intentionality, and the activity of the subject in constitution. For example, in

Cartesian meditations (1967) Husserl sets about to discover the origin and genesis of perceptual experience by the orienting person. While Husserl begins from and emphasizes the world, "the things themselves," as the aim of phenomenological investigation, phenomenology for Husserl is ultimately inspired by "... an egology, the explication of the self and of its self constitution, of the other, of the objective world, and of communities of persons ... this idealism is completed by this reduction or leading back of all reality to its origin in performances of the ego" (Ballard, 1967, p. xviii). Kirkpatrick & Williams (1971, p. 13) also point this out. They argue that Husserl's interpretation of intentionality and constitution involves "... a partial or total reduction of questions concerning the nature of objects to questions concerning the nature of the activity of thought."

Indeed, this reductive nature of Husserlian phenomenology has been seen as its chief difficulty. Ricoeur (1967), for example, has identified this characteristic as arising from a "dogmatic idealism" at the base of Husserl's approach. This approach remains in conflict with the stated aims of phenomenology. Ricoeur explains that the fault within this approach is the relating of Husserl's phenomenological method and description to his metaphysical decision to interpret phenomena idealistically. Sartre (1971) makes a similar assessment. He points out that Husserl's declaration of a transcendental ego is in primary conflict with phenomenology's aim to investigate and describe the givenness of objects precisely as they appear. Any characteristics of objects ultimately become dependent on the constituting activity of the ego.

This overemphasis on the subject's activity in the origination and constitution of perceptual meaning does not allow Husserl to solve the problem of intersubjectivity and social interexperience (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b, 1968; Ricoeur, 1967; Strasser, 1969). Specifically, in an act-oriented field theory of experience perceptual meaning is reduced to the person's activity, and the limits within their field of experience. By implication, the perception of the other person is never a direct perception of a genuine other. The meaning of another's expressive gestures is ultimately constituted by my own experience, i.e., the transcendental ego. Accordingly the meaning of others and the world is imprisoned within the individual fields of perceiving people, and does not exist as situated and commonly shareable between these perceptual viewpoints. Strasser (1969) refers to this position as monological because it eliminates the dialectical, perceptual dialogue over a common, shareable world, and cannot account for the existence of others. A variant of this position was already presented in Chapter II, where it was shown that the account of the other in psychoanalytic schools is always indirect and solipsistic. For now, the limits of Husserlian phenomenology should be obvious when used as an approach supporting a revision of the unconscious. If I can never experience a direct, genuine other, then I can never experience his unconscious, i.e., his unawareness of himself as genuinely his. Ultimately, his unconscious is constituted solely by my own solipsistic experience. This difficulty underlies the classic phenomenological revisions of the unconscious, as I will show in my chapter: A psychology of the unconscious.

A contemporary phenomenological approach, drawn from the evidence of perceptual experience, emphasizes its self-transcendent exteriority, and suggests a redefinition of intentionality. I will first cite literature depicting this exteriority, and will conclude with a redefinition of intentionality.

Several scholars exemplify this trend toward emphasizing the exteriorized character of intentionality since Husserl. For example, Stein, W. (1970), who was already quoted, has argued that an analysis of perceptual experience reveals a lived perceptual priority on the object, the noema, not self, acts, or ego. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1968) argues that the "flesh" of the world holds a primacy as starting point for any account of the perceptual process. In a similar manner, Levinas (1969) has also prioritized the self-transcendent nature of perceptual experience. He points out that a reflection on lived-through experience discloses its essentially exteriorized nature. Recourse to perception through reflection empirically reveals this priority, rather than the presence or simultaneous co-presence of acts or ego. Tymieniecka (1966, pp. 13-14) extends this example of exteriority in consciousness-object relations to that of the subject's relationship to the world when she says:

The real individual realizes his concrete existence within and through the world context... The cognizing subject is immersed anonymously within the world (among other beings) in the infinitely complex texture of the world system or world context. We

experience this texture as an infinite wave that carries us along with its incessantly changing and advancing course. Setting out in our basic inquiry into the nature of beings, we cannot overlook this primitive evidence and the basic, authentic status of experience--its ingrownness in the world texture [my emphasis].

Sartre (1971, pp. 48-49) also radically depicts this anonymity of the subject and priority on the world when he says:

There is no I on the unreflected level. When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects, it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousness; it is they which present themselves with values, with attractive and repellent qualities--but me, I have disappeared.

3.4.3. The insentient other: a phenomenological account

Within this exteriorized nature of intentional, perceptual experience, other people play an influential role in the genesis of perceptual meaning. In fact, since Husserl this

trend has received the support and continued work of many phenomenologists, and, accordingly, deserves inclusion in a phenomenological approach (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b, 1968; Sartre, 1956; Scheler, 1948; Stein, E., 1964; Strasser, 1969). Objects, activities, projects, self and others, which are experienced in the everyday world, are never constituted by the isolated individual alone; they acquire their meanings through the co-constitutive mediation of present and historical other people. These others may be present as contemporaries in a face-to-face situation, or they may be an historical other who is present through their writings, art, film, music, sculpture, etc., in short, through their expression. In either case, the other person is one with whom I have made contact, regardless of the mode of experience through which that contact happens. The other becomes what I will call an insentient other when his presence is pre-reflectively operative and horizontal, but nonetheless, influential. His viewpoint becomes appropriated as my own and is included as new possibilities for experientiation which did not exist prior to my contact with them. In the language of a phenomenology of perception, one would say that insentient others are lived out as habitual behaviors of the body subject (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b). Their overall influence is to mediate and co-constitute the meanings of worldly situations, as Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt. Yet, the other always occupies a tacit presence behind their influence, which, itself, is usually taken-for-granted and unacknowledged in the experientiation of the person. Empirically, the insentient other exists through either the "actor's" or "observer's" experiential viewpoint (Schutz, Vol.

11, 1964), when one is thematically aware of this presence. It must, however, be given through someone's experience to exist. Within the therapeutic relationship, this influential presence is usually first spotted by the person of the therapist; however, as the client comes to gradually appropriate the viewpoint of the therapist, and assume it toward his or her self, the client also comes to make these recognitions. Here, the therapeutic aim is to make explicit this influence and presence of the other, so that it may be examined and possibly transformed in the interest of health.

In summary, both the exteriorization of intentionality and the inclusion of the other person(s) in an approach toward meaning genesis cast criticism on perspectives of Husserlian phenomenology. These perspectives are Husserl's tendency to overemphasize the activity of the experiencing person in his account of intentionality and constitution.

This contemporary direction is well illustrated in the phenomenological literature. For example, Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 348) has said that "Someone uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, the bell for summoning, and it is through the perception of a human act and another person that the perception of the cultural world could be verified." Strasser (1969, pp. 61-62) makes the same point when he says:

It is precisely through the mediation of a "you" that I know at all that there are things worth touching, tasting, looking at, listening to. A "you" teaches me also that there exists reality which can be manipulated, "utensils" destined for a particular use

(Heidegger), matter which I must modify in my work (Marx). Without the active-receptive interplay with a "you" I would not know that my existence has a social dimension.

In other words, direct perceptual meaning of things is implicitly mediated by the already existent, sedimented thought and activity of others who have come before us. Straus (1963, p. 5) puts this insight well when he says, "No one ever starts from a radical beginning. As soon as we begin to think, we continue the thoughts of former generations." These former others have been identified as the influence of our predecessors, who are always horizontally present in our naive experience of the world (Schutz, Vol. III, 1966). Accordingly, an approach which seeks to understand both how people exist and their perceptual experience must include this interconnectedness and influence of others. The section in this chapter on the expressive body as the basis for inter-subjectivity both grounds and supports these insights. Perceptual experience, in short, is never constituted solely by the individual existing in isolation, and the activity of that individual within the perceptual process, as it is experienced, must be de-emphasized. Correlatively, the object of perception is never, in Tymieniecka's (1966, p. 13) words, "...a 'bloodless monster' of eidetic perception." Intentional experience is characterized by both its radical exteriorization and its dialectical relation with others.

The inclusion of this social dimension in the dialectical co-constitution of perceptual meaning, however, deserves minor qualification. Empirically, the phenomenal object is not al-

ways experienced as thematically social, for to assume an invariant, thematic social meaning for all experience is to invoke the constancy hypothesis and treat the social as an isolated stimulus. Brown (1967), for example, maintains this monological assumption throughout his discussion of the studies on the social psychology of learning by identification. Instead, following Gurwitsch (1964), the significance of the other is always found sedimented in the thematic field; the other always exists horizontally, and may, at times, be thematic in awareness. In closing, it should be emphasized that we do not constitute the other person; we dialogue with them. This insight flows from two experientially verifiable assumptions: a) that the incarnate, expressive lived body already allows the possibility for genuine intersubjective existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Lapointe, 1976), and b) that a description of perceptual experience reveals that the other person is already there, existing through our experience. Accordingly, no need exists to explain, construct, or reduce their presence (Merleau-Ponty, ibid; Strasser, 1969).

3.4.4. The insentient other as expressed in socio-psychological literature

Literature drawn from sociology and psychology richly portrays both the presence and the influence of the insentient other on the meaning of human experience. At a socio-cultural level, George Herbert Mead (1934) argues that the socialization of the individual is predicated on the assumption of the viewpoints of others. Perceptual meaning of the world, oneself, and society are informed by the insentient presence

of others. Mead (1934, p. 625) says this:

That which creates the duties, rights, the customs, the laws and the various institutions in human society ... is the capacity of the human individual to assume the organized attitude of the community toward himself as well as toward others.

Berger & Luckmann (1967) also point this out, and offer a theoretical dialectic to account for the processes of social evolution and change in the perceptual experience of people. For instance, an individual or group of people may initiate a social change that transforms the institutionalized structure of social reality. This is what Berger & Luckmann call the externalization of novel meaning into social reality. When this innovation is integrated into the fabric of social reality, they refer to this as the objectivation of social meaning. What was an innovation is now institutionalized as a taken-for-granted feature of social reality. Finally, internalization refers to the appropriation and influence of the insentient, now institutionalized, viewpoints on the experientiation of individuals and groups. In short, what was externalized as a product of human activity becomes institutionalized and objectivated, and dialectically arcs back to be internalized and inform ongoing human experientiation. For Berger & Luckmann, social reality is constructed and transformed in this fashion. Crucial to their argument is the assumption that social reality is a human product.

The theme of the unconscious serves well to illustrate

their dialectic. Many views of human unawareness were offered (externalized) prior to Freud. However, with Freud, the psychoanalytic unconscious achieved an objectivation and institutionalization at the cultural level. Henceforth, those individuals having experiential access to the sector of social reality influenced by Freud's externalization saw themselves and the world differently. They internalized his viewpoint, and, thereafter, the psychoanalytic unconscious came to exist and influence human experiential action. Prior to Freud's viewpoint, people did not possess this possibility for the experience of themselves and others. This analysis of the insentient other in the process of internalization is compatible with Kuhn's (1970) explanation of scientific paradigm changes, and Romanyshyn's (1975) paper on the effects of the Copernican revolution. In all these instances, a person's experience changes by virtue of including the perspective(s) of insentient other(s). Alapack (1972) has depicted how the insentient other is lived out in his empirical phenomenological study of the natural athlete. One of his findings is that both a person's initial choice of sports involvement, as well as the quality of their performance, is mediated by an internalized, historical or contemporary other person. Alapack (1972, p. 211) illustrates the experiential dialogue between self and other perspectives in this experimental subject's description. The person's father was a football coach.

Jim describes the paralyzing, awkward experience of trying to run with the football while simultaneously being pre-occupied "...

with my own view of running in comparison
to how my dad was seeing my running."

Giorgi (1975b) also reports the influential presence of the other among his findings in an empirical investigation of learning. A concrete, lived-through situation (interior decorating) was first described by an experimental subject. In response to the experimenter, the person reported having learned through the activity of doing the task. However, on reflection she also discovered that the activity tacitly took up the decorating perspective and principles of a friend. In both of the above examples, the insentient other acts as mediator in both opening certain possibilities for experiential and co-constituting perspectives of their meaning. In separate works, Van den Berg (1972, 1974) has shown how the insentient other mediates the experience of one's body. He (1974) reports that the bodily experience of pain is related to the presence and absence of other people. His historical survey reveals that pain and pain killers have been on the increase since the beginning of the nineteenth century. He argues that "pain abolishes a relationship with other people" (p. 225). Pain may be occasioned and intensified by personal isolation, which places a person out of contact with others. Correlatively, contact with others diminishes pain. In the same work, Van den Berg extends this argument to include the significance of the interpersonal relationship in hypnosis. A subject in pain is placed in contact with another person, the hypnotist. The early hypnotist, maintains Van den Berg, fixed the subject's attention upon an object, and through

this attention restored the person's contact with something. Through this contact, pain was diminished. What Van den Bèrg does not make explicit is that the object is offered in the context of a relationship to someone else. Accordingly, the appropriation of the hypnotist's post-hypnotic instructions allow the hypnotist to become an insentient other and mediate the transformation of the subject's experiation. This view of hypnosis is held by Sarbin & Coe (1972), who see the hypnotic process from within a social, role-assumption interpersonal relationship between subject and hypnotist. A second example illustrating the mediation of the other on a person's body image is found in Van den Berg's (1972) work. He notes how the loving relationship often effects a transformation in one's body experience. He (pp. 69-70) offers the following example:

The girl with freckles lives on strained terms with her face, until a man lets her know that he loves her as she is, with her freckles. Perhaps he tells her that he loves her because of her freckles, whereas so many girls have to do without them. That is what love is like... The exceptional peculiarity, even if, as a result of the opinion of others, it had become an obstacle, can be the basis on which one is accepted.

The example illustrates a two-fold mediation by the insentient other. On the one hand is the girl's self-critical attitude toward her appearance, drawn from an unacknowledged presence

of an anonymous, cultural other. Heidegger (1962, pp. 149-168) refers to this anonymous cultural other as "das Man." From this cultural viewpoint of the other, freckles may be termed unattractive. However, through a loving relationship this viewpoint comes to be superseded and transformed by the viewpoint of the loved other. In either case, an unseen dialogue with the appropriated other insentiently informs the girl's initial and altered experiences of her own body. Even in so-called solitary activities such as reading, a person is in dialogue with others who authored the thoughts read (Sardello, 1975; Strasser, 1969). When those thoughts are appropriated as one's own, new possibilities arise in experiential action.

The psychotherapeutic relationship also contains the presence of insentient others. When viewed as an interpersonal relationship, psychotherapy is the deliberate substitution of a beneficial, positively transforming relationship, whose aim is understanding of and emancipation from other influential, fallible relationships. Central in the therapeutic process is a transformation whereby the orientation, insights, and personal perspectives of the therapist are appropriated as a client's own (Barton, 1974). When this occurs, "... the analysis is an analysis of oneself" (Schafer, 1978, p. 10), and the therapist comes to exist also as an influential, insentient other who guides the transformation of experiential action. If successful, therapy is the superseding of the influence of prior insentient others, when the client consents to that choice.

Research on psychotherapy, in fact, has shown that the person's relationship to the therapist is one of the most significant variables to emerge in a client's estimation of the therapeutic process. A series of studies by Fiedler (1950a, 1950b, 1951) supports this. Fiedler has experimental subjects rate experienced and non-experienced therapists of psychoanalytic, Adlerian, client-centered orientations, along with three laymen. The technique employed was the Q sort. Results showed a higher correlation among the experts of the different orientations than non-experts. Factor analysis of the data disclosed one factor of goodness in the therapeutic relationship: the ability of the therapist to emphasize, understand, and communicate in the relationship with the client. Van Kaam's (1959) investigation of the therapeutic relationship discloses similar findings. Using a method of phenomenal analysis, Van Kaam found the experience of "really feeling understood" to be a central variable in the therapist-client relationship. Within therapy, the viewpoint of an empathic, understanding therapist extends to the client, and becomes taken up as an insentient other perspective, which often supercedes and transforms a client's pre-therapeutic experience of himself.

3.4.5. The psychoanalytic account of the insentient other

Psychoanalytic practice has also recognized the insentient presence and influence of others on our experiention through the concepts of introjection and internalization. Ferenczi (1952) was the first to use the term introjection, and posed

it as opposite to projection. Freud adopted the term, and made an explicit account of the introjective process in his paper Instincts and their vicissitudes (Freud, 1959, Vol. 4, pp. 60-83). The Kleinians use introjection synonymously with internalization, and by each designate "... the transposition in phantasy of an external 'good' or 'bad' object (the entirety or perspective of another person), or of a whole or part-object to the 'inside' of the subject" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, pp. 226-227). The terms in fact are closely related, and suggest different emphases. For example, in Freudian parlance the male child is said to introject the figure of the father and internalize a conflict with authority in the aftermath of an unresolved Oedipus complex (ibid., p. 227). An example drawn from clinical practice should clarify the meaning of introjection, and illustrate the insentient presence and influence of others on our lives. Guntrip (1969, pp. 42-43) cites the following examples:

Thus one patient felt depressed while bathing and cried silently, and then felt a strong urge to snuggle her head down on to her shoulder, i.e., mother's shoulder in herself, and at once she felt better. Again, sitting with her husband one evening reading, she became aware that she was thinking of an intimate relation with him and found she had slipped her hand inside her frock and was caressing her own breast.

The example cited above centers on the theme of narcissism,

which classically defined is autoerotic, "loving oneself" (Freud, 1959, Vol. 4, p. 76). In contrast, the English object-relations tradition argues that narcissism is not self love, but love of another person who is internalized and insentiently present prior to therapeutic awareness. As Guntrip (1969, p. 42) states it: "Narcissism is a disguised internal object-relation," which is empirically disclosed through a clinical approach that fosters a sensitivity to the significance of others, rather than a focus on instincts or ego processes. Similarly, the work of Anna Freud (1936) denotes the tacit presence and influence of others. In particular, her concept of the "identification with the aggressor" describes a situation in which a person anticipates or copes with aggression from an authority by appropriating that viewpoint. This may lead to actual aggression directed toward the self, or to an emulation of the other's power. In either case, the other's insentient presence, be it historical or contemporary, informs experience. This presence of the other is also found in Jacobson's (1974) account of grief and depression. She points out how the perceptual meanings of social objects may be loaded with the meanings of an absent or deceased significant other during a period of grief. Grief and depression, in her account, refer to loss, and draw from a horizon of early human figure loss. In short, introjection and internalization are concepts indigenous to schools of psychoanalysis, and always indicate the appropriation, dialogue with, and influence of the insentient presence of others on our lives (Schafer, 1968).

3.4.6. Limitations of the psychoanalytic account of the insentient other

Internalization and introjection have their origins in clinical practice. Their overall existential significance, however, is the recognition that taken-for-granted perceptual meaning within the natural attitude already appropriates the unacknowledged presence and viewpoints of others. This insight is not in question. In fact, it accords with Strasser's (1969) vision of "dialogal phenomenology," which provides a genetic perspective for understanding perceptual experience. What is questionable is the psychoanalytic, metapsychological account of this process. Specifically, this account begins from intersubjective relations, transforms this relationship, and reduces it to intrasubjective relations (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973; Van Kaam, 1966). Dialogue and influence are then understood intrapsychically between ego/superego/id (orthodox psychoanalysis) or central ego/anti-libidinal ego/libidinal ego/regressed ego (English object-relations tradition). Implicit in this account is the key Cartesian presupposition that "external" reality is separate from an "internal" psychic reality. From a phenomenological approach, this reduction, and the fragmentation of intersubjective relations into ego states, is unempirical. Laing (1970, p. 20) states this criticism forcefully when he says:

But experience is not "subjective" rather than "objective," not "inner" rather than "outer," not process rather than praxis, not input rather than output, not psychic

rather than somatic, not some doubtful data dredged up from introspection rather than extrospection. Least of all is experience "intrapsychic process." Such transactions, object relations, inter-personal relations, transference, counter-transference, as we suppose to go on between two people are not the interplay merely of two objects in space, each equipped with ongoing intrapsychic processes.

Laing's point is that the distinction between internal and external, as objectively defined, is not supported by perceptual experience. Instead, an empirical, phenomenological approach maintains that any theme or presence given through experience is neutral with respect to this distinction (Laing, 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 1966a, 1966b; Sartre, 1962; Straus, 1963). If one stays closely with experience, external usually refers to presences disclosed through visual perception and audition, while internal has reference to fantasy, memory, and imagination. For example, there is no objective spatial distinction between remembering my home and visually seeing it. In both cases, my home is present experientially; however, the modality of experience is different. From another perspective, internal and external may have reference to the degree of familiarity and at-homeness with which one experiences a viewpoint. Another person's point of view may appear as novel, strange, or even alien in reference to my stock of experience, but it is neutral with respect to any internal/external distinction.

Accordingly, a phenomenological approach has no need to explain how something external is internalized or introjected, because a point of view is experienced without any spatial reference to these coordinates. Giorgi's (1970) discussion of internal and external viewpoints makes a similar point, and is central to a phenomenological understanding of introjection and the insentient other. He points out that the essence of appropriating another person's viewpoint on ourselves is that we ignore or set aside our personal perspective and ordinary proximity to ourselves. We then experience ourselves from the attitude of another person, as if that person could be observing what we are experientially dealing with. Because the lived body expresses a structure of both behavior and experience, a person is capable of experiencing both, whether they are given through his or her viewpoint, or through that of the other person. Accordingly, Giorgi sees the adoption of another's viewpoint as a specialized internal viewpoint, but only in the sense that it remains the viewpoint of some person, or a position that we regularly assume toward self, others, and the world in everyday life. The lived body is neutral with respect to inner or outer, as is the status of viewpoints.

In conclusion, the analytic account of the insentient other is not upheld by the evidence of perceptual experience. The appreciation of the role of other people in our lives is there; however, the metapsychological account of introjection obscures rather than clarifies what is happening experientially between people. These difficulties are perpetuated by the approach of psychoanalysis, and disjunctions between approach

and theory, theory and practice, are the consequences.

3.4.7. Summary

This chapter occupies a pivotal position within this overall work, for it refers both to the issues preceeding it and to those that follow. The preceeding material of Chapters I and II discussed the psychoanalytic unconscious as it exists within the context of the theoretical superstructure of psychoanalysis, and how both this superstructure and the unconscious are grounded in and informed by the implicit psychoanalytic approach. In short, the psychoanalytic unconscious does not exist in isolation. Methodologically, then, my examination of the unconscious begins first by dealing with these issues of approach and their reflection in the psychoanalytic theoretical superstructure. Following Giorgi (1970), approach was defined as essentially a philosophical problem which co-determines both the nature of the phenomenon studied and how the therapist/researcher behaves toward that phenomenon in a therapeutic orientation or research strategy. Accordingly, an examination of the psychoanalytic approach was made, and its philosophical features were presented and made explicit in the theoretical superstructure of psychoanalysis. The approach of psychoanalysis, along with calls for revision, were shown to take for granted a dated, natural science standpoint. This results in an irony within the psychoanalytic enterprise. Psychoanalysis deals with people, but it does so from an approach originally designed to comprehend the things of early natural science. A series of empirical problems were shown to arise from this. Disjunctions

between the approach and theory, and theory and practice, were documented as resulting gaps which call into question the empirical bearing of psychoanalysis. Since the written and spoken word guides both clinical psychoanalytic practice and theory, a revision in approach was shown to be absolutely necessary on empirical grounds. In this work, the presence of these empirical problems and the need to ground the unconscious in an alternative approach having fidelity, empirically, to people, bear directly on a revised psychology of the unconscious.

This present chapter began by showing that a phenomenological approach provides a desirable alternative. Significant is the fact that phenomenology originated from an historical and empirical necessity to clarify human, rather than thing-like, existences. This empirical interest was found in both the origination of phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology, including schools of phenomenological psychoanalysis. Next, some essential features of a phenomenological approach were presented, again from a philosophical standpoint. These features have a two-fold reference in this work. They stand in direct contrast to the philosophical features of the psychoanalytic approach in Chapter II, and are propaedeutic to the criticism and reformulation of a psychology of the unconscious in Chapter IV.

Central to the interpersonal nature of the clinical situation is an approach informing views of how people exist, the relations between behavior and experience, how we know the other person, and the issue of intersubjectivity. Accord-

ingly, this chapter addressed these questions, and highlighted a presentation of a phenomenology of bodily existence. Here it was first shown that psychoanalysis makes a strict distinction between the appearance of behavior, including language, and the subjective, unconsciously initiated intentions, desires, and motives of the person. Further, within psychoanalysis the other person is known only indirectly and by inference through an introspective, projective process of our own self-knowledge. In this solipsistic account, a genuine other person with intersubjective possibilities does not exist. By implication, I can never know the other's unawareness of himself as genuinely his; I can only know my own, and see the other's through that projection. In contrast, a phenomenological approach was shown to make no distinction between appearance and being, behavior and subjectivity. The appearance is direct access to being, and behavior is direct access to subjectivity and a knowledge of the other person. That is, the phenomenological concepts of structure and the body-subject allow a direct view of a genuine other person who possesses intersubjective possibilities. Moreover, in this approach a person's existence is not reducible to either the observer's experiential viewpoint or the subject's viewpoint on himself. Rather, like the cited example of the work of art, bodily existence is co-existence, and a person exists as a shareable presence between the viewpoints present. Chapter IV will show the implications of this for a psychology of the unconscious.

The classical phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis and the unconscious by Boss (1963), Binswanger (1975),

and Ricoeur (1970) are predicated on an approach that emphasizes an epistemological basis from Husserlian phenomenology. Accordingly, a critical examination of this basis was made in the light of important post-Husserlian developments in phenomenological theory. It was concluded that a contradiction exists within Husserl's phenomenology, which affects his widely accepted definition of intentionality. For instance, Husserl argues that an empirical foundation for philosophical and scientific activity requires going "back to the things themselves," without recourse to ontological commitments and existing theoretical interpretations. Further, he maintains that one should not move outside the givens of experience in order to explain them. Yet, as documented, he overemphasizes the activity of the subject in the perceptual process, and ultimately reduces perceptual meaning to the transcendental ego, which is empirically unexperienceable.

Newer developments in phenomenological thought argue for a reformulation of intentionality. These developments de-emphasize the subject's presence and activity in a definition of intentionality, and point out that noematic exteriorization and personal anonymity are characteristic of an empirical account of intentionality. Moreover, one direction emphasizes the mediating influence of historical and contemporary other people in the co-constitution and genesis of perceptual meaning. I refer to this mediating dialogue with tacit others as the presence and influence of insentient others.

These refinements in phenomenological theory have appeared in the literature cited in this chapter; however, they have not

yet been integrated into an approach informing clinical psychology. One exception to this neglect is Halling's (1975) paper on the implications of Levinas' exteriorization for the therapeutic relationship. However, this paper by-passes any consideration of the unconscious. Accordingly, a phenomenological revision of the unconscious should include these references to the self-transcendent exteriorized nature of intentionality and the mediating influence of insentient others in the genesis of perceptual meaning. These refinements call into question the empirical status of the classic, phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis and the unconscious. Therefore, an examination of the unconscious within an up-dated, phenomenological approach appears necessary. This chapter has presented such an approach, with which we now turn to confront a psychology of the unconscious.

IV. A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

4.1 Nature and scope of this chapter

The previous chapters argued that a phenomenological approach, as a desirable alternative to the existing natural science approach, would allow the approach of psychoanalysis to be empirically consistent with both its guiding theory and practice.

Drawing from these earlier chapters as background, this chapter concludes with a presentation of the unconscious from within a phenomenological approach. This project, however, takes place within the context of a long, historical controversy over how the unconscious exists. In this section I will briefly depict this controversy and highlight some contemporary criticisms from humanistic and phenomenological psychology. These criticisms raise questions that demand consideration in any examination of the unconscious, and also show the scope of this present chapter. Accordingly, this material will be stated at the beginning.

The historical controversy surrounding the unconscious hinges on how it was assumed to exist, more specifically, on its localization. Pre-Freudian versions of the unconscious emphasize that it is implicit within a person's field of experience and capable of becoming conscious. Accordingly,

perceptual experience was held to be composed of both explicit and implicit factors realized through the individual's perceptual viewpoint on himself. These pre-Freudian versions come largely from the academic community. Freud, however, called for a Copernican leap away from the standpoint of these "philosophies of consciousness" in his interpretation of the unconscious. Based on the phenomena present through the practical, clinical situation, Freud was adamant in arguing that the dynamic unconscious was not a part of the individual's field of experience. The unconscious, he maintained, existed outside of the individual's experiential viewpoint on himself, within the realm of the biological. Specialized method, not self-experience, was the key to its disclosure.

Since Freud's time, this controversy has continued. Many humanistic and phenomenological psychologists criticize the psychoanalytic unconscious as being incompatible with a person-centered psychology based on human experience (Binswanger, 1975; Boss, 1963; Combs, Richards, A., Richards, F., 1976; Kelly, 1963; Perls, Hefferline, Goodman, 1951; Snygg & Combs, 1950; Stein, 1970; Van den Berg, 1975). These psychologists take human experience, conceived within the person's perceptual field, as the primary data of psychology. They argue that the psychoanalytic unconscious, insofar as it exists outside this field, is not a feature of perceptual functioning. Accordingly, a phenomenology of the unconscious is seen as a contradiction in terms. Hypothetical questions raised by these psychologists are: "How can you have the experience of some-

thing of which you are unaware?" "If a human science psychology is based on a commitment to experience, then how can the unconscious be included within this paradigm for psychology?" Finally, "is not the positing of the unconscious as outside the person's field of experience a return to Cartesian based naturalism, where 'real' exists behind the appearances of everyday experience?" In short, is not a phenomenology of the unconscious a contradiction in terms for those who wish to ground a human psychology in experience?

Likewise, objections may be anticipated from the community of depth psychologists. For example, "does not the project of a phenomenology of the unconscious negate and leave unintegrated the findings of depth psychology, which clearly show how much our experience is influenced by aspects of ourselves outside our awareness?" (Wyss, 1966). Further, "would a phenomenology of the unconscious not be a return to 'psychologies of consciousness,' which Freud had to reject?" Indeed, the unconscious is so crucial to psychoanalysis that Freud (1969) felt historians would attribute far greater importance to psychoanalysis as the science of the unconscious than as a therapeutic procedure.

What I depict in this chapter is that phenomenology and the unconscious are not mutually exclusive. A phenomenological approach is capable of including human, dynamic unconsciousness within perceptual experience while still integrating the wealth of insights derived from therapeutic reflection and practice. Accordingly, this revision meets the empirical criteria of a phenomenological approach by placing the

unconscious within a foundation of human experience.

The outline covered spans five main points: First, pre-Freudian views of the unconscious tended to see this phenomenon as existing within the person's field of experience. Nevertheless, academic psychology, founded then on the study of consciousness, was nearly unanimous in rejecting the unconscious. I will review these pre-Freudian versions of the unconscious. Second, Freud called for a Copernican leap from this tradition, and placed the dynamic unconscious proper outside the field of consciousness, but within the psychobiology of the person. Using the phenomenological approach from Chapter III, I will critically examine Freud's natural science stance toward the unconscious, and make explicit its specific dated natural science features in need of revision. Here, I will argue that Freud was correct in placing the dynamic unconscious outside the field of a person's immediate experience. However, by situating this unconscious within the psychobiology of the person, empirical problems result which perpetuate the disjunctions between approach and theory, theory and practice. Third, drawing from Husserl's epistemology, the classic phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis and the unconscious move back to view the unconscious within the person's field of experience. Here, I will show that Husserl's phenomenology, as approach, is capable of integrating what Freud meant by preconscious, but leaves untouched an integrated understanding of the unconscious proper. The phenomenological revisions of Binswanger (1975), Boss (1963), and Ricoeur (1970) are examined to illustrate these

limits of the Husserlian approach toward the unconscious. Finally, drawing from the updated phenomenological approach of Chapter III, a phenomenological account of the unconscious will be presented. This account overcomes the difficulties made explicit in Freud's treatment of the unconscious, and situates it within the approach and criteria of psychology conceived as a human science.

4.2 Pre-Freudian expressions and interpretations of the unconscious

In the minds of most people the theme of the unconscious is synonymous with the work of Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. Indeed, this association carries with it a certain truth. That is, among the various interpretations of human unawareness that have appeared throughout the history of civilization, Freud's version of the unconscious stands as the most dominant, influential, and paradigmatic (Ellenberger, 1970; MacIntyre, 1958; Whyte, 1960). However, if referenced to Freud, the unconscious would be incorrectly seen within a state of infancy, having a life less than eighty-five years. The literature on this topic states otherwise. While the unconscious that we currently know is generally, and correctly, credited to Freud, his interpretation is relatively new and specialized when compared to a long, documented history of curiosity about man's relative unawareness of himself and the insentient influences on human life. In this latter generic sense of the unconscious as unawareness I will now turn to review pre-Freudian expressions of the unconscious and select

interpretations. Detailed historical reviews of this topic have already been done (Ellenberger, 1957, 1970; Klein, D. B., 1977; MacIntyre, 1958; Margetts, 1953; Van den Berg, 1974; Whyte, 1960; Zilboorg, 1941). Accordingly, I will not repeat these efforts. Instead, my presentation will collate some select, major expressions and interpretations of unconsciousness as they exist in the cited literature. This is done to throw into relief just how original and unique Freud's interpretation of the unconscious is.

Expressions and interpretations of human unawareness, as the unconscious, have been present since the beginning of human thought. In one form or another, these phenomena were always appreciated as states that exist between conscious events (Whyte, 1960). Hence, they correspond roughly to what Freud meant by the preconscious, the implicit aspects of conscious perceptual processes, which can be explicit in awareness. Within this history, Whyte (1972) notes that an essential feature of the modern unconscious was lacking, prior to the seventeenth century. This was the separation of conscious awareness from a materially defined body and world. Accordingly, he traces the emergence of the modern unconscious to the philosophical dualisms announced by Descartes. Within this post-Cartesian period, however, the unconscious acquired a socially paradigmatic value only since the end of the last century. In short, whereas individual expressions of the unconscious appeared before the last half of the nineteenth century, these expressions must be considered anomalies. Only in the latter nineteenth century is the unconscious collectively

expressed (Ellenberger, 1970; Van den Berg, 1974; Whyte, 1960). This interpretation of the history of the unconscious is grounded in Kuhn's (1970) hermeneutic relativism.

Further, among these collective, nineteenth-century expressions, Freud's psychoanalytic unconscious became the most popular, influential, and institutionalized. Hence, at the level of experienced social reality, people did not possess a psychoanalytic unconscious until Freud's version achieved its popular institutionalization. This interpretation is supported by scholars in this area (Ellenberger, 1970; Van den Berg, 1974; Whyte, 1960). They insist that Freud's interpretation of the unconscious must be distinguished from its precursors on two counts. First, the psychoanalytic unconscious makes a strict distinction between conscious and unconscious, and places the unconscious proper outside the field of awareness, but within the person conceived as psychobiological organism. Second, the unconscious proper is conceived as dynamic and affective, and determines perceptual reality. Accordingly, only through the insentient presence of Freud do we so easily take for granted a recognition of dynamic significance in slips of the tongue, the meaning of dreams, and the influence of our familial history. With this established, we may now turn to examine pre-Freudian expressions of unconsciousness.

Pre-Freudian expressions and interpretations of the unconscious emphasize three trends: an avoidance of the term unconscious, a belief that the unconscious is never absolutely or permanently unconscious, and, finally, that it is not absolutely estranged from the structure of perceptual conscious-

ness. Some of the first expressions of human unconsciousness and duality appeared in the literature and philosophy of the eighteenth century, and were prior to any systematic, psychological understanding of this phenomenon. For example, in 1733 George Cheyne had published The English Malady, which disclosed a presentation and analysis of neurotoid symptoms among the aristocracy in England. Seven years later Samuel Richardson authored the novel Pamela, in which emotions and conflicts now indicative of unconscious human duality were presented. These themes were not ordinarily recognized nor discussed publicly in that time. Within the eighteenth century, two major figures drew attention to the emotional nature of the unconscious. Rousseau sought to explore this perspective as a basis for understanding his own cyclothymia. He says: "It is thus certain that neither my own judgment nor my will dictated my answer, and that it was the automatic consequence of my embarrassment" (in Whyte, 1972, p. 186). A second figure was the German religious philosopher J. G. Hamann, who studied an unconscious basis for his own religious conversion. Whyte (ibid) cites Hamann as concluding "how much more the formation of our own ideas remain secret." In this recognition, Hamann was presumably indicating a previously unacknowledged role of emotional factors in his conversion.

The dynamic and emotional significance of the unconscious was increasingly stressed between 1750 and the turn of that century. In particular, this time span contains the emergence of the Doppelgänger within literature, an expression of human

duality and unconsciousness. Ludwig Tieck's novel Ryno, published in 1791 was one of the first works to portray a divided personal existence. In this novel, the lead character dialogues with a stranger, who is not a literal stranger, but a foreign, publicly unexpressed part of himself. This same year sees the publication of Jean Paul Richter's Unsichtbare Loge, wherein the double emerges from hiding to take the place of the character portraying everyday consciousness. As Van den Berg (1974) indicates, the theme of human duality expressed through the Doppelgänger emerged only after 1790, and continues today. In the pre-Freudian expressions of this theme the unconscious self never is fully unconscious and cut off from potential awareness. The poet Herder emphasizes this accessibility of the unconscious in his understanding of the role of the unconscious in imagination, dreams, creativity, and illness. Similarly, Goethe spoke of the ongoing dialogue between consciousness and the unconscious in creative imagination. Both Hegel and Fichte understood the unconscious as a dynamic basis for reason, with Hegel extending this conception to the effects of the unconscious, historical dialectic on human living. Likewise, with Schelling, unconscious factors are not absolutely isolated, but can usually become conscious through the ego.

During the nineteenth century the unconscious had become a fixture of European everyday culture, and began to receive some explanation. For example, Goethe's physician and friend, Carus, opened his 1846 text Psyche with the words: "The key to the understanding of the character of the conscious lies in the region of the unconscious" (in Whyte, 1972, p. 186).

Speculative philosophical attention had also been drawn to the unconscious. Carus' investigations were the inspiration for von Hartmann's highly influential work, The philosophy of the unconscious, published in 1869. Von Hartmann specified twenty-six different modes of unconscious activity, drawing his supporting evidence from perception, emotional life, instincts, the association of ideas, personality features, personal destiny, and other areas. Von Hartmann became the fountain-head for other philosophers of the unconscious. His position that the unconscious exhibits a creative, autonomous, compensatory relationship to conscious life is reflected as a central feature of C. G. Jung's psychology a half-century later (Ellenberger, 1970).

Beginning in the mid-eighteen hundreds, the unconscious was approached more as a psychological phenomenon by philosophers, academic psychologists, and clinicians. Already in 1704, and later in 1714, Leibnitz had proposed the first account of the unconscious grounded in psychological terms (Ellenberger, 1970; Robinson, 1976). Leibnitz distinguished two kinds of perception. A central perception exists in which the perceiver is aware of the perceived object, and a peripheral experience also exists, in which the perceiver may be unaware of an object even though he is actively experiencing. These modes of perception are perception proper and apperception. Leibnitz's use of the term perception, accordingly, denotes the implicit aspects of human experience, and his perspective on the unconscious emphasizes this characteristic. Leibnitz does not inspire the notion of a dynamic

unconscious because he does not indicate a duality or dissociation of personal existence (Van den Berg, 1974).

A natural link exists between the work of Leibnitz and Johann Herbart, Kant's successor at Königsberg. In 1824 Herbart was drawn to the distinction between apperception and perception, and proposed a dynamic account of this relationship. He introduced the term threshold to denote a barrier between competing or conflicting ideas, awareness and unawareness. Stronger perceptions outweigh weaker ones, driving them below this threshold. These suppressed representations strive to surmount the threshold, and often associate themselves with other representations. Sub-threshold representations are always the background for aware, perceptual experience, and constitute what Herbart called the apperceptive mass. In Herbart's account, this apperceptive stratum, is always potentially accessible to awareness. His version of the unconscious signifies the implicit aspects of human experience.

The philosopher Nietzsche, however, is closer as a precursor for many psychoanalytic perspectives of the unconscious. Writing in the latter eighteen-hundreds, Nietzsche saw the unconscious as the irrational arena for the reenactment of historically earlier stages of individual and species-specific development. Dreams, for example, depict both this irrationality and reliving of former times. With Kierkegaard, Marx, Husserl, Freud, Ibsen, and Dostoevsky, Nietzsche is a central figure among these philosophers of suspicion, dedicated to unmasking or uncovering reality and human self-deception.

With Nietzsche, human living is a manifestation of unconscious motivation drawing from instincts. In particular, Nietzsche drew attention to the role played by aggression and self-destruction in life. In fact, the term Id (das Es) derives originally from Nietzsche, although Freud traces its source to George Groddeck (Ellenberger, 1970).

Among Nietzsche's concepts to later appear in psychoanalytic theory are instincts, and their antithetical relationship to culture, notions of psychic energy, and the mind as a system of drives, as well as numerous clinical insights into the nature of people. While Nietzsche revealed many dynamic expressions of the unconscious, however, he never emphasized the structural isolation of the unconscious to the degree that Freud split it from the field of consciousness.

Gustav Fechner's psychophysical investigations of Herbart's ideas inaugurated some of the first experimental investigations of the unconscious (Wyss, 1966). Around 1850 Fechner began studying the quantitative relationship between the intensity of the stimulus and the experimental subject's perception. Through this design, Fechner was seeking a mathematical distinction between awareness and unawareness. The results of this work led to Fechner's law, which states that the intensity of sensation increases as the logarithm of its stimulus (Von Fleandt, 1966). Freud (1938) acknowledges the influence of Fechner on psychoanalysis, and scholars have also traced such psychoanalytic topics as psychic energy, constancy of energy, intensity of associations, and psychic localization to the work of Fechner. While he studied the

relationship between awareness and unawareness, Fechner never recommended the term unconscious, nor did he distinguish unawareness structurally from consciousness as strictly as Freud would later do.

Following Fechner, other experimental psychologists tried to measure unconscious psychological activity. Around 1860, both Wundt and Helmholtz introduced the term unconscious inference (unbewusster Schluss). In their formulation, perception is an unconscious reconstruction which utilizes our past experience along with perceptual objects. Perception is, accordingly, influenced by a "set," which adds to raw sensory data, and also abstracts from it, to retain what is necessary for our knowledge of objects (Boring, 1957).

Within this same period Oswald Külpe, leading the Würzburg school of experimentation, was studying imageless thought and the influence of mental sets, or Aufgaben, on perception. Aufgaben were understood as unconscious mental sets which act as preparation for action. They may function autonomously in the absence of any sensory or imaginal stimulation. The unconscious in this school was treated as the implicit aspects of perception, similar to the treatment of Herbart, Fechner, Helmholtz, and Wundt. In France, Chevreul showed experimentally that divining rod and pendulum movements were guided by unconscious bodily movements, occasioned by unconscious thoughts. Finally, Galton developed the word association test to demonstrate that a person's word associations are correlated to his unconscious attitudes, preferences, and memories.

Within the late eighteen-hundreds the unconscious was collectively expressed as a duality in human existence and personal identity. In France alone considerable clinical interest became focused on this problem, with over sixty publications on suggestion, hypnotism, and the dual self appearing between 1885 and 1887 (Van den Berg, 1974). Moreover, Van den Berg (ibid) points out that the neurotoid patient does not make a significant appearance in medical records until the eighteenth century. Particularly from the late eighteen-hundreds, neurotoid disorders become increasingly present in a changing form to our present time. Not only does a division of labor occur, but "... everything or almost everything was divided, split up, and separated into parts. Even man's ego falls apart into a plural self" (ibid, p. 136). This condition led to a reawakening of interest in hypnosis, and in its practical use. Hypnosis was thought to occasion a division of human consciousness, which evoked a second self. By 1888, Van Eeden had urged that this second self be called a "second personality," and emphasized its accessibility to awareness through certain techniques. Along with Dessoir and Janet, he urged the avoidance of the term unconscious on the following grounds:

The term is incorrect. A personality which acts intelligently, answers logically, remembers everything that has occurred, awake as well as asleep, remembers it with even more clarity than the customary waking personality, cannot be called unconscious.

It must be called a second personality, a dual self (cited in Van den Berg; 1974, p. 35).

In 1889, Janet had argued a similar position on avoiding the term unconscious. He urged the term "subconscious," saying that "nothing in our lives is completely and entirely unconscious; not now and not then" (*ibid*, p. 25). Similarly, Dessoir preferred the term "double self." He argued that we possess two selves within us simultaneously, and that they usually appear in succession. Pathological conditions such as insanity and epilepsy reveal a disappearance of the sane self, with another self, having different desires and intentions, taking its place. This duality was exquisitely expressed in literature by Robert Louis Stevenson's 1886 publication of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Van den Berg (1974, pp. 39-40) sees Stevenson as recognizing four features of human existence that were operative at that time; the duality in man's existence, the power of the secret part of the personality, the second self's immorality, and the triumph of the second self. In Stevenson's portrayal of dual existence, the second self is not absolutely unconscious. Although these aspects of self are clinically dissociated from one another, aware access to their mutual existence is known by the lead character.

Similarly, Max Dessoir believed that the individual's existence and identity is a result of two mutually independent, although accessible, forms of consciousness. He called these Super and sub-consciousness. Ribot in 1884 had, likewise,

spoken of a re-doubling of the personality. Two years later Binet published his Psychology of reasoning, in which he spoke of a double consciousness. He called for the recognition of a permanent and automatic process of sub-conscious activity in reasoning, the hypnotic subject, states of hysteria, and dual personality. The general emphasis on the accessibility of the unconscious was echoed in the hypnotic work of Bernheim, Liébeault, Charcot, and others throughout France. Ellenberger (1970) reports that this interest in human dissociation and duality was initially stimulated by Charles Richet's publication in 1875.

Following this, the eighteen-eighties saw Charcot and Bernheim begin an experimental study and practice of hypnosis, with notoriety and numerous publications stemming from that work. Speculative interest in this duality led Bergson to say in 1889 that people possess a public self, and an inner individual existence. By 1893 the sociologist Durkheim had also focused on this duality. He specified two forms of consciousness. One consciousness was self-consciousness, and the other was of the community. He added, however, that this community consciousness may have multiple divisions, leading the individual to have as many social identities as there are social groups to which he or she belongs.

Very significant contributions were made in the clinical exploration of the unconscious in the period from 1889 to 1900. Janet, for example, published his Automatisme psychologique in 1889, and argued that a sub-conscious, although accessible, stratum of activity is at the base of numerous

psychological phenomena. In taking this position he was also supporting Binet's conclusions some three years earlier. Within this same period, Flournoy, a disciple of Wundt and a Professor of Psychology at Geneva, applied the techniques of experimental psychology to parapsychological phenomena. He pointed to the existence of sub-conscious activity within many forms of parapsychological experiences. Flournoy was not the first, nor was he alone in this interest. In fact, already by 1882 the Society for Psychical Research had been established by Barrett in London, and had a popular following. Thematic in their research interests were a study of the nature and influences of human inter-personal contact, and a scientific examination of hypnosis, clairvoyance, insensitivity to pain, and other related phenomena (Van den Berg, 1974, pp. 40-41). Psychotherapy becomes formally established at this time, and includes some awareness of extra-conscious activity. The first psychotherapy clinic was established in Amsterdam by Van Eeden and Van Renterghem around 1887, and the word psychotherapy appears in Tukes dictionary of 1892. In England, Maudsley had published his work The pathology of mind, which expressed his understanding of the unconscious. Freud included this 1879 reference in his classic Traumdeutung. By 1893 Breuer and Freud had issued their preliminary paper on hysteria, and followed this by the publication of their book Studies in hysteria two years later.

In short, pre-Freudian clinicians and hypnotists expressed an enthusiastic curiosity about the unconscious. In common with others at that time, they avoided the use of the word

unconscious, preferring to emphasize the accessibility of subconscious activity to conscious awareness.

In contrast, the early interest of academic psychologists in the unconscious had begun to wane, and their reception to this idea turned to rejection. A belief in unconscious activity had become so popular that academic psychologists found it necessary to examine or re-examine this subject. Their conclusion emphasized a rejection of this topic as incompatible with the newly-articulated vision of psychology as a science. Their criticism drew largely from the approach within introspective, laboratory-based psychology, which, following Wundt, emphasized a reporting on the immediately present mental contents as the proper data and basis for psychology. For example, Merlan (1945, 1949) notes that by 1874 Brentano, with whom Freud studied philosophy, had examined the unconscious in his book Psychologie vom empirischen standpunkt. Brentano repudiated the idea, concluding that unconscious psychological activity does not exist. Further, Klein (1977) reports that Ebbinghaus' dissertation critically examined and rejected von Hartmann's 1869 treatment of the unconscious. Schakow (1930, p. 510), in fact, cites Ebbinghaus as saying that "wherever the structure [the unconscious] is touched, it falls apart."

This rejection was the final outcome of a reversal of opinion on this topic by both Wundt and Helmholtz. Both these influential psychologists had originally supported the doctrine of unconscious inference. However, by 1876 Wundt had rejected the idea in his publication that year, and Helmholtz

followed three years later. By 1897 Wundt had this to say:

We can know nothing of the unconscious or, what amounts to the same thing for psychology, a material process which is not immediately perceived but merely assumed hypothetically on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions. Such metaphysical assumptions are merely devices to cover up an incomplete or entirely wanting psychological observation (in D. B. Klein, 1977, p. 62).

Similarly, William James had subjected the unconscious to a rigorous analysis and rejected it in his Principles of psychology of 1890. Here James was aiming at those versions of the unconscious elaborated by von Hartmann's work. James' criticism had many specific objections. Like Wundt, however, his central point was that the unconscious is a superfluous concept prompted by erroneous assumptions. Moreover, he cautioned against the inclusion of this subject into psychology. He felt that the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes was "... the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might become a science into a tumbling-ground for whimsies" (James, Vol. 1, 1950, p. 163).

Taken together, these early influential psychologists appeared unanimous in their conclusion. In D. B. Klein's (1977, p. xvii) words, all "... were as one in eliminating the unconscious from what they envisaged as the foundation of a scientific psychology, [and] ... by the time of Freud academic

psychology had already examined and evaluated the concept of the unconscious mind and found it unacceptable."

4.2.1. Reflection upon the pre-Freudian situation

Pre-Freudian versions of the unconscious, whether academic or clinical, have in common at least two features. First, they emphasize the implicit and sometimes dissociated aspects of experience, although often from varying standpoints. In their view, the implicit could be realized in awareness through education, specific training, or techniques. Second, the unconscious was not totally unconscious or split from the perceptual field. Stated positively, the unconscious was within what William James had called the "fringe" or "margin" in the field of an individual's perceptual consciousness (Gurwitsch, 1964, p. 22).

Nevertheless, these pre-Freudian views were profoundly divided on the issue of the existence of the unconscious. By Freud's time the influential academic community in psychology had largely negated the topic of the unconscious, while clinicians and hypnotists embraced some notion of the unconscious, and thereby claimed practical understanding and progress in their work. I maintain that these antithetical emphases are understandable if viewed as arising from different approaches, which correspondingly, disclose different phenomena. In short, academics and clinicians were confronting different phenomena as the unconscious because they were coming from different "Research-guiding Interests" (Radnitzky, 1973, p. xxxix). In the words of Kuhn (1970, p. 112), "... schools

guided by different paradigms are always slightly at cross-purposes." This is so because differing paradigms aimed at the "same" topic disclose different phenomena. For example, academic, scientific psychology arose in the latter eighteenth-hundreds, and was greatly influenced in its approach-methods-content structure by introspectionism. The overall structure of psychology was, at that time, decidedly Cartesian (MacLeod, 1975). In this psychology a scientific approach was being built on the study of the immediate data of consciousness. Accordingly, pre-Freudian views on the unconscious were negated by reference to this priority on reportable, immediately conscious data. The research aim was an experimental and theoretical explanation of psychological life through this approach. In contrast, the interest of health was emphasized as the guiding horizon in the work of clinicians and hypnotists who favored some version of the unconscious. These practitioners were guided more by the nature of puzzling phenomena they encountered in clinical work than by the interest in securing a scientific foundation for the field of psychology. Divisions in the self were not only expressed in hysteria, but also hypnotic states, somnambulism, parapsychological phenomena, and the dissociations of multiple personality. In fact, the culture was replete with expressions of division in awareness and identity. To paraphrase Kuhn (1970), an understanding of these phenomena was pre-paradigmatic. In the area of practice these phenomena presented intriguing puzzles awaiting a puzzle-solving paradigm, and the overriding interest was the health of the person. Freud later provided this paradigm, but only

by first doubting the approach toward the unconscious which his predecessors assumed.

4.3 Freud's unconscious as a transformation in approach toward personal existence

Within this historical context of views about the unconscious, Freud offered his first systematic presentation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. The review of the preceding section makes evident that the idea of unconscious activity is not original to Freud. Instead, Freud's originality was in the particular way he developed this idea, already in the wind, within the scientific approach of his time (Ellenberger, 1957; Fancher, 1973; Klein, D. B., 1977; Van den Berg, 1974; Whyte, 1960, 1972; Zilboorg, 1941). Freud's response to the prevailing criticisms of the unconscious was to first question an assumption common to their underlying approach. Specifically, Freud questioned the assumption that a person's psychological life (psychische) is synonymous with his conscious awareness of it. This tract appears in both his 1912 and 1915 papers on the unconscious. When applied to a person's personal existence, as Freud's clinical work required, this assumption required that a person's existence be reducible to his awareness of it. For the phenomena of hysteria, epileptiform convulsions, parapraxes, and other states of dissociation, Freud found the traditional approach toward personal existence inadequate in assimilating all the data and in rendering these phenomena understandable. Already, in the 1900 publication of the Interpretation of dreams, Freud (1938,

p. 541) says:

The problem of the unconscious in psychology is, ... less a psychological problem than the problem of psychology. As long as psychology disposed of this problem by the verbal explanation that the "psychic" is the "conscious," and that unconscious psychic occurrences are an obvious contradiction, there was no possibility of a physician's observations of abnormal mental states being turned to any psychological account.

Accordingly, Freud instituted a change in approach or paradigm on this issue. The traditional equation of psychological life with immediate consciousness was appropriate for deriving scientific, introspective data. This approach, however, was inappropriate for explaining the phenomena Freud encountered in the practical, clinical arena, with its guiding interest in emancipation. Slips of the tongue, misplacing of objects, dreams, and pathological symptoms and experiaction, all required a different approach if these phenomena were to be understood and transformed. As Freud (1959, Vol. 4, p. 99) puts it in his 1915 essay, The unconscious:

All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we are to hold fast to the claim that every single mental act performed within us must be consciously experienced... A gain in meaning and connection, however, is a perfectly justifiable motive,

one which may well carry us beyond the limitations of direct experience.

In Freud's unconscious, at least three assumptions surface. First, Freud (1943, p. 102 f.) explicitly adopts the word unconscious (unbewusst), first as an adjective, then later as a noun (das Unbewusst). He thereby distinguishes the psychoanalytic unconscious from pre-Freudian versions identified as sub-conscious, co-conscious, second personality, and double consciousness or self. Second, the unconscious proper is not implicit within the field of experience, as pre-Freudian versions emphasized. The unconscious proper is clearly both divorced and dynamically separated from the perceptual field. This is quite original to Freud. Van den Berg (1974, p. 36), for example, notes this in his comparison of Freud's unconscious to those that came before. He says: "The uncertain, untangible, dangerous elements of late nineteenth-century life were allocated to a closed, systematized, area, confined within the individual, far away from the hazardous contacts with other people. The originator and protector of this area was Freud." Finally, in contrast to pre-Freudian versions, the psychoanalytic unconscious proper is completely unconscious. Freud is unambiguously explicit about this in his first, 1893, paper with Breuer (ibid, p. 37). This emphasis is also new with Freud.

Accordingly, what is at stake throughout pre-Freudian, Freudian, and the phenomenological revisions in a psychology of the unconscious are differing approaches toward how a person exists. These approach differences lead to differing

psychologies of the unconscious. In contrast to the tradition before him, Freud emphasizes that a person's existence is not synonymous with his consciousness of it. Experience is determined by an unconscious that is alien to the individual's perceptual field. The disciplined methodological procedures of clinical psychoanalysis, not naive self-experience, disclose this unconscious (Freud, 1943). How Freud arrived at this view and his own psychology of the unconscious is clearly understood by now turning to consider the topic of hysteria, from which psychoanalysis initially arose.

4.4 Clinical hysteria and the origin of the psychoanalytic unconscious

In "normal science" (Kuhn, 1970) the development of techniques, methods, choice of content, and their theoretical understanding, arise originally, in part, from the scientist's initial engagements with the phenomena studied. From this engagement comes the approach (Giorgi, 1970), which co-determines both how the scientist views the nature of the phenomenon and how he or she conceives of the clinical or experimental relationship to that phenomenon. Psychoanalysis is no exception to this rule. The psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious has its roots in the study of clinical hysteria. Strachey (1962, pp. x-xi) illustrates this direct relationship between hysteria and the unconscious when he says:

The historical accident that psychoanalysis had its origin in connection with the study of hysteria led at once to the hypothesis of repression (or more generally of defense) as

a mental function, and this in turn to a topographical hypothesis--to a picture of the mind as including two portions, one repressed and the other repressing ... this apparently simple scheme underlay all of Freud's earlier theoretical ideas: functionally, a repressed force endeavouring to make its way into activity but held in check by a repressing force, and structurally, an "unconscious" opposed by an "ego."

Accordingly, in what follows I will focus on the nature of hysteria and the first emerging theory about the unconscious derived from a study of that subject. The presentation is, therefore, limited to Breuer & Freud's (1950a) Preliminary communication, originally published in 1893, and their later Studies in hysteria (1950b), published two years later. A following section will trace the further theoretical developments in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. This methodology is chosen because Freud's psychology of the unconscious underwent many changes and refinements throughout his lifetime. Accordingly, a faithful rendering of his psychology of the unconscious must note the phenomena from which it arose as well as the theoretical refinements that developed over these years.

4.4.1. The explanation of hysteria and the early psychology of the unconscious

The prototype for Freud's early theory of hysteria and the unconscious arises from Breuer & Freud's (1950a, 1950b)

work with conversion hysteria, although Freud also identified a form of defense hysteria. In conversion hysteria, a psychological conflict is excluded from conscious awareness and expressed in somatic symptoms, having no physiological basis in actual tissue lesions or dysfunctions. Anaesthesias of body parts, hysterical paralyses, and emotional expressions thematic by their theatricality were reported as primary symptoms. Defense hysteria referred to the defensive activity of the person against the conscious recognition or recall of ideas which provoked unpleasant affect. Memory loss, indifference, unawareness of often obvious aspects of a person's experiaction, and acute anxiety episodes characterized this disorder.

The explanation of hysteria offered by Breuer & Freud (1950a, 1950b) may be summarized as follows: Hysterical symptoms are the result of psychological trauma having a determined effect on the person. The reaction to the trauma is not expressed, but is inhibited and excluded from conscious awareness. Nevertheless, the memory of the incident, along with its affect and excitation, exists in a latent, unconscious manner within the person. The authors note that hysterical symptoms disappear when the person becomes conscious of the event which provoked them. When that event is languaged, this process is accompanied by a release of the pent-up affect and excitation associated with the trauma. However, prior to this "abreaction," the pathogenic experience, and the repressed associations, are retained in their original form in the person's memory. As a primary condition for the onset of

hysteria, an idea, its associations, affect, and excitation, must be repressed from consciousness, thus instituting a split (Spaltung) in the person's mental life. Freud felt that this repression was intentional, and was the basis upon which neural excitement became converted into a somatic symptom. He theorized that the repression of ideational material was, at the same time, a repression or damming up of neural energy. When this excitation was cut off from the usual pathways of association, deviant tracts which led to somatic innervation were substituted. Thus, the meaning of "conversion" in conversion hysteria.

At a psychological level, the basis for the repression is unpleasure (Unlust). Breuer & Freud (1950a, 1950b) explained that the mental split is based on an incompatibility between the meanings of the traumatic idea that is repressed and the nucleus of ideas constituting the ego. The traumatic episode exists when the incompatible idea forces itself upon the ego, and the ego repudiates its meanings. The nuclear idea, and its related associations and excitations, are thereby split from the ego and self-awareness.

The traumatic experience was usually of a sexual nature, occurring in childhood. At this early point in his writing, Freud thought the erotic incident had literally occurred, only to find later that this was untenable. The incident, nevertheless, is forgotten or repressed because of its painful nature, but the excitation elicited by the sexual event persists unconsciously, along with the repressed ideas. Ideas, affect, and energy remain, existing in this latent, unconscious manner

until restimulated by a present situation having some similarity to the original trauma. At this point, an initial or recurring outbreak of hysterical symptoms may (re)appear. Systematically seen, the barrier of repression is overcome by the excitation which seeks discharge through a new neuronal pathway (Bahnung), and is expressed as a neurotic symptom. The symptom, in turn, was seen as a compromise between the repressed idea and the counterforce of an ego seeking to keep the idea out of consciousness. For the patient, personal consciousness presents this conflict only through disguised, symbolic manifestations which are connected with the nuclear trauma only through associative links.

The view of the unconscious within Studies is an admixture of a physiologically informed metapsychological explanation, written largely by Breuer, and rich clinical data presented mostly by Freud. This mixture is an early expression of the aforementioned split between a mechanistic approach and exquisitely human data. The view of the unconscious rendered in Studies, accordingly, reflects this polarity of the psychological.

Psychologically, hysteria is not a divided consciousness, but a divided psyche having conscious and unconscious parts. Breuer (Breuer & Freud, 1950b, p. 167) is careful to make this distinction between the pre-Freudian notion of a splitting of consciousness and his own view of hysteria as a hypnoid-like condition defined by a dissociation of conscious and unconscious ideation. Hysteria expresses a "splitting of the psyche." In arguing this position, Breuer (ibid) points out

that in relatively healthy people, their awareness, particularly of themselves, is based on the accessibility of ideas to consciousness, "... if they possess sufficient intensity." In contrast, a significant division between awareness and unawareness was present in the sample with which he and Freud worked. For example, Breuer notes whole ideational complexes that were able to achieve conscious awareness, "... and a smaller one [ideational complex] which was incapable of consciousness" (ibid). The actual self-awareness that these people may have had did not coincide with the possible self-awareness that they could, and, adaptively, should have had. Breuer understood this division as within the person, intrapsychically, as a precursor to Freud's (1938) explicit topographical model in the Interpretation of dreams of 1900. As he (ibid) states it:

The psychic ideational activity is here
,divided into conscious and unconscious parts,
while the ideas are divided into those capable
of consciousness and those not capable of
consciousness. Hence, we cannot speak of a
splitting of consciousness, but rather of a
splitting of the psyche.

The topographical split between consciousness and the unconscious, consequently, expresses how this division was indigenous to the way in which hysteria presented itself to Breuer & Freud. Stated differently, the lived division present in the hysterical person's experience of himself co-determined the topographical separation of consciousness and the unconscious in this early psychology of the unconscious. The clinically

observable refusal of ideas (meaning) to be included within a person's coherent sense of self (ego) is what is underscored in this demarcation of a relatively isolated unconscious. This is why Breuer (Breuer & Freud, 1950b, p. 167) speaks of the unconscious as ideas "... incapable of consciousness," under existing pre-therapeutic conditions.

The metapsychological explanation of hysteria and this early psychology of the unconscious are equally as important as the preceding clinical account. Freud's psychology of the unconscious is approached from the standpoint of a neurophysiological attitude, one grounded in the centrality of the reflex arc (Amacher, 1965; Binswanger, 1975; Fenichel, 1945; Solomon, 1974). In a theory of the reflex arc, the neuron is the basic structural unit, although the simplest reflex arc is composed of at least three interconnected neurons, each having a functional relationship to each other. For example, a receptor neuron, having an absolute threshold necessary for firing or transmission, is stimulated through sufficient intensity to transmit nerve impulses first to an interneuron within the spinal cord, then through an effector neuron into activity (Morgan, 1965). Amacher (1965) has already detailed how strongly Freud's professors and research colleagues were committed to the reflex arc theory as the fundamental basis for explaining nervous system activity. In addition, Amacher (ibid) has shown how this neurophysiological approach specifically informs the explanation of hysteria and the unconscious in Studies. In general, the psyche is defined as a psychobiological system, an apparatus within the person conceived as

organism. In Studies, this system is characterized largely in terms of its capacity to have energy available, and to transmit and transform that energy.

Specifically, repression and the unconscious are explained metapsychologically as follows: The nervous system normally functions in the manner of the reflex, whereby significant quantities of psychic energy, termed "Q," are received and transmitted into "Psi" neurons of the cortex. Psi neurons route this excitation to motor effectors, and discharge. A corresponding cessation of excitation occurs. Freud (in Amacher, 1965, p. 62) called this "... the principle of neuronc inertia, which asserts that neurons tend to divest themselves of quantity... This process of discharge is the primary function of neuronc systems." Initially, however, stimulation may come from two sources; exogenous stimulation, which may come from an "external" source, as in the classical understanding of the stimulus in perception, and endogenous stimulation, which may also arise, from interoceptive processes of the body. A neuron charged with Q was said to be in a state of cathexis (Besetzung). However, prior to this charge, Q accumulates at a contact barrier (precursor to synapse theory) between the neurons until it flows to the next adjacent neuron. In overwhelming states of arousal a neuron may be cathected above its normal threshold, hypercathected, and will discharge all Q directly to established pathways. The opening up of nerve pathways between Psi and auxillary "Omega" cortical neurons was thought to be the physiological basis for psychological activity. In fact, possibilities for a person's

reactions, constituted through this establishment of nerve tract pathways, provide a model not dissimilar to Hebb's (1949) later physiological explanation of learning. In repression and the unconscious, however, no new pathways for discharge are available to handle the excitation, and Q accumulates at the contact barrier. Functionally, this is explained as the activity of an inhibiting ego, located in the barrier, which is unable to handle the accumulated sum of Q.

Accordingly, the unconscious is defined energetically as an anomalie in normal reflex activity through this physiological approach. The repressing ego and the unconscious are defined within the person's neuroanatomical makeup. Accumulated energy as the unconscious is the metapsychological analogue of "strangled affects" (Breuer & Freud, 1950a, p. 12) and ideas in the clinical, psychological explanation. Impulse inhibition or anti-cathexis is, likewise, mirrored in the psychological analogue of dissociation as exclusion from awareness. In short, in both the clinical and physiologic accounts, the unconscious exists at an intraorganismic level. The unconscious is outside the field of awareness, but within the body as psychophysiological mechanism. Simply put, "Freud never forgot that the mind was in fact in the body" (Marcus, 1977, p. xi).

The approach informing the above explanation of hysteria and the unconscious is grounded in Freud's (1977) Project for a scientific psychology, written the same year (1895) as Studies. While the Project was mysteriously abandoned on

completion that year, many of its specific features, and certainly its fundamental approach, continued to inform psychoanalytic thought to the end (Amacher, 1965; Binswanger, 1975; Fancher, 1973; Kris, 1977; Solomon, 1974; Smith, 1975). The importance of the Project is that it inaugurates a metapsychology, an attitude, in short an approach, which permeates the texture of the psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious to the very end. The philosophical and scientific features of this approach were already presented and criticized in Chapters II and III; consequently, I will not detail again the specific features of this physiologically informed approach. Instead, I will now present some further refinements in Freud's psychology of the unconscious as refinements in psychological theory within the same essential approach. This will be followed by a critical evaluation of Freud's overall psychology of the unconscious.

4.4.2. Freud's psychology of the unconscious after Studies

The recognition of the centrality of the unconscious in psychoanalysis led Freud to devote more attention to clarifying this topic, and in the process, to sharpening psychoanalytic metapsychology. Three regularly cited works stand as Freud's major statements on his psychology of the unconscious (Ellenberger, 1970; Fancher, 1973; Klein, D. B., 1977; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973; Monroe, 1955; Ricoeur, 1970). These are the 1912 paper, A note on the unconscious in psychoanalysis, the 1915 paper, The unconscious, and the 1923 publication of The

ego and the id. Using these works, I will first present these refinements in Freud's psychology of the unconscious, to complete the presentation on this theme. Following this, I will argue that the reduction of the unconscious to the body as mechanism pervades Freud's overall psychology of the unconscious. This reduction, in company with other features of the overall account, continues to express the natural science approach, as outlined in Chapter II. Consequently, disjunctions between approach, theory, and practice are perpetuated throughout this psychology of the unconscious, and compromise its empirical certitude along with the understanding and treatment of the psychoanalytic client.

Prior to 1923, the unconscious was defined primarily through a topographic model of the mind, already present in the Project of 1895, and refined in Chapter 7 of the 1900 publication of The interpretation of dreams (Freud, 1969; Strachey, 1969). In this model, the unconscious and pre-conscious systems were focused on as the most important components of the mind, and lived neurotic conflict was explained by reference to the intrapsychic conflict between these topographical areas. Before Freud's (1959, Vol. 4, pp. 22-29) paper on the unconscious in 1912, the systems of unconscious and preconscious were defined in two ways. A descriptive standpoint referenced these terms through their topographic relation to consciousness (awareness). A dynamic viewpoint defined them by reference to the psychodynamic problem of repression and defense as a barrier to conscious recognition, abreaction, and emancipation from conflict.

The 1912 paper, however, introduces some major refinements in this position, and is aimed at a clarification of how the unconscious exists. Freud stipulates three standpoints from which the unconscious may be said to exist. The descriptive account situates the unconscious within a topography of the mind. This is the closest Freud comes in his metapsychology to a phenomenology of experience (Ricoeur, 1970). Herein, unconscious is used in an adjectival sense, as a thought or memory--broadly, as meaning--which is not immediately given through awareness at a point in time. Freud's (1959, Vol. 4, p. 22) statement about this sense of unconscious is clear and direct. He says:

A conception--or any other mental element--
which is now present to my consciousness
may become absent the next moment, and may
become present again, after an interval,
unchanged, and, as we say, from memory, not as
a result of a fresh perception by our senses.
It is this fact which we are accustomed to
account for by the supposition that during
the interval the conception has been present
in our mind, although latent in consciousness.

In short, the descriptive account aims at comprehending the presence and absence of experienced meaning. Something once present to reflective awareness, Freud (ibid, p. 22) says, may be absent, but, nonetheless, continues to exist in a latent mode. Accordingly, in this account unconscious is synonymous with a meaning that exists in a latent, though unperceived

manner. Used in this descriptive sense, unconscious is a generic term applied to both preconscious and unconscious proper components of the topography.

The dynamic viewpoint retains the adjectival sense of being unconscious, and distinguishes between preconscious and unconscious proper meaning. Freud (ibid, p. 25) says:

We have now gained the conviction that there are some latent ideas which do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they may have become. Therefore we may call the latent ideas of the first type preconscious, while we reserve the term unconscious [proper] for the latter type which we came to study in the neuroses. The term unconscious, which was used in the purely descriptive sense before, now comes to imply something more. It designates not only latent ideas in general, but especially ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity.

Hence, preconscious meaning may be unconscious in the descriptive, but not dynamic sense of this term. The dynamic sense always implies that, through repression and defense, specific meanings are incapable of entering consciousness, not that they are temporarily absent at a point in time. Further, these meanings are derived from the instincts, and continue to exert an observable influence on human life. The dynamic sense of this term draws from the metapsychology of the Project, which

accounted for experiaction through the obstruction, flow, and discharge of psychic energy through neuronal pathways. Later, in his 1915 essay The unconscious, Freud identifies this dynamic separation of meaning as resulting from an anti-cathexis or primitive barrier between preconscious and unconscious proper ideas.

Finally, the systematic standpoint departs from a consideration of being unconscious in the adjectival sense (unbewusst), and considers it as a noun (das Unbewusst), a subsystem having its own psychic locality and specialized function within the psychic apparatus. The systematic viewpoint has a long history in Freud's writings, and in his professional training. Regarding the latter, Amacher (1965) has documented some correspondence between Freud's approach to a conception of the mind as psychic subsystems having specific physical or metaphorical localities, and his early training with Theodor Meynert (1833-1892). For example, in 1881 Freud served as Sekundararzt (resident) in the psychiatric clinic of Meynert, a brilliant brain anatomist who turned his attention to psychiatry. Meynert's specialty was the relating of organic brain symptomatology to localized areas of the brain, which he believed controlled specific functions. Meynert had a profound, personal and professional influence on Freud (Jones, 1957, Vol. 1). Along with Ernst Brücke and Sigmund Exner, he emphasized an account of experiaction in materially defined, spatially localized, system-like terms. Accordingly, it is highly probable that Freud's consideration of the unconscious as a system draws from these influences in his early training.

The idea of the unconscious as a system is present throughout Freud's writings. The systematic useage is implicit in both 1895 Project and Studies texts, and is later mentioned explicitly as a structural component of the psychic apparatus in Chapter 7 of The interpretation of dreams, which appeared in 1900. In his 1912 essay on the unconscious, Freud wrote that the division between the conscious-preconscious/unconscious proper systems was acquired through the process of repression. He (1959, Vol. 4, p. 27) says:

Unconsciousness is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our mental activity; every mental act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not. The distinction between preconscious and unconscious activity is not a primary one, but comes to be established after repulsion has sprung up.

In support of this position, Freud utilizes an analogy that compares the development of a photographic negative to the realization of previously unconscious meaning. In both cases, judgment over the acceptability of the negative or unconscious meaning is crucial. He says, for example, that in selecting photographic negatives for development, those negatives "... which have held good in examination" are selected, and pass from a first photographic stage as negatives to "... the 'positive process' ending in the picture" (ibid). This analogy

contains at least two points worth noting for now.

First, those unselected negatives, like repressed meanings, continue to exist even though they were not made visible through photographic development or a lifting of the repression, respectively. In the latter case, as Freud says, the meanings continue to exist, albeit in a latent mode of being. Second, Freud's analogy, like his concept of a latent, unconscious existence is drawn from a visual modality of experience. For now, I wish only to note these points, for I will utilize them later in the critical evaluation section following this presentation.

To return to the systematic viewpoint, the terms conscious, preconscious, and unconscious are no longer merely adjectival descriptions of psychological functioning; they achieve the status of sub-systemic, interacting components within the overall psychic apparatus.

With Freud's 1915 essay, The unconscious, a significant movement can be detected within his psychology of the unconscious. This is the movement away from the approximations of the phenomenal level, found in Freud's topographical descriptive account, into an emphasis on "the unconscious" as belonging to a system. Ricoeur (1970), for example, equates this movement with an anti-phenomenological negation of the data of immediate consciousness as a starting point for psychoanalytic reflection. He makes the point that whereas phenomenology seeks the essence of a phenomenon through a radical commitment to the givens of consciousness, psychoanalysis proceeds by a reduction of consciousness. That is, in this approach, instincts

(Trieb) are substituted as the basis of evidence, and all data within the analytic setting are approached as vicissitudes (Schicksal) of the instincts. Accordingly, both the object of interest (clinical situation) and the subjectivity of the person (languaged experience) are de-emphasized in favor of an explanation which begins from the meaning and function of the instincts. I have already shown in detail (Chapter II) how this occurs through the explanatory nature of psychoanalysis. For now, I wish only to mention that the emerging priority of "the unconscious" in Freud's psychology of the unconscious goes hand in hand with a de-emphasis, if not outright negation, of consciousness as the empirical reference point for psychoanalytic theorizing and practice.

This movement is shown in his 1915 essay, in the increased attention Freud (1959, Vol. 4, pp. 98-136) devoted to clarifying and defining the unconscious as system. Therein, he distinguished further between the dynamic and systematic senses, with the former coming to be subsumed under the latter. For example, dynamically unconscious meanings are defined simply by their inability to enter consciousness because of repression, but Freud adds that this dynamic sense is not all there is to the unconscious. "The unconscious has the greater compass: the repressed is a part of the unconscious" (ibid, p. 98, my emphasis). Similarly, he (ibid, p. 105) refines the distinction between the descriptive and systematic senses of unconscious by saying:

... we cannot escape the imputation of
ambiguity in that we use the words conscious

and unconscious sometimes in a descriptive and sometimes in a systematic sense, in which latter they signify inclusion in some particular system and possession of certain characteristics.

These characteristics of the systematic unconscious are: exemption from mutual contradiction, mobility of cathexis as in primary process activity, timelessness, and substitution of psychic for external reality (ibid, pp. 118-122). Stated in economic terms, the overall aim of the systematic unconscious is to discharge the cathexis of instinct-presentations, which are wish impulses. In Freud's vernacular, unconscious impulses have no regard for logic or social acceptability. Logically contradictory impulses may exist together, seeking expression. As Freud (ibid, p. 119) puts it, "In the Ucs there are only contents more or less strongly cathected." That is, unconscious instinct-presentations are neutral with respect to logic or conventionality. Here, of course, Freud is alluding to an aspect of primary process activity first used to identify a tendency toward immediate neuronal cathexis discharge (Breuer, 1950b). It was included in that form within Freud's Project (1977), and later, in 1911, extended to describe a style of thought in the essay Formulations regarding the two principles in mental functioning (Freud, 1959, Vol. 4, pp. 13-21).

Mobility of cathexis is the second characteristic of the unconscious. Understanding this aspect of the unconscious requires first an explication of Freud's metapsychological assumptions about how repressed ideas (meaning) exist.

Freud (ibid, pp. 112-118) makes the assumption that within

the unconscious repressed meaning is composed of several independent and separable aspects. For example, affect and cathected energy may disengage from an ideational representation of an instinct, which itself can never be known. Accordingly, mobility of cathexis refers to this disengagement and transfer of energy from unconscious instinct representatives. Freud (ibid., p. 119) stipulates two forms of this. First, in displacement the whole volume of cathected energy may be transferred from one idea to another. A lucid example of this explanation is found in Freud's (1959, Vol. 3, pp. 149-289) analysis of the phobic "Little Hans." Second, through condensation the energy available separately to several ideas may converge to cathect one idea. These two forms of cathexis mobility characterize the primary process, and are grounded in the assumption that cathected energy will seek alternative neuronal pathways for discharge. As mentioned earlier, this mobility of cathexis served as the physiological explanation of conversion hysteria, wherein new or anomalous somatic nerve tracts became innervated.

The timeless (zeitlos) nature of the unconscious is the third characteristic of the unconscious mentioned in the 1915 paper. Actually, this aspect of the unconscious appears first in The psychopathology of everyday life, published in 1901 (Strachey, 1965). Timelessness, here, is tied directly to the arresting and ensuing preservation of memories acquired in psychosexual fixation. In the above-cited work, Freud (1965, p. 275 f.) says:

The unconscious is quite timeless. The most

important as well as the strangest characteristic of psychological fixation is that all impressions are preserved, not only in the same form in which they were first received, but also in all the forms which they have adopted in their further developments... Theoretically every earlier state of the mnemonic content could thus be restored to memory again, even if its elements have long ago exchanged all their original connections for more recent ones.

The 1915 essay re-emphasizes that the unconscious is unsituated in time. Time, for Freud (1959, Vol. 4, p. 119) is a characteristic of conscious and pre-conscious systems, not the system Jcs. Processes within the latter system have no temporal ordering, are not altered by the passage of measured time; in fact, "they have no reference to time at all" (ibid). Accordingly, the timeless character of unconscious wishful impulses is intimately tied to Freud's assumption concerning the indestructibility of repressed meaning and the memory process. This state of affairs, he says later (1933), is capable of being transformed only by the analytic process, whereby what was anonymous, impersonal, and split off, but nonetheless active, is realized and integrated within the conscious system and sense of self (Freud, 1965). This transformation is announced through Freud's (ibid, p. 80) now famous dictum: "Where id was, there shall ego be" (Wo es war, soll Ich werden). Literally translated, this reads: "Where it was,

I ought to become" (Erandt, 1966, p. 51), a rendering which more clearly communicates the sense of this transformation from the impersonal to the personal.

Finally, the last characteristic of the systematic unconscious mentioned in the 1915 paper is a "substitution of psychic for external reality" (Freud, 1959, Vol. 4, p. 120). This occurs, as do the other characteristics, because the unconscious is governed by the pleasure principle. The outcome of unconscious processes is contingent on two factors: "the degree of their strength" (the economic viewpoint), and "their conformity to regulation by pleasure and pain" (cessation of excitation, i.e., homeostatic balance, drawn from the Project) (ibid, p. 119). The sense of this substitution of psychic for external reality stands upon an emphasis that emerged in the 1911 paper Instincts and their vicissitudes (ibid, pp. 60-83). Therein, Freud (ibid, p. 61) more strongly emphasized a departure from description and perceptual consciousness. Instincts were explicitly taken as the "basal concepts" on which a systematic psychology of the unconscious was grounded. Ricoeur (1970, p. 122) calls this an "epoche in reverse," saying:

The epoche in reverse implies that we stop taking the "object" as our guide, in the sense of the vis-a-vis of consciousness, and substitute for it the "aims" of the instincts; and that we stop taking the "subject" as our pole of reference, in the sense of the one to whom or for whom "objects" appear.

This substitution of psychic for external reality occurs because instincts hold the privileged position of being causal determiners in psychoanalytic metapsychology. Along with ego defensive processes, they produce a disguised compromise expression through the analysand's experience. Accordingly, for Freud (1959, Vol. 4, pp. 98-136) the analyst's commitment to the manifest meaning of the analysand's expressions have an equivocal status. The languaged consciousness of the analysand is, indeed, the beginning point of psychoanalytic inquiry. However, this consciousness is held as deceptive and untrustworthy because, through the defensive process, the manifest conceals (verdecken) the real (unconscious) motives and desires of the analysand. Within the clinical setting psychic reality is technically defined as all unconscious wish impulses and their accompanying fantasy expressions (Freud, 1965). These constitute the primary data to be deciphered in the interpretation of transference, free association, and dreams. From this basis, Freud (ibid.) emphasized a strict distinction between psychic and external reality. As Laplanche & Pontalis (1973, p. 363) explain this:

Phantasies, even if they are not based on real events, now come to have the same pathogenic effect for the subject as that which Freud had at first attributed to "reminiscences."

Here, psychic reality assumes a priority because it comprises the primary data for interpretation and emancipation in the clinical setting.

Despite radical differences in approach, both psychoanalysis and phenomenology show general methodological similarities. Both aim at emancipation. Clinical psychoanalysis intends toward a personal emancipation, while phenomenology seeks an emancipation from institutionalized cultural meaning (Giorgi, 1975a). Both pursue this emancipation, first by a focus on the person's experience. Psychoanalysis achieves this by concentrating on the manifest meaning, while phenomenology commits to the described meaning of appearances. The manifest meaning and the meaning of the appearances are disengaged from the institutionalized meaning in consensual experience. This is done with the goal of arriving at the real, which, for psychoanalysis, is the latent, unconscious meaning, and for phenomenology is the essential structure. Hence, psychic reality is distinguished from external reality on these methodological grounds in the interest of emancipation (health) in clinical psychoanalysis.

However, these are not the only grounds for this distinction. A more fundamental basis lies in the pre-scientific vision of the person within the psychoanalytic approach. Chapter II of this work has already shown how the nature and role of the instincts, their modification through defensive processes, and their relation to the world (object) is understood through a Cartesian approach in which consciousness and world are originally divorced. Therefore, what remains to be demonstrated is how, from this approach, psychic reality replaces external reality.

Freud (1959, Vol. 4, p. 61) explains that "an instinct

is a stimulus to the mind," and arises from within the organism. Further, the instinct is of a biological nature; its role, like other stimuli, is to institute or provoke excitation within the nervous system. Now the instinct, like the whole person, can never be directly known. The instinct can be known only through its wish impulse, representative idea or aim, which, specifically, is discharge, abolishment of stimulation, and return of the psychic apparatus to a state of entropy. Hence, the basis of the instinct is the psychophysiological body. Freud (ibid, p. 66) puts it this way: "By the source of an instinct is meant that somatic process in an organ or part of the body from which there results a stimulus represented in mental life by an instinct." Moreover, only through cathexis to an object can the instinct achieve its aim of discharge. This object choice, however, is highly variable, owing to the mobility of cathexis and the defensive process. Taken together, this primary process nature of instincts, their mobility of cathexis, and accompanying defensive operations set up a replacement of external consensual reality. Freud (ibid) has shown how this occurs in the example of sado-masochism, whereby the original instinctual impulse may be altered by a reversal into its opposite, a turning around upon the subject, a re-instituted effort of repression, and an alteration through sublimation. Accordingly, the experienced reality for the psychoanalytic subject is the defense-altered psychic reality. A person's sexual desire, for example, may be present to him as a reversal of love into hate (reaction formation), or the experience not of himself but of the other person as desirous

(projection), and so on, depending on the nature of the defense. The subject's own instinctual desire, represented by the split-off systematic unconscious, remains occluded, and is replaced in this manner by the defense-altered psychic reality.

Overall, the 1915 essay The unconscious is significant in another respect. The original descriptive topography of the mind, emphasized in earlier work, is refined into a system of the mind where not only the unconscious proper but preconscious and conscious processes are systematized. In other words, the presence and absence of experience, Freud's (1959, Vol. 4, p. 22) starting point in his 1912 essay on the unconscious, is de-emphasized in favor of an explanation which literalizes and reduces these characteristics of experience to components within the intrapsychic system. Hereafter, a descriptive account which flows from experience is increasingly abandoned, to be replaced by this systematic explanation grounded in specific assumptions. Moreover, the introduction of localities within the system is unavoidable.

Whether this localization is literally anatomical or metaphorical is inconsequential. The fact remains, as I have already shown, that an attitude toward localization persists throughout the gamut of Freud's metapsychological writings. Further, this localization is central to the systematic account. This is clear when Freud (ibid, pp. 105-106) says:

... a mental act commonly goes through two phases, between which is interposed a kind of testing process (censorship). In the first phase the mental act is unconscious

and belongs to the system Ucs; if upon the scrutiny of the censorship it is rejected, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be "repressed" and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this scrutiny, it enters upon the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the second system, which we will call the Cs... It is not yet conscious, but it is certainly capable of entering consciousness... In consideration of this capacity to become conscious we also call the system Cs the "preconscious."

In addition, preconscious and conscious systems are governed by secondary process thought, and stand in direct contrast to the primary process governed system Ucs. For example, identifying characteristics of these systems are: the ability to enter consciousness, non-contradictory nature of the experientially present, deferred discharge through cathexis, concern for appropriate temporal relationships, and a regard for external reality. Furthermore, Freud (ibid) understood ego-oriented instincts to be in the preconscious system, while pleasure-centered orientations are within the system Ucs. Censorship is instituted by the preconscious system at its boundary with the system Ucs, and serves to protect the preconscious and conscious systems from unconscious intrusion. Finally, clinical resistance is localized at this site in the metapsychological account.

One further point in the 1915 essay deserves mentioning

before moving to take up the changes expressed in the 1923 The ego and the id. I will simply mention this point now, and defer a discussion of its significance until the section on a phenomenological psychology of the unconscious. From the viewpoint of the reflective observer, Freud (1959, Vol. 4, p. 102) makes the following statement about how being unconscious of something originally presents itself to a person's experience. He says:

... we must say that all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else and are to be explained by the mental life ascribed to that person... Some special hindrance evidently deflects our investigations from ourselves and interferes with our obtaining true knowledge of ourselves.

For now, I wish only to note that this ego-alien givenness of unconscious processes through the other is a feature not only of Freud's psychology of the unconscious, but of other dynamically-based psychologies of the unconscious as well (Fairbairn, 1952; Jung, 1966, Vol. 7; Klein, M., 1975; Sullivan, 1953).

From 1920 through 1923, with the publications of Beyond the pleasure principle and The ego and the id, Freud's psychology of the unconscious underwent a major paradigm change. The topographic viewpoint, with its reliance on consciousness and clear divisions of Cs, Pcs, and Ucs systems, was no longer

workable for the assimilation of newly emerging clinical discoveries. Specifically, two reasons led Freud (1962a) to institute the structural model of the mind associated with The ego and the id.

The first reason arose from a conflict between the dynamic and systematic conceptions of the unconscious through which the unconscious was equated with the repressed, and the latter as act was identified as a function belonging to the system Pcs. Through his 1915 paper on the unconscious, Freud had viewed the acts of repression and resistance as part of the Pcs system. Clinical work, however, revealed that the analysand was unaware of both the act and content of repression. These discoveries stemmed from the observation that the defensive maneuvers to avoid unpleasure within the analytic setting constituted a resistance which was not easily accessible to the analysand's awareness. Accordingly, Freud (1962a) drew the following conclusions: The acts of repression and resistance could no longer be identified with the system Pcs, since pre-conscious processes had been defined by their accessibility to consciousness. Next, the ego could not be equated purely with the systems Cs and Pcs because defensive functions of ego processes appeared resistant to awareness. For example, by 1920, in Beyond the pleasure principle, Freud had identified an unconscious aspect of the ego, which previously had been defined by its accessibility to awareness. His focus on the nature of the ego and its relationship to defense led him to conclude that "it is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious... ; only a small part of it is covered by the term

'preconscious'" (in Strachey, 1962, p. xii).

Secondly, Freud (1962a) observed that people in analysis often expressed needs for punishment and/or carried a sense of guilt, both of which existed outside awareness as unconscious. Again, however, the topographic model identified these trends with anti-instinctual forces which were both available to awareness and part of the Pcs system.

Taken together, these two reasons led Freud to abandon the topographic theory insofar as it related specific processes to the systems Cs, Pcs, and Ucs. The pure distinctions of the mind into these systems, and the functions assigned to them, were no longer appropriate as a model for assimilating the clinical discoveries that Freud made. What now achieved significance in his emerging structural theory was whether processes belonged to the primary or secondary process activities.

One consequence of this change is a further departure from consciousness, considered both as metapsychological criterion and as the analysand's perceptual experience. Freud (1962a, p. 7) states the beginning of this change and of ego psychology in the following statement drawn from The ego and the id:

... we land in endless obscurities and difficulties if we keep to our habitual forms of expression and try, for instance, to derive neuroses from a conflict between the conscious and the unconscious. We shall have to substitute for this antithesis another, taken from our

insight into the structural conditions of the mind--the antithesis between the coherent ego and the repressed which is split off from it.

The changes in Freud's psychology of the unconscious, appearing in The ego and the id (1962a), are corrections to the aforementioned discrepancies and contradictions within the topographic model. I will make an overall general presentation of this model, and will then show how these difficulties in the topographic model are transformed in the new, structural model.

The structural model conceives of psychological functioning in terms of the now-famous tripartite divisions into ego, superego, and id. Perception and awareness are accounted for by the Pcpt.-Cs system. The function of this system is to both receive and organize external stimuli, and to orient the person to reality demands. This system is derived from the Pcpt. system explained in Chapter 7 of The interpretation of dreams (1938), and, even earlier, from the Psi-Omega neuron system in the Project (1977).

Next was the structure of the ego, which organized stimuli received from the Pcpt.-Cs system, and from unconscious instinctual sources. The ego now also included structures responsible for resistance and defense. In its totality, the ego shows three functional divisions. Part of the ego is conscious, and utilizes the secondary process thinking previously identified with the preconscious. Another part is preconscious, and performs the thinking and judgment activities

governed by the secondary process. Still another part is dynamically unconscious, and contributes to fantasy formation, resistance, and defense. These are the secondary process activities that take place outside a person's awareness.

Within The ego and the id, Freud (1962a) stressed the essentially passive role of the ego. It was seen as subservient to external and internal demands, being a mediator between superego and ego. However, by 1926 in Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety, Freud (1959, Vol. XX, pp. 77-175) repudiated this passive role, and saw the ego as actively responding to anxiety by instituting defenses, control, and direction of id impulses.

In contrast to the organized, reality-oriented ego, the id was viewed as undifferentiated and unorganized, a reservoir of primordial energy and impulses governed by the primary process. Freud (1962a) explained that the id is not synonymous with the whole unconscious, since aspects of ego functioning were also unconscious. The id, moreover, is developmentally prior to the ego and superego structures, and is the foundation from which these other structures emerge over time.

Finally, the superego is the last structure to developmentally differentiate, and emerges with the resolution of the Oedipal complex. The superego is concerned with moral expectation, and is described as including both conscience and ego ideal directives. The superego was described as related to, but functionally independent from the ego. Superego functions have their own energy source. They produce guilt and prohibit immoral expectation. Since the superego energy can be turned against the orientations of the ego, the superego is independent

from the former. Hence, moral considerations may be opposed to the ego's role as mediator between reality and instinctual demands.

Overall, Freud's (1962a, p. 14) diagram of the structural theory of the mind illustrates the following:




Figure 1. Freud's original (1923) diagram of the structural model of mind.

The Pcpt.-Cs component constitutes one end of the system, and is oriented to external reality. At the other end is the id, which is oriented toward instinctual demands seeking immediate gratification. The ego is located between these two systems to designate its mediative function between external and internal demands. This structural model subsumes the earlier systems Pcs and Ucs, and the terms preconscious and unconscious are now limited to designating a dynamic sense of the unconscious in this new model.

The structural theory enabled psychoanalysis to assimilate the clinical discoveries which remained anomalies in the topographic model. Specifically, both the act and content of repression are accounted for in the new structural theory as being dynamically unconscious. The repressed material is now considered part of the id, while the act of censorship is

derived from the unconscious functions of the ego. Accordingly, both these aspects of repression are accounted for and integrated within Freud's (1962) final model for a psychology of the unconscious. Likewise, the existence of self-critical judgments and guilt are also accounted for as unconscious, and distinguished from ego processes by reference to the largely unconscious superego. Neurotic conflict is now explained as a conflict between the ego and the id, and the participation of the superego in this antagonism may vary. For example, in some cases the superego may act in alliance with the ego through injunctions which stimulate control of the id. In other instances the superego may be allied with the id against the ego, as in more regressed reactions. Patrick Mullahy (1955) vividly portrays this antagonism of structures when he says that the structural theory depicts an intrapsychic battle between superego and id, with the ego, or sense of self, as the battlefield.

4.4.3. Critical evaluation of Freud's psychology of the unconscious

This critical evaluation of Freud's general psychology of the unconscious directly draws from the criticism of the psychoanalytic approach presented in Chapter I of this work. This methodological plan was stated at the onset in the preface of this work. For example, the psychoanalytic unconscious was shown to be situated in and informed by the overall approach implicit in psychoanalysis. Criticisms of psychoanalysis by phenomenological psychologists and philosophers singled out the approach as contributing to some discrepancies which

compromised the empirical bearing of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Accordingly, this approach was made explicit, examined, and criticized by reference to the meaning of empirical in a phenomenological standpoint. Results of this criticism high-lighted specific points which diluted the empirical strength of psychoanalysis, and contributed to disjunctions between approach and theory, theory and practice. With this material now available as horizon, this critical evaluation of Freud's psychology of the unconscious will focus on some central points which specifically illustrate how Freud's psychology of the unconscious requires empirical revision. In doing this, I will not reference all these criticisms since they are consistent with those already established in the literature and cited in Chapter II.

Overall, the development of Freud's psychology of the unconscious shows a consistent and gradual abandonment of consciousness as a criterion from which the unconscious is functionally defined. For example, by 1923 in The ego and the id, components of the mind were no longer dependent on a relationship to consciousness for their primary definitions. Therefore, what Strasser (1969) says of the overall development and scope of Husserl's work pertains also to Freud. Namely, that the initial concern with the "what," the phenomena of human existence, is gradually replaced by a preoccupation with the "by what," that which genetically and hypothetically explains how the object arises. This departure from the object of consciousness leads to the loss of an empirical reference point to which reflection and theory building always

refer. Jaspers (1967), in fact, defines speculative thought in just these terms, as a thinking which takes place without the guiding norm of an experienced object. Chapter II already documented how this lack of empirical grounding was expressed in the psychoanalytic approach toward people. There it was shown that psychoanalytic explanation involves a reduction and transcendence of perceptual experience, with the real influences being conceived of as causes which were extra-conscious. That is, influences were understood as not merely temporarily absent from an individual's awareness at a point in time, but as unable to be perceptually experienced by anyone from any perceptual standpoint.

The psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious, accordingly, mirrors these themes in its account of how a person is clinically unaware of aspects of his personal and social existence. Overall, the Cartesian assumptions of psychoanalysis form an approach in which the person is only indirectly and inferentially known, for appearance is not a reliable access to the subjective being of an individual. Seen phenomenologically, the expressive body-in-a-situation (Being-in-the-world) is the primordial starting point for psychoanalytic inquiry. However, in the psychoanalytic approach the split between appearance/being is also expressed as a behavior/subjectivity, symptom/cause dichotomy. Accordingly, the phenomenal meanings of the other person's speech and gestures are first taken as untrustworthy behavioral appearances to be decoded and given intelligibility by psychoanalytic method. Behind these appearances lie the subjective, unconscious

motives, desires, and intentions, which have a causal status. The discovery and identification of these factors is contingent, however, on the subordination of observed phenomena to the assumptions of psychoanalytic method. This assumption is at the heart of the psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious. As Freud (1943, p. 338) puts it:

As a science psycho-analysis is characterized by the methods with which it works, not by the subject-matter with which it deals... Psycho-analysis aims at and achieves nothing more than the discovery of the unconscious in mental life.

These assumptions about how the person exists imply a conception of what that person may be unconscious of or about. For example, with the assumption that the other person can never be directly known as a genuine other, what the person is unconscious of or about is, likewise, only known indirectly and inferentially. Hence, Freud approaches the unknowable unconscious of the other as Galileo approached the mystery of a terra physics--by making assumptions that would hold true despite the dynamic fluctuation of subjective appearances. With Galileo the measurable primary qualities lie behind the appearances, and are the basis for what constitutes evidence and certainty (Clavelin, 1974). For Freud, the instinctual themes of sexuality and aggression assume this role, despite the perceptual meaning of phenomenal appearances. Perceptual experience is by-passed as a basis for evidence in favor of the hypothetical instincts and their role as evidence in the

explanatory superstructure of psychoanalytic metapsychology. Accordingly, what a person is dynamically unconscious of is already predetermined, a priori, by assumptions surrounding directly unknowable instincts in a directly unknowable unconscious, subjective life. Being dynamically unaware of something in a situation is always some variation of an unawareness of the sexual or aggressive perspectives of that situation.

Two empirical problems may be identified in this psychology of the unconscious. First, the priority of sexuality and aggression in the psychoanalytic approach predestines the psychoanalytic practitioner to discover only those themes in the unconscious life of his or her clients. This fact has a two-fold significance for psychoanalytic practice. What is revealed in psychoanalytic work is already predetermined, fixed exclusively in advance, by these assumptions. Accordingly, that which will be discovered is already anticipated and capable of prediction. However, through these same assumptions the psychoanalytic treatment of the unconscious deprives itself of any evidence to the contrary. On these grounds, both behavioral and phenomenological psychologists were shown to have questioned the empirical validity of psychoanalysis in Chapter II. This criticism of Freud's psychology of the unconscious leads to a second empirical problem encountered in clinical practice. At the cultural level, many practicing psychologists have argued that as society has changed so too has the nature of psychological problems since Freud's time (Keen, 1970; May, 1959; Van den Berg, 1964;

Wheelis, 1958). Indeed, many of these changes are to be incorporated in the forthcoming Diagnostic and statistical manual III, published by the American psychiatric association. Many distressed people continue to seek assistance from some form of psychoanalytic psychotherapy which proceeds from a Freudian inspired approach toward the unconscious. In this context, the empirical question is how can these changes be initially recognized, then responded to by these practitioners, when the psychoanalytic approach precludes consideration of themes other than sexuality and aggression? Further, how can variations between individuals in this psychologically distressed group be recognized and effectively responded to?

As stated, these empirical problems in Freud's psychology of the unconscious flow from a theoretical architecture built on a Cartesian approach to how people exist. The above discussion showed how this approach already predetermines what a person is dynamically unconscious of, and depicted two related empirical problems in this psychology of the unconscious.

A psychology of how dynamic unconsciousness exists also results from this approach, and presents other empirical problems. For example, psychoanalytic practice fundamentally takes place in a dyadic, interpersonal situation, and the making explicit of unconscious processes is both grounded in and contingent on this dialectical, inter-experiential context (Barton, 1974; Laing, 1970; Van den Berg, 1971). Nevertheless, from this relationship the psychoanalytic approach reduces unconscious processes to an intrapsychic level, within the person conceived as psychophysical organism. In short, being-

unconscious-of-something is reduced to a spatially viewed locale within the person (ibid). This reduction was seen as a stable trend from the early neuronal model of the Project (Freud, 1977) to the final model of Freud's psychology of the unconscious in The ego and the id (ibid, 1962). Spatially reifying and removing dynamic human unawareness in this manner is the basis for the popular criticism that Freud treats unawareness as a thing-like container, directly inaccessible to any experiential viewpoint which serves as evidence (Keen, 1970; Lyons, 1963; Van Kaam, 1966). Accordingly, how the unconscious exists is inside the person. For Freud, the mind is in the body, and the unconscious exists within the person. This is true for both preconscious and dynamically unconscious processes alike. However, as presented in Chapter III, this reduction to the psychophysical body goes unsupported by the evidence of perceptual experience, and is an outcome of Freud's mechanistic approach.

The duration of identified unconscious content is another empirically questionable issue in this psychology of the unconscious. For example, earlier it was shown that when a given perceptual meaning was no longer present to awareness, Freud said that meaning continued to exist in a latent manner. This line of reasoning leads Freud (1959, Vol. 4, pp. 106-109) to pose the following problem in his 1915 essay on the unconscious: if a person is dynamically unaware about something, and the therapist directly tells that person what he or she is unaware of, do two records then exist, one in consciousness and the other in the unconscious? In this presumption of a latent

existence, Freud treats unconscious meaning as a thing. That is, he holds that unconscious meaning continues to exist despite the evidence of self or other perceptual experience, which fluctuates in its themes through time and situation. Here again the constancy hypothesis is operative, for once identified and defined unconscious content holds the privileged position over the evidence of human experience. The empirical disjunction between this mechanistic approach and human subject matter should be evident here. By contrast, the phenomenological approach presented in Chapter III showed that existence is always an experienced existence, situated both temporally and spatially. Accordingly, from this approach nothing supports the position that unconscious meaning possesses a thing-like continual duration.

The indestructability of memory is another assumption closely tied to durability in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. In fact, memory and the unconscious go hand in hand in this psychology. The relationship between these two is never more powerfully portrayed than in his Three contributions to the theory of sex (1938), published in 1905. Therein, Freud seeks to understand how those extremely formative, early childhood years up to six or eight are usually forgotten. Freud (ibid., pp. 581-582) called this problem infantile amnesia, and remarked that "...the very impressions which we have forgotten have nevertheless left the deepest traces in our psychic life, and acted as determinants for our whole future development." Freud (ibid., p. 583) goes on to say that this is not a real forgetting, but an amnesia brought about by "...the psychic

forces of loathing, shame, and moral and esthetic ideal demands." In short, the forgetting is the result of repression which "... is organically determined" (*ibid*). In another work, Freud (1943, pp. 178-179) explains that "These impressions have never really been forgotten, but were only inaccessible and latent, having become part of the unconscious." Accordingly, that which was originally experienced is not forgotten. Rather, like the existence of the unconscious, memory traces continue to exist as they were originally experienced but in a latent manner of existence. The duration of memories and their immutable form lead Laplanche & Pontalis (1973, p. 249) to conclude that Freud's later works emphasize a view of memory traces "... as reproductions of things in the sense in which this is understood by an empiricist psychology."

The issue of an unperceived, latent existence has, already been explicated as an unempirical, positivistic perspective in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. The claim of an enduring existence apart from its empirical grounding in someone's experience was shown to leave psychoanalysis without an empirical foundation in experience and subject this approach to the charge of being speculative. What remains now to be examined is Freud's assumption that, once recorded, memory traces are immutable in this form. This assumption has received some criticism from psychologists who view memory in a developmental context. Schachtel (1959), for example, has extensively criticized this assumption about memory in Freud's interpretation of infantile amnesia. To repeat, Freud saw infantile amnesia as arising exclusively from a biologically based

ensorship which repressed objectionable material that, excluding repression, is capable of being remembered. In short, the assumption is that the richness of early childhood experience continues to exist in its original form, but is unavailable to voluntary recall because of repression. Schachtel (ibid.) objects to this interpretation on two counts. First, he asks why all experience during this period is forgotten when sexual experience is the object of repression during this time. Second, the concept of repression suggests that material which otherwise can be recalled is excluded from recall by virtue of its traumatic meaning. Here he points out that even the most complete analysis never fully recovers early childhood experience. Accordingly, Schachtel maintains that something in the quality of early childhood experience leads it to be forgotten. He argues two main points in support of this view. First, he points out that the sensory schema necessary for articulate memory are relatively late in developing. The child is first experientially present to the world through the proximal senses of touch, taste, and smell. Only later, with the gradual development of vision and audition, the distal senses, is the child able to experience, remember, and recall a world through the conventional schema of adult memory. Further, in this development of experiential schema, the quality of early childhood experience is not preserved, and recedes into the background to be replaced by developmentally more mature schema. Specifically, memories of pleasure, disgust, and pain, the content of infantile amnesia, are replaced by a sensory schema which highlights distal, abstract modes of

experiential organization. Schachtel's second point is closely related to the above. He holds that the quality of early childhood experience can not be integrated into this developing schema of experience and memory. This is so because the adult, distal schema arises from the preferences and injunctions of an adult culture, and is not suited to accommodate experiences and memories typical of early childhood. As Schachtel (ibid, p. 285) states it, "The person who remembers is the present person, a person who has changed considerably, whose interests, needs, fears, capacity for experience and emotion have changed." Hence, in this position memory is neither immutable nor indestructible, but is situated in a whole person who is in the process of developmental becoming. As that individual changes, memory changes, and allows other perspectives of what was once experienced to be experientially present and open to inspection. Accordingly, Schachtel's developmental perspective on memory does not support the assumptions on the immutability of memory traces within Freud's psychology of the unconscious.

Goldstein, K. (1966) has also criticized Freud's assumptions about memory and repression. Goldstein makes a distinction between normal forgetting and repression. Like Schachtel, he argues that the young child is engaged in a series of complex developmental transformations. In this process, structures of experiential organization once appropriate to a lived through situation are outgrown then replaced by newer, developmentally more appropriate structures. Outgrown structures are, consequently, forgotten since they are no longer directly serviceable in the process of adaptation and becoming. This is normal

forgetting. Goldstein's viewpoint on normal forgetting also argues against the assumption that the once perceived presence becomes in memory an enduring, indestructible, thing-like reproduction of its original. Like Schachtel, Goldstein maintains a view of memory as developmentally situated. Memory is mutable, and genuine forgetting does exist. Hence, to see all infantile amnesia as the result of repression, and all the forgotten as still existent, conflicts with the evidence of Goldstein's developmental position.

Finally, Strasser (1969, p. 17) has also argued against the viewpoint that memory is thing-like and indestructible. His position is closely allied to that of Schachtel and Goldstein. He states it in these terms:

Perhaps we could say that the fact that childhood experiences are "buried" means that we have outgrown them. A new life, another kind of life has been formed and has taken the place of the earlier life.

Citing the Dutch psychologist Rümke, Strasser (*ibid*) speaks of a developmentally necessary "productive disintegration." That is, the developmental process of growing and outgrowing is possible precisely "... because certain structures of a child's consciousness disintegrated and were replaced by others." The possibilities for genuine memory changes and eventual forgetting also exist in this view.

Taken together, the developmental theories of Schachtel (1959), Goldstein, K. (1966), and Strasser (1969) suggest that Freud's position on memory and the unconscious needs reformu-

lation. The details of this reformulation will be reserved for later. For now, I wish only to note that Freud's view that infantile amnesia is the exclusive outcome of repression must be modified. Memory data does not continue to exist, invariantly, like a thing over time. The considered developmental theory, instead, indicates that memory data changes in the process of human development, and the possibility for a genuine forgetting exists. Accordingly, Freud's identification of the unconscious as timeless deserves amendment in light of this developmental information.

The localization of memory is another theme requiring revision in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. This revision is needed for two reasons. First, like the unconscious, human memory is both reduced to and localized within the psychobiological subject. This is clearly shown in both the Project (1977) and Interpretation of dreams (1938), where Freud gives his most extensive scientific account of memory and the unconscious. Second, in these same works Freud repeats the statement that perceptual consciousness and memory have a mutually exclusive relationship to each other. I will take these points one at a time.

Contemporary research in a phenomenological psychology of memory argues against reducing it to processes internal to the person (Goldstein, K., 1966; Kvale, 1974; Merleau-Ponty, 1966b; Minkowski, 1970; Steiner, 1974; Straus, 1963, 1966). This research argues that while human remembering certainly involves internal, physiological processes, memory can not be reduced to this substrate. These psychologists point out that remembering

always occurs within a person's present centered, perceptual relationship to the world. During this perceptual process, a perceived presence opens up horizons of past recollections. For example, the smell of bus fumes in a city instantly makes present the horizon of being in a bus-populated, downtown Chicago during my childhood, or my recognition of the sky's sheer vastness in Georgia makes present the horizon of a typical, clear Saskatchewan day. Memory, in short, always takes place within the intentional structure of a person's perceptual relationship to the world, and may not be defined apart from that relationship. Hence, a reduction to internal processes is untenable in this approach to memory.

The above material is equally relevant to the second point, the assumed mutual exclusion between perceptual consciousness and memory. Freud (1938, 1977) makes this distinction on the basis of hypothetical psychic localities within the intrapsychic apparatus, not on the basis of empirically describable experience. Data from the latter, for example, show that human remembering always presents the remembered presence through the modality in which that presence was originally experienced (Goldstein, K., 1966; Straus, 1966). Hence, memory is intimately tied to perceptual experience in this account, and Freud's exclusive distinction between the two is not empirically demonstrable.

The sharp distinction between conscious and unconscious processes also deserves critical examination in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. As already presented, Freud made an absolute distinction between conscious awareness and the

unawareness characterized by preconscious and unconscious proper processes. The later form of unawareness was recognized by its inaccessibility to awareness, and like conscious and preconscious processes was assigned to its own system to further demarcate its boundaries. Research already presented showed that Freud was the first and only figure at that time to make such an absolute distinction.

Since that time, philosophers and psychologists of perceptual consciousness have continued to criticize the relations between consciousness and unawareness. William James, for example, understood the relations between awareness and unawareness within constantly changing fields of consciousness situated in time (Gurwitsch, 1964). He insisted that awareness and unawareness were fluctuating moments within the perceptual process. They existed within a changeable structure having a focal theme and a fringe or margin. What is immediately relevant and central to attention is focal, while co-present but not immediately relevant data are marginal within consciousness. Fluctuations between theme and margin occur through fluctuations in attention. For example, through attention material once focal may become marginal without disappearing from the field of consciousness; likewise, marginal data may transform into focal status. James saw the field of consciousness as a fluxing stream composed of often indistinct and ambiguous moments. Accordingly, he argued against both the sharp distinction between awareness and unawareness and their reification into static states.

The evidence of gestalt psychology also argues against an

absolute distinction between awareness and unawareness. Koffka (1963, p. 330), for example, has written that "... the psychoanalyst's use of the term unconscious was unfortunate." Koffka argues that usage of the term unconscious would cease if experiention were considered within a field theory having a figure-ground structure. In this structure, awareness and unawareness are not sharply distinguished, but are qualitative variations in the movement between figure-ground perceptual relations. In summary, gestalt psychology argues against both the reification of experience into entities and its designation of a conscious/unconscious dichotomy.

These criticisms have been repeated elsewhere in the literature (Binswanger, 1975; Fink, 1970; May, 1967; Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Romanyshyn, 1975; Sartre, 1956; Van den Berg, 1974). What these authors have in common is the criticism that if one takes recourse to the evidence provided by perceptual experience then human experiention is not so easily arranged into conscious/unconscious sectors. This criticism is vividly argued by Van den Berg (1974, p. 35), who maintains that awareness and unawareness

... are entangled together, which makes the distinction conscious-unconscious even more incorrect, more confusing and crude, just as confusing as the distinction white-black would be in the description of the colours of a field of flowers.

One further point remains in connection with this conscious/unconscious dichotomy. I will raise this point now, and merely

pose it as a problem to be discussed later. The issue is this: from the standpoint of the experiencing person's viewpoint on himself, that person's experience of his own pre-existing dynamic unconsciousness would be the experience of a blank, a gap, and incompleteness. In other words, Freud's unconscious proper is absolutely unconscious, a realm unpopulated by meaning for the experiencing person. One psychologist phrases the issue this way: "The unconscious, on the contrary, to the extent to which it is the unconscious, exists as a blank" (Sonnemann, 1954, p. 192). Accordingly, the question to be raised is does the experiencing person express no knowledge of, show no reference to the unconscious perspectives of their living? In short, is dynamic unconsciousness truly an absolute unconsciousness for the experiencing person? I will reply to this question in the section dealing with the phenomenological reformulation of the unconscious.

A final point to be examined in Freud's psychology of the unconscious is its assumed causal status. Chapters II and III already showed how the psychoanalytic approach conceives of the unconscious as a discrete causal determiner within the superstructure of psychoanalytic explanation. Further, those substructural, metapsychological propositions, i.e., the topographic, economic, systematic, dynamic, etc., also have this role within the explanation of experientiation. In both super and substructural explanation the action of instincts is directly unknowable, and instincts exist outside the evidence provided by any experiential viewpoint. Nonetheless, these instincts have a direct causal influence on human experientiation.

At least two empirical problems result from this treatment of the unconscious. The first is found in the often repeated criticism that this psychology of the unconscious leads to a constricting determinism, where all of a person is first reduced to, then explained by, the isolation of a part of that person (Binswanger, 1975; Goldstein, 1963; Giorgi, 1970; Jaspers, 1972). Stated phenomenologically, the statement would be that all of lived existence is assumed to be determined by a part of that existence. William James calls this the psychologist's fallacy (Gurwitsch, 1964, pp. 25-26). James argued that the explanation of higher mental states by recourse to the assumed causal action of lower mental states is empirically untenable. He notes that experiential presences are occasioned through a plurality of stimulations occurring together. This ensemble of stimulations or conditions, however, does not warrant an explanation of the perceptually present "...as if it were composed of those elements which would respectively arise if each of the partial stimuli would come into action separately" (ibid., p. 26). In short, the discrete separation of those elements is abstract and possible only after an original, pre-reflective experience of a whole, or what James calls "sensible totals" (ibid., p. 27). Accordingly, James, with the tradition of gestalt and phenomenological psychology, argues against a positivistic, causal psychology (Giorgi, 1970). Human experiention presents itself originally as perceptible wholes. As such, it is to be described, not causally explained, since no determinants of that experiention exclusively exist. Hence, recourse to experience as evidence

argues against how Freud conceived of the insentient influences on human living, and suggests the need for an alternative more empirically faithful to our histories and relations to others. The second point focuses on the extra-conscious status of the unconscious as cause. In psychoanalysis the unconscious is removed from conscious recognition on two grounds: by a distinction present through the phenomena studied, and by a distinction induced through the assumptions inherent in the psychoanalytic approach. I will take these one at a time.

One ground for appreciating a division between awareness and unawareness stems from a distinction present in the nature of the phenomena which psychoanalysis originally studied. As indicated, many roots of past and contemporary psychoanalysis are intertwined in its original clinical engagement with hysteria. As was shown, in hysteria aspects of a person's experience of their own ongoing experientiation appeared to Breuer & Freud (1950a, 1950b) as being genuinely unavailable to that person's experience of himself. Accordingly, these early psychologists saw in hysteria a divided existence, in which unrecognized aspects of a person's living were clinically significant by their absence from that person's total awareness of their own identity, intentions, and desires. These aspects were termed unconscious, and their inaccessibility from a person's conscious awareness was underscored. More recently, contemporary accounts of hysteria have continued to emphasize this division through such terms as dissociation and depersonalization (Grey, 1978; Shapiro, 1965). Accordingly, a division between awareness and unawareness appears to be empirically

present in the hysterical style, as that is experienced by others. Hence, viewing dynamic unawareness as extra-conscious from this perspective is supported by perceptual experience, and is, therefore, empirically centered.

The second ground for removing and assigning a causal role to dynamic unconsciousness is necessitated by the psychoanalytic approach. For example, the genuine division inherent in hysteria was explained by Freud through the approach assumed by the science of his time. This was identified as a Cartesian approach for science, and its features were detailed in Chapter II of this work. This division within a person's intentionally related existence (Being-in-the-world) was first transposed then reduced to a division between an intrapsychically bound consciousness and unconsciousness, wherein the latter was designated a causal determiner. Here, the inaccessibility of unconsciousness to perceptual experience is absolutized by a reduction to speculative psychobiology. Seen in this approach, insentient influences on our lives are not merely extra-conscious for us as individuals, they are extra-conscious to any experiential viewpoint. Hence, this feature of Freud's psychology of the unconscious is speculative insofar as it lacks the empirical confirmation of having been experienced. However, this view of influence as cause is faithful to the assumptions of Cartesian natural science. For example, a central feature of this approach is the view that one must look behind the experienced appearances by a method to discover a cause, conceived of as separate and distinct from the appearances of a phenomenon (Giorgi, 1970; Gurwitsch, 1966; Husserl,

1970a; Romanyshyn, 1975a). Accordingly, I argue here that the approach of Freud's science pre-established him to think of insentient influences as discrete determiners existing apart from any experiential evidence. Freud recognized correctly, I believe, that certain unacknowledged perspectives of our existence have an influence on our living. However, he understood that influence as causal, from the standpoint of a pre-given approach having limits in its empirical applicability to the range of human phenomena.

4.5 Comparison of pre-Freudian and Freudian psychologies of the unconscious

A review of pre-Freudian and Freudian versions of the unconscious was presented to show how the unconscious, i.e., being-unaware-of-something, was understood and explained in these psychologies. Pre-Freudian versions were shown to emphasize two features. First, being-unaware-of-something was understood from within a psychology of consciousness as the implicit. Second, the implicit was within the individual's perceptual field, and not totally split from awareness. Hence, being-unconscious-of-something is reduced to an event within the individual's perceptual field, and corresponds to Freud's designation of preconscious processes.

Freud, however, found this position unworkable in dealing with hysteria through the clinical situation. Hysteria appeared to deny inclusion into a position that emphasized a person's self report on his existence, for many significant aspects of that person appeared inaccessible from his awareness of himself. Accordingly, Freud proposed a model of the mind that affirmed

the normal, temporary presence and absence of meaning as conscious and preconscious processes; however, unlike his predecessors he saw dynamic unconsciousness as absolute and timeless, rather than temporarily implicit. Further, his explanations reified this form of unawareness into a psychological system, divorced from the field of perceptual experience. The preceding section showed that these and other related features of Freud's psychology of the unconscious are an outgrowth of the pre-given approach he assumed for psychoanalysis. Without exception, these features coincide with Giorgi's (1970) criticism that the approach of psychoanalysis is mechanistic, deterministic, and dominated by the causal-genetic bias. In addition, two other general criticisms were shown in response to Freud's psychology of the unconscious. First, all reviewed points in this psychology treated some aspect of dynamic unawareness through a reduction to the body, whether this pertains to the nature of the instincts, of memory, or in the spatial placement of unconscious processes. Second, all points cited in this evaluation rest on the foundation of hypothetical assumptions, through which psychoanalytic evidence appears arbitrary, solipsistic, and tautological. For example, some variation of sexuality and/or aggression must be an ingredient in what people are dynamically unaware of because the nature of unconscious instincts is fixed as sexual and aggressive, and instincts are determiners of human experiaction. Accordingly, evidence for the psychoanalytic unconscious is determined axiomatically by reference to assumptions within the approach.

A phenomenological approach also has assumptions which co-determine how a particular phenomenon is seen. The difference between the psychoanalytic and phenomenological approaches is far greater than this similarity. For example, Freud's psychoanalytic approach was uncritically borrowed from a mechanistic, dated, natural scientific biology (Binswanger, 1975). With the adoption of this approach, Freud did not sufficiently reflect on its underlying assumptions, and they remained influential but implicit and unrecognized. Hence, criteria for evidence and certainty are derived from an unexamined foundation. By contrast, in a phenomenological approach an attempt is made to first explicate one's assumptions and preferred ways of viewing that phenomenon. These are then bracketed or temporarily set aside, while the researcher/therapist carefully articulates new assumptions based on how the phenomenon in question manifests itself in original perceptual experience. In short, the extent to which given assumptions go supported or denied is directly referenced to the firm evidence of pre-reflective, perceptual experience. Assumptions, therefore, are not capable of being proven in a scientific laboratory; they are, however, capable of being supported or denied by experience in a human science approach (Giorgi, 1970; Van Kaam, 1966).

Hence, when selected points were designated unempirical in Freud's psychology of the unconscious, this criticism is in reference to the unexamined, seemingly arbitrary status of his assumptions. When then examined by comparison to the updated phenomenological approach in Chapter III, Freud's assumptions

were shown to lack the support of experience and lead to numerous empirical difficulties. Accordingly, the psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious, like its approach, requires revision on these stated empirical grounds.

4.6 Nature and limits of early phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis and the unconscious

The classic phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis and the unconscious have an equivocal status when compared to the contemporary phenomenological approach offered in Chapter III. In particular, the works of Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963) have clearly recognized many of the problems inherent in psychoanalytic theorizing and practice from a natural science approach. Their pioneer accomplishment was to have installed many valuable insights of psychoanalysis into a metapsychological approach drawn from Husserl and Heidegger. Likewise, from a different methodological direction, the more recent work of Ricoeur (1970) has moved to extract the human meaning of psychoanalysis through an interpretive hermeneutic approach. However, I will argue that the approaches adopted in these respective efforts are themselves limited, since phenomenological thought has progressed considerably since these revisions. Further, these limitations are also reflected in the understanding of dynamic unconsciousness by these and other psychologies of the unconscious which draw from the same philosophical sources. Specifically, in those revisions having this basis a tendency exists to approach the person through a phenomenology of the

"self," and to near exclusively focus on both personal identity and unawareness through the individual's consciousness or Dasein. The latter terms reveal a common structure of explicit themes and implicit horizons of meaning, and unawareness is equated with the implicit.

Accordingly, I will first present a brief overall characterization of these revisions. Next, I will show that these revisions have in common an emphasis on identifying a person's existence through self-experience, understood either through the structure of Dasein or consciousness. Finally, I will argue that these psychologies of the unconscious equate dynamic unconsciousness with the implicit, and, thereby, homogenize the temporary absence of experientially derived self-knowledge with forms of self-unawareness marked by their apparent inaccessibility to a person's experience, passive disownership, and ego alien quality. In short, these revisions include what Freud called preconscious meaning within an empirically grounded human science approach, but leave untouched the significance of dynamic self-unawareness.

4.6.1. Scope of the classic phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis

In the hands of Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963), early phenomenological revisions of psychoanalysis aim at criticizing, then replacing, its natural science approach with one originally drawn to clarify human existence. Broadly, these psychologists argue that the adoption of the natural science approach by psychoanalysis leads to a highly speculative

conceptual base through which human data are empirically obscured rather than clarified. The result is an explanation of experience in terms that are positivistic, reductionistic, causal, and without the empirical support of human experience.

The original works of these men present the specific nature and scope of their efforts. Many of these specifics were already presented as criticisms and modifications within this present work, and have also been summarized elsewhere (Ellenberger, 1970; Giorgi, 1970; Hall & Lindzey, 1970; Izenberg, 1976; May, 1959; Needleman, 1975). Consequently, I will not repeat these efforts. Instead, the overall scope of their works may be seen in the following three points summarized by Izenberg (1976, p. 13) who says this:

Given their insistence on the primacy of meaning, and their belief in the inappropriateness of conceptualizing meaning in terms either of the functioning of a mental apparatus or of biological instincts, the existentialists [Boss & Binswanger] had three problems with regard to psychoanalytic theory.

To paraphrase Izenberg (*ibid*), they are: First, how to account for the meaning of neurotic experience without taking recourse to reified explanations based on the natural science models of the psychic apparatus and psychic energy. Second, how to understand the often influential temporal connections between past and present without adopting a causal approach. Finally, how to apprehend, classify, and derive conclusions from experience that deviates from the instinctual categories of sexu-

ality and aggression. As already indicated, these problems were tackled with the intention of becoming more empirically certain in psychoanalytic theorizing and practice.

4.6.2. Empirical problems in the approach of the early revisions

Husserl and Heidegger are the chief contributors to the philosophical approach informing the revisions of Binswanger (1975), Boss (1963), and the hermeneutic interpretations of psychoanalysis by Ricoeur (1970). These revisions are contingent on the empirical value of their supporting approaches, and problems do exist in the philosophical sources informing these platforms. In the case of Husserl's epistemology, Chapter III of this work drew two critical conclusions after a comparison of Husserlian and contemporary phenomenological thought. First, Husserl was shown to have placed an over-emphasis on the person's activity in the origination and constitution of perceptual meaning. Second, that meaning, whether it be of oneself, others, or the world, is reduced to within the individual's field of experience. By contrast, contemporary phenomenological thought was shown to emphasize two features: the essential exteriorization of perceptual meaning, and the status of the perceptual world as existing between existing perceptual viewpoints. Hence, as Strasser (1969) points out, Husserl was never able to solve the related problems of how the other person exists and how there is intersubjectivity, for his phenomenology is empirically compromised by idealistic, egoistic tendencies. In the case of Heidegger, the

empirical value of his ontology for psychoanalysis is ambiguous. Critics have emphasized that Heidegger's (1962) ontology in Being and time is offered without any recourse to the evidence of perceptual experience (de Waelhens, 1967; Sartre, 1956; Schrag, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965, Vol. 1). Accordingly, the empirical value of this ontology remains undetermined by the generally accepted, conventional grounds for evidence in phenomenological investigations.

These problems in approach are reflected in the cited revisions. Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963) aim at centering psychoanalysis in a human science approach, whose empirical basis is a focus on experiention understood in the terms of Dasein. However, differences do exist in the interpretation of Dasein by these respective psychologists. Further, the outlined problems in the Husserlian-Heideggerian based approach are expressed in varying degrees in each revision. Binswanger (ibid), like Husserl, emphasizes the person's viewpoint and activity in the constitution of Dasein. This understanding of Binswanger is supported by Needleman (1975, p. 123), who says that with Binswanger "... phenomenology would be the method par excellence for a philosophy that holds by necessary fiat to the notion of constitutive powers of the "self." In contrast, Boss (ibid, p. 50) carefully distinguishes his own interpretation of Dasein from those that identify it with the constitutive powers of the person. He characterizes Dasein in a manner more in keeping with Heidegger's (1962) original rendering. Accordingly, with Boss Dasein analysis has its focus on impersonal Being, not on isolated man (Needleman, ibid). The overall

differences between Boss and Binswanger are succinctly put in Needleman's (ibid., pp. 125-126) statement that Boss views Dasein in the impersonal terms of a "pure subject," while Binswanger sees Dasein as "emanating from the subject." The differences in their respective emphases on constitution by the person are evident.

Nevertheless, these differences are negligible when compared to the commonalities shared by these psychologists. As practicing psychotherapists both make a commitment to lived experience as the fundamental data for psychoanalysis. Specifically, their focus is on the individual's immediate experience of his or her world. Second, both view that experience from within the structure of how Dasein presents itself. For example, with Boss (ibid., pp. 41-42) the meaning and essence of directly observable behaviors are treated as manifested existentialia within the whole frame of references horizontal to the existentialia. In short, Dasein possesses an explicit-implicit structure in its disclosure to the person. Binswanger also takes this structure of Dasein as a basis for understanding experientiation. However, his emphasis on the person's constitutive activity places him more in line with an interpretation that follows Husserl's phenomenology of the theme-horizon nature of consciousness, and the nature of essential structures (Needleman, 1975). In both cases, in the clinical arena Dasein receives a practical interpretation through a focus on the individual's experiential viewpoint on their existence as understood within an explicit-implicit structure of perceptual disclosure. Hence, the emphasis is on the meaning of a given phenomenon being

restricted to the standpoint of the individual experiencing person.

Empirical problems arise when this approach is focused on understanding the individual person in their bodily existence, particularly in the clinical area where troubled people go for psychological assessment and/or assistance. Therein, the person exists in an interpersonal setting along with the testor or psychotherapist. The very nature of this setting is to determine and understand the desires, intentions, emotions, and conflicts of that person in the interests of their health. Chapter III already showed that these aspects of a person are not simply "private events," to be defined exclusively through the person's experiential viewpoint on himself. Rather, these aspects of a person always have a potentially intersubjective, perceptually shared status in a contemporary phenomenological approach. This intersubjectivity, again, is possible because human subjectivity is embodied, and the body is directly expressive of that subjectivity to the viewpoints of other people. Accordingly, answers to such clinically relevant questions as "Who am I?" "What am I doing and experiencing now?" and "How can I understand the way I have lived?" are always co-defined between my viewpoint on myself and the literal and insentient viewpoints of others present to me.

In contrast, the recognized failure of both Husserlian and Heideggerian thought to provide a philosophy that clearly articulates this intersubjectivity (Strasser, 1969) is evident in the accounts by Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963). Both emphasize restricting knowledge of a person to the data

derived from that individual's viewpoint on himself. On these grounds, aspects of myself genuinely extending beyond the limits of my experiential viewpoint on myself are, de facto, inadmissible. Hence, the empirically valuable co-defining viewpoints of others are ignored in this approach.

4.6.3. The homogenization of dynamic unconsciousness with the horizontally implicit

In everyday terms, I believe that these pioneering revisions make the mistake of throwing the baby out with the bath water. That is, these efforts have a common thrust of rejecting a dated, natural science approach with its deterministic emphasis on discrete causes existing outside of any experiential viewpoint. However, with this rejection they include a rejection of dynamic unconsciousness as an influence outside the individual's grasp of him or herself. In fact, recourse to the works of Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963) show that their stated reasons for excluding the unconscious are largely on metapsychological grounds. Their clinical work, however, continues to include some appreciation of dynamically unconscious phenomena, but from within Dasein's transcendental horizon of thrownness (Geworfenheit). Hence, dynamic unconsciousness is homogenized with the implicit in the overall explicit-implicit structure of the individual's world, as it appears to the individual.

The often repeated theme of the inaccessibility of dynamic unconscious poses problems in these revisions. Needleman's (1975, p. 88) characterization of Binswanger's individual-

centered phenomenology depicts such a problem. Needleman says this of Binswanger's aim:

... his criticism of the reductive explanatory nature of psychoanalysis as a whole implies his criticism of the more specific aspects of psychoanalytic theory. And yet, his whole position is, in a sense, a criticism of such a notion as the unconscious--since what he is after is the structure of the world of the individual as it appears to the individual, and since the unconscious has no world.

This same priority on the individual's viewpoint leads Boss (1963, p. 94) to deny the inaccessibility of dynamic unconsciousness to the individual, and include it within the field of immediate awareness. He says:

Daseinanalysis makes it unnecessary to go beyond immediate experience. It can elucidate without difficulty, on the basis of immediate experience alone, all those psychic phenomena that forced Freud to invent the unconscious.

Finally, Ricoeur (1970) has recognized many of the problems inherent in a phenomenological assimilation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. Ricoeur's position on this task is in partial agreement with the argument I have maintained toward the work of Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963). For example, he points out that in practice phenomenology has sought to

integrate the unconscious through the notion of implicit horizon within a phenomenological model of perceptual experience. Ricoeur concludes that through this approach phenomenology integrates only preconscious phenomena. He (ibid, p. 392f.) puts it this way:

Phenomenology accounts only for "field phenomena" pertaining to a perceptual model (the fringes of the implicit, the horizon of the perceptible, the invisible other side of the visible), that is to say, phenomena at the frontier between the preconscious and the conscious, which Freud, it is true, "barely began to describe."

That is, through these and such other concepts as the pre-reflective, functioning intentionality, passive genesis, sedimentation, and the quest for operative meaning by an investigation of languaged meaning, phenomenology depicts only the preconscious aspects of the psychoanalytic unconscious.

For this reason, Ricoeur (1970) argues that phenomenology misses the very heart of psychoanalysis, the proposition that dynamically unconscious meaning is separated from consciousness. He says that phenomenology affords "... only an approximate understanding" of the psychoanalytic unconscious, an understanding which "... is also bound to fail" (ibid, p. 376). Accordingly, Ricoeur (ibid, p. 392) suggests that the movement from a phenomenological to psychoanalytic approach occurs "... when one understands that the main barrier separates the unconscious and the preconscious (Cs., Pcs./Ucs.) and not the

preconscious and the conscious" (Cs.,/Pcs., Ucs.). He concludes that a phenomenology of unawareness seen as the implicit or co-intended can never identify and integrate the psychoanalytic recognition of a dynamic unconscious proper. Only by stepping outside itself into psychoanalytic technique can the inaccessible psychoanalytic unconscious be rendered accessible to phenomenological understanding. In Ricoeur's (ibid., p. 392) own words:

The unconscious of phenomenology is the
preconscious of psychoanalysis... The mean-
ing of the barrier is that the unconscious
is inaccessible unless an appropriate technique
is used.

For reasons of agrument, I will defer a discussion of Ricoeur's position until the closing of the following section.

4.6.4. Discussion of the phenomenological attempts at revision

This section presented three main phenomenological positions toward the psychoanalytic unconscious. This was done with the aim of assessing their empirical value, when referenced to the phenomenological approach presented in Chapter III. The results of this comparison disclosed an important limit in the revisions of Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963).

A central limitation in their work, carried over from Husserl, is a reduction of the meaning of a person's experiention to his or her individual viewpoint on the world. When this approach is focused on a person within the clinical setting, empirical problems are likely to develop. For example,

Chapter III showed that the expressive body always exists between the perceptual viewpoints present, and this includes the experiential viewpoint a person has on himself. That is, in an updated phenomenological approach a person co-exists with others who are present both bodily as well as insentiently in memory, fantasy, and imagination. Within this context of co-existence, a person is, accordingly, co-perceived, co-defined, by the ensemble of perceptual viewpoints present in the same manner that the meaning of a work of art is situated. However, in the approach of the revisions considered, the clinical determination and meaning of specific forms of experiential action are empirically compromised. This occurs because the important co-existent viewpoints of others are de facto excluded.

This reduction affects the revised psychology of the unconscious in the works of Binswanger and Boss. Therein, the psychoanalytic metapsychology of the unconscious is rejected, and its dynamic, inaccessible nature is homogenized with the implicit horizon in this individualistic phenomenology of perceptual consciousness. Accordingly, this psychology of the unconscious is capable of affirming and integrating only pre-conscious phenomena within its approach.

Ricoeur (1970) supports this conclusion in his own phenomenological investigation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. However, he identifies the limits of this particular approach as limits of the approach of phenomenology. The psychoanalytic unconscious, he says, remains inaccessible to phenomenology unless one steps outside its basis of experience into psycho-

analytic technique.

I have argued contrary to Ricoeur's conclusion, and my reasoning is as follows. Ricoeur implies that dynamic unconsciousness transcends the evidence of experience in a phenomenological approach. In fact, however, Ricoeur uses the model of Husserlian phenomenology as the model of phenomenology in taking this position. The model of perceptual conscious he presents, and such terms as operative intentionality, passive genesis, horizon, sedimentation, all derive originally from Husserl's thought. By contrast, Chapter III showed that Husserl's phenomenology was empirically inadequate on some points. Particularly on the issues of a phenomenology of ^{the} bodily existence and inter-subjectivity, Husserl's thought needed updating in order to satisfy his own criteria for evidence and certainty. In short, Husserlian phenomenology was shown to be inadequate on these points so essential to a phenomenology of the unconscious. Accordingly, in agreement with Ricoeur I have argued that dynamic unconsciousness cannot be affirmed by Husserlian phenomenology. This is so because this unconsciousness does exist outside the field of the individual's viewpoint on himself. However, unlike Ricoeur, I maintain that the dynamic unconscious still exists within experience, and is, therefore, capable of being included in an empirically centered phenomenological psychology. The following section will demonstrate this.

4.7 A phenomenological psychology of dynamic insentience

This presentation of a phenomenologically grounded psychol-

ogy of the unconscious will make two overriding points about how dynamic unawareness of self exists. First, the inaccessible nature of this process for the individual is retained as a characteristic in this revision. This inaccessibility will be shown to be relative rather than absolute. Second, I will argue that this form of unawareness is, nevertheless, given in experience through some point of view on the individual. Hence, an empirically defensible psychology of the unconscious will be offered as both possible and scientifically desirable. To illustrate this I will now first examine, then empirically revise the eight points cited as needing revision in the section on Freud's psychology of the unconscious. These points will be presented one at a time in the form of a general summary of Freud's natural science understanding of each issue. Following this, that issue will be revised through its consideration in the phenomenological approach of Chapter III.

4.7.1. Empirical determination of the object of dynamic unconsciousness

An empirical issue common to all dynamic psychologies of the unconscious is the determination of what a person is unaware of. The approach toward this issue greatly affects the direction of both later theorizing and clinical practice. With Freud, the object of a person's dynamic unawareness is already predetermined in advance through assumptions about the activity of hypothetical, isolated, psychobiological instincts. The object of dynamic unconsciousness is always some variation of disowned sexual or aggressive meanings. The details of this

process were already presented at length earlier. Following this, three empirical problems were identified. The first has to do with what Radnitzky (1973) calls theory construction. As an empirically grounded theory, Freud's psychology of the unconscious deprives itself of any evidence to the contrary, and its empirical reference point (the existence and activities of the instincts) has no directly confirmable status in experience. Accordingly, this psychology is genuinely vulnerable to those earlier presented criticisms about its empirically alienated, deterministic, speculative metapsychology. The other two problems were identified as consequences of this position in clinical practice. First, the fixed predetermination of the object of dynamic unconsciousness affects the clinician's initial identification of the problem and his or her practice toward it. Here, the empirical difficulty is clearly revealed through again paraphrasing Rollo May (1967) when he asks how we may be sure we are truly experiencing the person in need of help rather than our own pet theories and projections. The approach of psychoanalysis precludes making this empirically necessary distinction. The second point raised refers to the ability of psychoanalysis to empirically recognize and deal with the changing nature of psychological disorders. On this issue I argued that psychopathology has changed radically since Freud's Victorian situation. The fixed assumptions in his approach, however, do not allow his psychology of the unconscious to recognize these shifts. Hence, the treatment of the contemporary person may be severely compromised. Taken together, these three problems arise from the

psychoanalytic approach, and affect the empirical determination of the object of dynamic insentience.

In a phenomenological psychology of the unconscious the empirical determination of what a person is unaware of flows from the general research guidelines in a human science approach. Considerable work has already been done to specify the features of a human science paradigm applicable to both experimental and clinical situations (Colaizzi, 1973; Fischer, C., 1975; Fischer, W., 1974; Giorgi, 1970, 1975b; Keen, 1975; Van Kaam, 1966). Moreover, specific applications of this approach to human science research and clinical work have appeared regularly in the Journal of phenomenological psychology, and in the Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology (Giorgi, Fischer, W., & Von Eckartsberg, Vol. I, 1971; Giorgi, Fischer, C., & Murray, Vol. II, 1975). In addition, Chapters II and III of this work have presented many features that guide phenomenologically based inquiry. Given this work, I will focus on three often cited features of phenomenological approaches to clarify how the object of dynamic unconsciousness is empirically determined through a phenomenological psychology. These features are: the primacy of the life world as the source of psychological data, fidelity to the actually experienced phenomena as a major research guiding feature, and the highly influential, engaged presence of the researcher/therapist in the research/clinical situations. The revision arising from this presentation will be shown to be empirically based and capable of avoiding the criticisms of being speculative, reductionistic, deterministic, and causal. Inconsistencies and gaps

between approach and theory, theory and practice will, thereby, be reduced.

Truly experiencing the other person as they present themselves, and empirically determining the object of their dynamic insentience is closely tied to a number of key presuppositions in phenomenological psychologies. The first is that the life-world (Lebenswelt) is the primary, most empirically certain, foundation for the derivation of psychological data, theorizing, and practice (Colaizzi, 1973; Fischer, C., 1975; Giorgi, 1970, 1975b; Keen, 1975). To repeat what I have already documented, the life-world is the operatively experienced, actually lived through world of a person's experience of a particular phenomenon. Methodologically, the perceptual meaning of that experience is made explicit as data through the person's descriptive languaging of what was initially present to them experientially. Hence, the description is tied as closely as possible to the person's reflection of that experience in the terms that it was originally experienced. This strategy is intended to preserve the pre-theoretical nature of the life world, which exists prior to any theoretical explanations, scientific interpretations, and philosophical judgments about its ultimate nature. Accordingly, every effort is made here to present these data in a manner free from prior assumptions and preconceptions.

The preservation of the originality of the data is maintained further by a second key presupposition common to phenomenological psychologies. This presupposition is commonly called fidelity to the phenomena (Fischer, C., 1975; Giorgi, 1970,

1975b; Keen, 1975). In practice, fidelity to the phenomena means that psychology as a human science must be capable of considering the range of human phenomena without, a priori, constricting and reducing their meaning to pre-existent theoretical and personal biases. Giorgi (1975b, p. 99), for example, argues that this means "... allowing anything that the subject feels worthy of mentioning to be registered as data as well as making explicit the perspective of the researcher." A minimum requirement for considering something as "hard data" is that it be an actually lived through experience present through someone's consciousness. Here, the phenomena delimit the range of meanings to be considered, not pre-existent theoretical viewpoints. Methodologically, this means that the range of data to be considered is delimited by the person's experience, rather than through the unexamined pre-existing assumptions and theories of the researcher/clinician. Thus, this reduction arises naturally from the presented evidence of experience, and may not be termed reductionistic. Accordingly, the methodologies of phenomenological psychologies are deliberately open-ended and open to the range of meanings disclosed by people.

Finally, a third presupposition seeks to insure the original evidence of the phenomena from the influences and biases of the psychologist's unexamined assumptions and theories. This presupposition concerns the influential role played by the psychologist in the co-constitution of both the situation studied and the resulting data. In short, unlike the traditional assumption of an uninvolved, objectively observing

detachment of the experimenter or anonymous, neutrally experienced clinician, phenomenological psychologists emphasize the influential engaged presence of the psychologist in what he or she studies (Fischer, C., 1975; Giorgi, 1970, 1975b; Romanyshyn, 1971). They do so because the data revealed by the person are not purely personal meanings emitted by a person existing in isolation. These data contain themes that are intersubjectively shareable from the perspective of the psychologist. Accordingly, these themes exist between the participants in the research/clinical settings. Here, the psychologist as person brings in his or her own unexamined values, assumptions, and preferred perspectives toward the phenomenon. Moreover, the practicing psychologist is further identified through the influence of the work context, with its economic and personal meanings for the research subject or clinical client. Barton (1974), for example, has clearly portrayed many of these unacknowledged and influential factors within the therapeutic setting, while Fischer, C., (1975) has depicted these influences within the psychological assessment situation.

In a phenomenological psychology the making explicit of these influences and the preserving of the data's essential meaning are accomplished through a phenomenological reduction. I have already described the nature of this reduction in Chapters II and III. The intention of the reduction, however, is significant here, and deserves repeating.

Merleau-Ponty (1966a) describes this intention as a chosen methodological shift in the psychologist's attitude from an

intellectual consciousness to a perceptual consciousness. In practice this means that the psychologist moves from an already prefigured value and theory encrusted perception of the studied theme to a naive perceptual discovering attitude, which allows the phenomena to appear and disclose structures prior to the psychologist's reflective judgments and interpretations (Colaizzi, 1973; Giorgi, 1975b). In the clinical situation Keen (1970, pp. 172-173) understands the reduction as a "letting the patient be." This attitude maximizes the possibility that the person will be faithfully seen in their own right, without their experience being transcended and reduced by, or confused with, the psychologist's own unexamined pre-existent preferred ways of seeing. The methodological shift in the reduction is realized first through the psychologist's attempt to make explicit his own taken-for-granted standpoint toward the studied theme. This is accomplished through the psychologist's rendering a reflective description of his or her own experience of the theme being investigated. Following this, an individual or group reflection on that description serves to help make explicit previously implicit preferred perspectives, assumptions, and orientation tendencies of the psychologist. These pre-existent influences may then be recognized and temporarily put aside (bracketed) in order for both the range and multi-perspective richness of the data to be empirically present without prejudice. For examples of this method in practice see the psychological research of Alapack (1972, 1975) and Romanyshyn (1970, 1971). Within the clinical situation, this function would be accomplished through clinical supervision.

Searles (1965, pp. 584-625) has taken some steps in this direction. In his essay on "Problems of Psycho-Analytic Supervision," he skillfully identifies many themes that reflect the personal contribution of the therapist to his or her work. However, Searles, like most analysts, focuses his concern in the personal, biographical meanings that color the therapeutic vision toward the client. Barton (1974) better approaches the ideal of examining all potential influences of the therapist in his specific recommendations for a comprehensive science of therapy. Nevertheless, a detailed presentation which focuses on issues of this kind within clinical supervision has yet to be written.

In review, some intentions and expressions in practice of the reduction in relation to the psychologist's always engaged presence have been presented. At this point, the effectiveness of this intention must be qualified. In no sense does this methodology strive toward an absolutely presuppositionless basis for science (Fischer, C., 1975; Giorgi, 1970). Phenomenological psychologists have recognized that Husserl's (1969) original expectations for the reduction have been established as overly ambitious by phenomenological scholars (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b; Strasser, 1969). These psychologists recognize that the value of the reduction is limited as human perceptual experience is limited. For example, the reduction is taken up by a human being whose perceptual awareness is always perspectival, and further situated through space and time. Consequently, completely presuppositionless knowledge at any point in time is impossible. Giorgi (1970, p. 162), accordingly, recommends

that "... if one can never be without presuppositions, the next best thing is to clarify those presuppositions that one has. The constellation of presuppositions then define the perspective that one is in."

In summary, the aim of the foregoing, overall presentation in this section must now be recovered. This section aimed at disclosing how three presuppositions in a phenomenological psychology serve both as empirical checks and guidelines for a more empirically certain determination of the meaning of psychological data. This discussion may now be specifically applied to how the object of dynamic unawareness is empirically determined.

Three problems were identified in the psychoanalytic determination of the object of dynamic unconsciousness. These were shown to be empirical issues needing revision. The first is that the object of dynamic unconsciousness is predetermined in advance by recourse to hypothetical agents (instincts) which exist outside the potentially available evidence of lived-experience. Consequently, psychoanalysis as knowledge gathering theory has no means of empirically confirming what it does see because it deprives itself of evidence to the contrary. Further, psychoanalysis has no means for assessing what it methodologically ignores because other possible lived-meanings are excluded from empirical consideration as objects of dynamic unconsciousness. Two other problems, portrayed in clinical practice, were seen as consequences of this approach. First, the predetermination of the object of unconsciousness is reflected in the clinician's empirical identification of the

problem and in the resulting practice. Stated existentially, the range of clinically encountered problems exist as variations of the ability to love and the ability to move on the world, sex and aggression. Again, other possible meanings are excluded in practice from empirical consideration. Second, these same assumptions truncate an openness to the documented historical changes in psychopathology. The ability of psychoanalysis to remain contemporary is called into question, for both the empirical certainty and quality of practice are directly affected by these considerations.

In contrast, a phenomenological psychology of dynamic unawareness allows both the potential range and often unique variety of lived-meanings to emerge as possible objects of dynamic insentience. As a knowledge gathering approach, this psychology allows the object of dynamic unconsciousness to emerge from an examination of the potentially explicable field of clinician/client interexperience. Specific descriptions of how this methodological examination takes place have already been done (Colaizzi, 1973; Fischer, W., 1974; Giorgi, 1975b). The end result of this approach is that the limits of what will be considered meanings as the object of dynamic unconsciousness are both founded in and potentially explicit through a basis in experience. Accordingly, it becomes unnecessary to move outside the situation as interexperienced to determine the object of dynamic unconsciousness. In fact, to do so is to depart from an empirical base. This approach allows a clearer, more empirically grounded determination of the object because empirical consideration is given to both the range of potential

meanings as well as the multiperspective nature of each experiential theme. In short, this psychology does not exclude any evidence to the contrary because, in principle, all evidence to the contrary because, in principle, all evidence is considered. This means of object determination in a phenomenological psychology of the unconscious avoids the reductionistic, deterministic biases of the psychoanalytic psychology. Further, this approach is anti-speculative since both the initial identification and specific nature of the object arises from a base of clinician/client interexperience. Key presuppositions within this psychology further help the psychologist to make explicit, examine, and actively utilize many of the influences that he or she brings into the situation. Accordingly, much effort is maintained to faithfully stay in touch with the expressions of the client and distinguish unexamined influences that may prefigure or distort an understanding of this person appearing for assistance. In Giorgi's (1970) terms the psychologist is then able to distinguish between the universe of science or objective thought and the primordial phenomena which reveal a person and his world.

This discussion has positive implications for the problems in clinical practice raised earlier. First, the identification of the client's problem, its theoretical understanding, and the resulting practice of the psychologist arise from an open-ended consideration of the range and nature of experience as it is presented. Hence, these activities are more closely referenced in the potentially intersubjective evidence of experience. As mentioned earlier, this value of greater empirical clarity was

precisely what originally drew psychologists to a phenomenological approach. It appears to be open to the range of human experience, and able to deal with its truly human nature (Giorgi, 1970; May, 1959; Van den Berg, 1974). Accordingly, a psychology of dynamic insentience built on this approach appears to allow a more empirically certain determination of what the client is unconscious of.

The value of this psychology has further implications for the second issue raised over clinical practice. It was shown that the fixed assumptions of psychoanalytic psychology preclude the recognition of documented historical/cultural changes in the forms and meanings of psychopathology. By contrast, the open-ended consideration toward data by a phenomenological approach affords a wide view of these changing conditions. Consequently, this psychology is capable of including both the consensual patterns and unique subtleties expressed through the changing nature of people (Van den Berg, 1964). For example, the clinical case histories of Binswanger (1975) and Boss (1963) disclose a variety of meanings about which their patients were dynamically unconscious. More specifically, Van den Berg's (1974) historical/cultural analysis thematizes the expectation of equality and the repression of spirituality as contemporary objects of collective and individual insentience. On this issue, a phenomenological psychology of dynamic insentience appears able to recognize and integrate these changes in subject matter, and, thereby, avoid many pitfalls inherent in the psychoanalytic approach to the unconscious.

4.7.2. The localization of dynamic insentience

The general problem of the "localization" of human unawareness has been an incipient issue throughout this work's discussion of the historical interpretation of the unconscious. This issue was shown to be implicit in both pre- and post-Freudian psychologies of this theme. With Freud, localization attains an explicit status, and is conceived both anatomically, as in the Project (1977), as well as metaphorically in the later writings.

Specifically, I first showed that pre-Freudian versions of the unconscious largely emphasized the person's introspective standpoint on himself as a criterion for accepting or rejecting the unconscious. When affirmed, the unconscious was understood as being implicit within this introspective field of a person's awareness of himself.

Freud's interpretation of the unconscious was shown to have made a distinction in the understanding of unconsciousness. Preconscious processes refer to a temporary, although accessible, form of unconsciousness, and correspond to the implicit aspects of perceptual consciousness. The unconscious proper, however, was localized inaccessibly outside the perceptual field, but, nonetheless, within the person seen as psychobiological organism or psychic apparatus.

Finally, the considered phenomenological revisions emphasized a person's own individual viewpoint on him or herself through the perceptual field redefined through intentionality. Dynamic unconsciousness, therein, was understood as the pre-

reflective, implicit, or co-intended horizontal features of perceptual experience.

Accordingly, among these various psychologies of the unconscious some controversy remains over how the unconscious exists in a person's relationship to himself and the world. Chapter II maintained that in a radically empirical approach any statement about the nature of a phenomenon should both arise from and remain faithful to how that phenomenon was originally given through perceptual experience. Therefore, this section will move to clarify some of this controversy over localization by recourse to the phenomenological approach of Chapter III. Specifically, I will first present an interpretation of how dynamic insentience exists by examining it within the context of an approach whose aim is the clarification of human existence. Next, I will make explicit some guidelines for the determination of dynamic insentience within the clinical situation. Here, it will be shown that the basis for such a determination remains within the evidence of perceptual experience, and, thereby, avoids recourse to hypothetically derived auxiliary constructs outside this basis.

In a phenomenological psychology, the psychoanalytic unconscious proper is always grasped through the viewpoint of the literal or insentient other person, and its existence is always situated between the self and other. This view stands in direct contrast to Freud's psychology of the unconscious, which maintains that the unconscious exists within the person, and is empirically alienated from the evidence provided by any perceptual viewpoint. Further, in common with psychoanalytic

psychology, a phenomenological psychology of the unconscious argues that dynamic insentience exists outside the individual's perceptual viewpoint on himself. Accordingly, the clinically observed themes of the inaccessibility of dynamic insentience and its ego-alien, disowned quality are retained, integrated, and capable of being understood in this psychology.

These insights are a direct consequence of examining the unconscious from within a phenomenological approach. In line with Merleau-Ponty's aims, my intention with this approach was to make explicit a human science understanding of how people exist. That is, "... how, as subjectivities, they [people], can manifest themselves to me" (Lapointe, 1976, p. 213). For the clinical psychologist, this issue within the approach is fundamental to the understanding of other people and their lives.

A general summary of this aspect of the approach maintains that a person is already engaged within a worldly situation in and through a pre-reflectively related, expressive body. That person is capable of being known perceptually in a direct but limited way, and accordingly, exists as a genuinely present other. The other person is directly experienced because subjectivity is embodied, incarnate, and expressed through his or her behavior. Consequently, behavior and subjective experiences are not mutually exclusive, and a person's intentions, desires, motives, and moods are not divorced from their appearances as disclosed through expressive behavior. Accordingly, the conclusion was drawn that, interpersonally, a person always has a shareable presence between self and others, and is always

situated between the perceptual viewpoints present, including his own. From this it was shown that a person's experience of himself is also necessarily incomplete, situated, and perspectival. Hence, many perspectives of a person remain outside the field of his experience of himself, but are perceptually available to the standpoint of the other person. On this basis it was suggested that human bodily existence, like a work of art, always reveals a meaning that is co-constituted and co-defined by the co-existence of other viewpoints. In practice, then, the psychological assessment of the meaning of a person's experience is a project that takes place between the viewpoints present to that person. Connie Fischer's (1973) contextual approach to psychological evaluation is an excellent example of this position, for her clinical activity appears, at least implicitly, to draw from this manner of conceiving a person's existence.

This approach toward the person has other direct implications for psychological practice. First, the viewpoint and personal experience of the clinician is affirmed and often actively utilized. Chapter III addressed this issue in detail. There, I pointed out that a traditional attitude treats the clinician's subjective involvement in the relationship with suspicion and control. In light of this phenomenological approach, that caution must be modified to recognize the positive informational value of the clinician's perceptual experience of the client. For example, merely by virtue of their perceptual viewpoint on the person of the client, clinician's have access to perspectives outside the genuine limits of

their client's experience of themselves. Accordingly, I recommended that a clinician both recognize and actively dialogue his experience of the client with that client when that experience was judged free of counter-transference themes and was within the interests of the client's health. Thus, the psychologist has direct, empirically based perceptual access to the person of the client, and always co-constitutes the meaning of the studied data.

This explicit inclusion of the psychologist's experience in co-defining the experiential and person of the client is a primary feature in this revised psychology of the unconscious. In fact, the clinician's experience is so central in the relationship to the client that it is the empirical reference point for determining the existence of dynamic insentience. For, as others have stated it, the therapist's consciousness is the unconscious of the client (Fischer, W., 1971; May, 1967; Straus, 1966; Van den Berg, 1971). This important insight appears to have been drawn largely from practice by these psychologists, for the approach they utilize draws largely from the work of Husserl and Heidegger. Chapter III already showed the empirical limits of this work in their account of how the other person is known. Hence, this insight requires a re-phrasing more in keeping with the contemporary approach of Chapter III. The therapist's consciousness is not the unconscious of the client. The therapist's perceptual experience is the viewpoint through which the client's dynamic unconsciousness can become manifest. That unconsciousness remains the client's; nonetheless, it becomes experientially

visible through the co-constituting viewpoint of the therapist. Accordingly, dynamic unconsciousness does not exist within the person of the client, nor does it exist outside any basis of evidence in experience. Dynamic self insentience exists between the viewpoints present, and is always perceived through the standpoint of the other person.

This view of the unconscious is supported through a consideration of how the self-insentient person is experientially present to self and others. Under certain conditions, the dynamically unconscious person always presents a dissociated (Breuer & Freud, 1950), ambivalent (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b), or divided existence (Van den Berg, 1974). In this division, the possibility for intersubjective perception of the client on a given theme is ruptured between clinician and client. In short, how that person experiences him or herself does not coincide with the evidence of how they are experienced by others. I believe Freud (1943, p. 379) recognized this division when he remarked that in the ambivalently present person, "Our knowledge of what is unconscious in him is not equivalent to his knowledge of it." Further, that disagreement is often expressed through a client's defensive and resistant experiential action to own specific possibilities about himself that are presented by the clinician. In Sullivan's (1953) terms, the perspectives of himself about which a person is dynamically unaware exist as affectively-laden, "not-me" experiences for him. Hence, the lack of agreement portrayed in dynamically unconscious experiential action must be distinguished from simple disagreement over issues.

The presentation of two examples will further illustrate how dynamic insentience exists in this revised psychology of the unconscious. First, William Fischer (1971) provides an important understanding of this problem through his clinical description of a boy's unconsciousness of his own anger toward Fischer. The boy had been taught by his parents that being angry was the equivalent to sinning. Accordingly, he tried to appropriate this viewpoint in his conduct. Fischer (ibid, p. 252), however, notes that during the course of therapy "... there were many occasions when his facial expression, the tone of his voice, and his general bodily posture all indicated to me that, despite his previous upbringing, he was angry with me." Yet, when Fischer communicated this perception to the boy, he actively denied it. As Fischer (ibid, pp. 252-253) put it, "He had such an overriding interest in not experiencing himself as angry with me that he literally could not do so." Fischer argues strongly that the boy's insentience does not exist in him. Rather, in Fischer's (ibid, p. 253) words, that unconsciousness "... belongs to the situation of both of us together, each with our own frameworks of understanding and each with our various interests in that situation."

This description serves as an example to illustrate how dynamic insentience is conceived through this psychology of the unconscious. First, the boy's presence in a situation was divided and ambivalent. In some moments his experience of himself as not angry did not coincide with co-existent anger expressing gestures disclosed to the perspective of the therapist as other. The boy's insentience of this perspective of

himself occurred in a relationship, and while occurring between the participants was both disclosed to and co-constituted by the viewpoint of the other.

A view of how dynamic unconsciousness exists is further clarified by comparing it to the example of the phantom limb. What I will do here is present the phantom limb's mode of existence as a "model" for how dynamic insentience exists. This aim is similar to how some French psychoanalytic scholars have used the model of language to depict aspects of the psychoanalytic unconscious (Ricoeur, 1970). This presentation will be limited to the issue raised earlier over localization.

Merleau-Ponty (1966b, pp. 76-89) has presented a discussion of the phantom limb which, for this discussion, illustrates many features of how dynamic unconsciousness exists in a human science psychology. He says that the phantom limb manifests an ambivalent existence. For example, from the person's experience of himself, the severed limb continues to exist, and the person habitually seeks to engage in possibilities for action that was allowable prior to the amputation. From the perceptual viewpoint of others, the limb, of course, is non-existent, having been physically removed. The point here is that the limb is not either existent or non-existent. Rather, this condition expresses an ambivalent existence, situated between these viewpoints. Hence, intersubjective perception occurring between these viewpoints is genuinely ruptured. On this basis, Merleau-Ponty argues against a Cartesian account which either reduces this condition to a persisting "memory" within the afflicted person's psyche or to the continuance of

"interoceptive stimulation" in a physically defined body.

In summary, this example serves to illustrate that dynamic unconsciousness exists like the phantom limb's mode of existence. Both conditions depict a person's existence as divided or ambivalent within the network of viewpoints perceptually present to that person. Perspectives of a person's existence are experienced from one viewpoint, and go relatively undisclosed to another point of view. Nonetheless, the whole living person exists between these and other possible perceptual standpoints. Hence, each condition expresses a rupture of perceptual intersubjectivity over specific features of a person's existence. Finally, as with the phantom limb, human dynamic insentience is not localized in self or other. In fact, as with all perceptual meaning, this condition is neutral with respect to spatial localization. I have used the word "between" in an effort to depict this neutrality, for spatial localization must not be confused with the perceptual standpoint from which a phenomenon is initially disclosed.

This view of how dynamic insentience exists has implications for its specific determination within the clinical situation. For example, Freud's metapsychology of the unconscious was criticized as unempirical inasmuch as the determination of the unconscious takes place outside any direct evidence in experience. In contrast, this present revision empirically grounds such a determination in the perceptual experience of the other person, specifically the clinician. However, when dynamic insentience exists within the clinical arena is a remaining question. One criterion I have already offered is the experi-

enced rupture of intersubjectivity between clinician and client. The specific nature of this rupture has already been described. It may be first experienced through the sensitive focus of the clinician. However, by no means is the perception of this theme confined to that viewpoint. For example, a client may be reflectively unaware of what the object of his insentience is. Nevertheless, during therapy he may come to appropriate this viewpoint toward himself, and recognize that dynamic unconsciousness is operative when he experiences an emotionally-laden disjunction or flight from the therapist's viewpoint. Typically, resistance expresses this state of affairs in psychoanalytic forms of therapy, and is often intersubjectively recognized between analyst and analysand (Guntrip, 1969).

A number of advantages accrue when "rupture of intersubjectivity" is used as a criterion for determining when dynamic unconsciousness exists. First, this criterion arises from a model of dynamic insentience which is derived from perceptual evidence. Second, the determination of when this state of affairs is operative is also rooted in the interexperience of both clinician and client. Accordingly, no need exists to abandon perceptual experience in dealing with this issue, for this criterion remains within the appropriate evidence of a human science psychology.

Identifying specific instances of how a rupture of intersubjectivity could be manifested is a possibility for later research. However, aspects of the work of Van den Berg (1971, 1974) and Winnicott (1971) appear consonant with this criterion,

and depict possible directions. Van den Berg (1971), for example, maintains that unconsciousness is expressed through the therapist's experience of inequality in the relationship to the client. Van den Berg terms this condition a communicative inequality existing between these people. In his approach, psychotherapy is the work done to move from communicative inequality to equality in the clinician/client dialogue. For our purposes this aim reflects the movement from a rupture of intersubjectivity to genuine intersubjectivity over specific themes. Van den Berg (ibid, p. 337) says this:

First, they were not equal. Of the therapist it can be expected that he can talk freely about aggression without having the feeling of being hard pressed or that he will not be upset when a conversation turns to sexuality. With the patient things are different. And it is this difference, which, if feasible at all, must disappear. They used to be unequal: they must become equal.

Winnicott (1971) offers another possibility in how dynamic insentience may be expressed. He says that unconsciousness is operative when clinician and client are unable to play together. Winnicott (ibid, p. 38) puts it this way:

Psychotherapy takes place in the overlap of two areas of playing, that of the patient and that of the therapist. Psychotherapy has to do with two people playing together. The corollary of this is that where play is

not possible then the work done by the therapist is directed towards bringing the patient from a state of not being able to play into a state of being able to play.

Situated clinically, play is the freedom to spontaneously and creatively explore life themes and issues with, and in the presence of, the therapist. Winnicott (*ibid*, pp. 47-52) says that playing is a satisfying, trusting preoccupation with something or someone, and always exists in a spatially neutral, "potential space" between the participants. In short, play or unplay is a qualitative perspective of the interexperiential relationship that takes place between clinician and client. As with Van den Berg's (1971) equality, play or unplay is most probably experienced initially from the specialized viewpoint of the clinician. However, this theme, too, is potentially intersubjective during the course of therapy. Like inequality, un-play is a means of determining unconsciousness by recourse to the evidence of experience, and does so without any reduction of insentience to spatially conceived localization. Further, the movement from un-play to play may also be interpreted as a movement from a ruptured intersubjectivity to genuine intersubjective sharing in this psychology of the unconscious.

4.7.3. Duration, permanence, and localization of memory in a psychology of dynamic insentience

Memory and the unconscious were shown to be interrelated conditions in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. Three

points were singled out for criticism in Freud's treatment of these issues: the duration of unconscious content, the indestructability of memory, and its localization. It was pointed out that Freud's psychology of the unconscious depicted each of these issues in speculative, thing-like terms which have no direct basis in perceptually derived, intersubjective evidence. Accordingly, revisions were recommended. In review, Freud maintained that the unconscious continues to exist as latent despite the perceptual evidence given through self and other person viewpoints. This interpretation, in turn, was shown to be an outgrowth of his implicit natural science approach.

By contrast, dynamic insentience is always situated in a context of lived space and time with a human science psychology. Descriptive accounts of psychotherapy emphasize that dynamic insentience is not always directly expressed in the focus of psychotherapeutic work (Barton, 1974; Malan, 1979; Sechehaye, 1968; Yalom & Elkin, 1974). For example, disjunctions between a person's verbal and non-verbal communication occupy some, but not all, moments of clinical work, and persistent unawareness of often obvious perspectives of a person's present and historical experiaction are also differentially present. Chapter III, likewise, emphasized that the very structure of perceptual experience has a differential nature, with perceptual themes fluctuating from a focal presence to horizontal absence relative to a person's awareness. Accordingly, the appearance of dynamic unconsciousness in the clinical, interpersonal context is always limited. Dynamic unconsciousness is expressed

in some temporally situated conditions, and not others. Hence, the existence of dynamic unconsciousness is always limited and differentially expressed through its appearances in perceptual experience. Again, this view is in direct contrast to Freud's presumption that the unconscious has an unlimited, continual duration despite the evidence of experience.

The experience of music offers a useful model for conceptualizing the differential duration of dynamic insentience. For example, many scholars have criticized some prevailing accounts of experience on the basis that they draw too exclusively on experience as visual experience (Gurwitsch, 1964; Ihde, 1977; Langer, 1951; Schachtel, 1959, 1966; Stein, W., 1970). Visual experience, some maintain, often emphasizes the distal, abstract, rational perspectives of a phenomenon, and neglects other non-visual perspectives (Ihde, 1977; Langer, 1951; Schachtel, 1959, 1966). Accordingly, the experience of music has often been utilized as a metaphor to portray experience (Gurwitsch, 1964; Merleau-Ponty, 1966a; Schütz, Vol. II, 1964; Straus, 1963). Using this precedent in the literature, I will present an analogy which compares the presence and absence of dynamic insentience to the presence and absence of a theme in an orchestral expression. This analogy will serve to illustrate the differential duration of dynamic unconsciousness within the clinical relationship.

Human experience of self, other, and world always reveals perceptual themes as present at some points in time and situation and absent in other contexts. The experience of music also portrays this structure of presence and absence. For

example, a musical theme once present through orchestral expression becomes absent, and is replaced by other aspects of an expressed composition. Two questions are: Does that musical theme continue to exist, to endure, despite its experienced and written absence? If so, then where does it exist; where does it go when no longer present? These questions were shown to be central in how Freud approached the unconscious.

In contrast, the phenomenological approach of Chapter III maintained that the existence of something is always empirically referenced in its experience by someone. Consequently, while a once stated theme does have a potentially horizontal existence within the musical experience, that theme does not endure as a thing does, nor does it go anywhere spatially. The theme, like dynamic insentience, exists differentially in the context of lived space and time as perceptually experienced by people.

An example drawn from clinical practice appears to both implicitly draw from and illustrate this differential expression and durability of the unconscious. Connie Fischer (1973) argues that personality is always situationally contextualized and differentially expressed. For example, she maintains that pathology does not exist "... in the person, but between the person and his milieu" (ibid, p. 25). Hence, she recommends that the practical use of personality theories which emphasize constant traits, systems, and dynamics within the person be discontinued. Clinical psychology, she argues, is more effective through an approach to the person as contextualized. Fischer (ibid, p. 26) puts it this way:

For example, rather than evaluate how much hostility a person "has," we would identify when and how he breaks windows, clenches his fist, and so on, and when he does not.

Accordingly, her work is attuned to the differential expression of personality, which is revealed within a potentially specifiable contest or situation and is empirically co-defined by the participants. The expression of specific desires, intentions, and abilities is contextualized within these specifiable situations. Fischer (ibid.), for example, says:

Always the goal is to identify the "when/when-nots" of specific behaviors, and to develop from there concrete recommendations already within the client's ken. The "when/when-not" context includes both the person's and the outsider's experience of the surrounding events, objects, and persons, his goals and endpoints, and his pathways to them. Neurophysiology, diet, and cultural institutions all play a part in "experience."

Fischer does not specifically address the topic of dynamic unconsciousness in this paper. Nevertheless, her work does support how this revised psychology of the unconscious understands the latter's expression and durability. As one aspect of human personality, dynamic insentience is always differentially expressed in a lived-context existing between the participants. Like a theme in a musical piece, unconsciousness is both genuinely present and genuinely absent, depending on the

perceptual experience of the participants within the clinical situation.

Two other, closely related, issues singled out for revision pertain to the nature of memory in a psychology of the unconscious. In psychoanalytic psychology, these issues were identified as the indestructibility of memory and its localization. When these issues were examined through a phenomenological psychology, considerable evidence was presented to show another way of understanding these phenomena. That is, for both issues alternatives were presented from other research and theory, and new accounts of these phenomena were offered. These alternative accounts were shown to be more empirically desirable because they both directly drew from and remained within the evidence of experience. Accordingly, I will not repeat these efforts here. Instead, I will summarize that work already done into positive statements about indestructibility and localization, as these issues are viewed in this revised psychology of the unconscious. These points will be taken in reverse order after a general summary of the problem to which they refer.

As already shown, memory and dynamic unconsciousness are allied issues. For example, memory includes both the accessible and the "repressed" in a psychology of the unconscious. With Freud, it was shown that memory was viewed as being both localized within the person and divorced from his or her perceptual experience. Further, he saw memory as the immutable and indestructible recording of early life events. This view was shown to be heavily inspired by the assumption of the

constancy hypothesis. For example, he assumed that life events are faithfully recorded as indestructible memories whose meanings remain immutable despite other modifications of the person through life-development. Hence, infantile amnesia was explained solely as the action of repression, for events to which the young child was exposed, in principle, continued to exist as memories. Thereby, Freud ruled out the possibilities for both a genuine forgetting and a developmental transformation of experientially existing memories. This was the problem posed earlier.

Contemporary phenomenologically grounded research argues differently on these issues. First, the presupposition that memory is localized internally within the person and divorced from his perceptual consciousness goes unsupported by this research. Literature cited appeared in agreement that, experientially, memory always is manifest in the context of an undivided person-world, consciousness-object relationship. Further, as with all modalities of experience, memory is neutral with respect to inside/outside, internal/external. This is so when an account of its localization is rigorously drawn from how memory is experienced by people. Second, when experience is again considered as evidence, memory is shown to be intimately intertwined with, rather than absolutely separated from, ongoing perceptual experience. This intertwining is so on two counts: When considered experientially, memory always arises in the context of a person's perceptual relationship to the world. That is, as Keen (1975) has shown, features of the experiential present open up both memories and anticipations.

In another sense, the very form and range of mnemonic meanings is heavily dependent on how the remembered phenomenon was initially perceived. For example, Kvale (1974, p. 25) stands in agreement with both Kurt Goldstein (1966) and Erwin Straus (1963) when he maintains that "... how an event is remembered depends upon the context in which it is perceived, retained and retrieved." Therefore, memory is intimately tied to perceptual consciousness in this aspect of a revised psychology of the unconscious, and is neutral with respect to localization.

Another issue needing revision was shown to be the assumption of indestructible, immutable memories. On this issue a phenomenological psychology of unconsciousness holds that a memory, like any phenomenon, exists to the extent that it is referenced through someone's experience. From this position, the developmental work of Schachtel (1959), K. Goldstein (1966), and Strasser (1969) appeared in agreement that a view of memories as fixed and immutable is not supported by an account which begins from experience as evidence. They argue that mnemonic meanings are not only genuinely forgotten, but, indeed, also change depending on the context in which they become present. For example, Schachtel (ibid) argues that memory is always co-determined by largely adult mnemonic schemata. These schemata are a reflection of institutionalized values toward what a culture deems important to be remembered and forgotten. These schemata are relatively late in developing. Accordingly, experiences associated with the period of infantile amnesia are not retained in the form that they were originally experienced because these experiences exist as anomalies to what the

culture or society deems significant. Hence, the existence of these memories must not be presupposed in theory or practice, for a genuine forgetting is possible. Goldstein (ibid) makes a similar point by situating memory in the process of adaptation. He maintains that structures of experience no longer serviceable to ongoing adaptation are discarded and replaced by more appropriate, mature structures. Mnemonic meanings acquired through outgrown structures are modified and often genuinely forgotten. Hence, memory meanings are mutable, and the possibility for genuine forgetting exists. In fact, as Strasser (ibid) concludes, this outgrowing and replacement is a "productive disintegration" that is necessary for developmental maturation. Accordingly, memory is both modified and forgotten when viewed in the context of a person developing within a social milieu that allows limited rather than infinite possibilities for experience.

A more recent paper on memory by Kvale (1974) appears to support these conclusions. For example, after reviewing previous empirical investigations of memory by himself and others, he argues for a contextualized interpretation of memory. Kvale (ibid) argues against the hypothesis that memory is permanent through citing findings from experientially grounded, natural setting research. He maintains that genuine mutability and extinction of memory is the rule during the course of a person's life.

This mutability is clearly illustrated through a final example depicting how the context co-constitutes and alters the meaning of a memory. The example, again, draws from a musical

experience, as present in Gaston Berger's (1967) paper: "A phenomenological approach to the problem of time." Berger (ibid, p. 194) remarks that in written music repetition of a passage is indicated by a double bar. This notation means that the musician must repeat the same twenty-four or thirty-two measures played earlier in the piece. These measures are played exactly as played earlier. However, as Berger (ibid) points out, "To repeat, in music, is not to give a second time the same impression, it is to produce a new effect because the first performance has modified the listener." Now, the point of this example is to show that the "same" thing contextualized in a different setting is experienced as different in meaning from its original presentation. Giorgi's (1967) study on serial learning also supports this point. Accordingly, a memory present in two different contexts is not the same memory. Hence, the evidence of experience suggests no reason to retain the idea of an indestructible, immutable memory when that is not given in and through experience. As the reviewed literature suggests, memory is most effectively understood when it is situated in the process of a person's becoming in situations which also transform and alter. This view is important for an empirically grounded psychology of unconsciousness which draws on the evidences of lived memories.

4.7.4. The distinction between conscious-
unconscious, degree of unconsciousness,
and its influential role

Three final points remain for revision in this psychology

of dynamic insentience: the distinction between conscious-unconscious, the-degree of unconsciousness, and its influential role. Taken together these issues were also treated extensively earlier. In this presentation, literature was brought forward to highlight some empirical difficulties in the psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious. In addition, this same literature functioned to suggest other possible alternative accounts of the three considered issues. Again, this material will not be repeated. Instead, those alternative accounts will be summarized, and their place in this revised psychology of dynamic insentience will be examined.

The first issue is the nature of the distinction between conscious-unconscious. In review, Freud's metapsychology was unique in maintaining a strict distinction between conscious and unconscious systems and processes. This manner of distinguishing the two was shown to be a consequence of the approach implicit in psychoanalysis. By contrast, a phenomenological psychology sought recourse to the evidence of perceptual experience for a view of this distinction.

The reviewed literature was strongly critical of such an absolute distinction made by psychoanalysis. The literature emphasized that perceptual experience admits of gradations of awareness, always situated in the ongoing flow of lived time and space. Moreover, the experiential field is always structured into thematic and horizontal meanings, which allow perceptual givens to be both clear and explicit as well as genuinely ambiguous (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b). The perceived presence, however, always also exists in perspective, and other perspec-

tives of that presence become perceptually adumbrated over time. Accordingly, this work argues strongly against approaching the experiential field as a conscious/unconscious dichotomy, and in conceptualizing these terms as entities.

Instead, this psychology of unconsciousness approaches this distinction from three angles. First, perceptual experience makes a distinction between various gradations of awareness and unawareness. Second, in at least two ways dynamic unconsciousness is initially present to the individual through the literal or insentient viewpoint of the other person. Finally, the distinction between what is conscious and unconscious is culturally referenced, and not reducible to the individual. I will take these points one at a time.

First, gradations of awareness and unawareness are indigenous to the experiential field. Hence, unconsciousness, as generic unconsciousness, is indigenous to perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty (1970, p. 4) puts it this way:

Every perception is the perception of something solely by way of being at the same time the relative imperception of a horizon or background which it implies but does not thematize.

At least three forms of unconsciousness may be identified by reference to this statement and the material presented earlier. First, the horizontal is the accessibly implicit perceptual meanings not in thematic awareness. Hence, both Freud's pre-conscious and the co-implicit meanings pointed to be pre-Freudian and the considered phenomenological psychologies of

the unconscious are affirmed in this form of unconsciousness. Second, genuine dynamic unconsciousness associated with repression exists within an operative horizon of awareness for the person. The horizontal significance of dynamic unconsciousness will be presented in more detail in the following section on the degree of unconsciousness. Finally, the genuinely indeterminate and truly ambiguous features of the perceptual field are also underscored here. Again, Merleau-Ponty (1966b, p. 6) denotes this feature of the perceptual field when he says that "There occurs here an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other ... We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon." In summary, a phenomenological psychology includes all three forms of insentience as instances of generic unconsciousness co-present with explicit awareness.

Second, dynamic insentience is both initially and regularly present for the person through the literal or insentient viewpoint of the other person. This occurs through what Strasser (1969) calls the dialogal relationship. For example, earlier it was maintained that at the cultural level the dynamic unconscious that we know did not exist until Freud revealed that possibility to humanity. Through insentient dialogue with Freud's viewpoint we now recognize and take for granted many expressions of dynamic unconsciousness in everyday life.

This is also the case in the clinical relationship with the psychologically initiated client. For this person, the recognition of his dynamic insentience may only initially arise through the viewpoint of the literally present clinician.

Thereafter, during the course of therapy that client may independently discover, understand, and report meaningful instances of dynamic unconsciousness. This is what Owen (1979) calls "becoming your own therapist." This transformation always involves the appropriation of the therapist's viewpoint, which shifts at times from a literal to insentiently present other person. Hence, dynamic unconsciousness arises both initially and regularly in this way.

Outside the clinical situation, a person may acquire that viewpoint on his life through the insentient dialogue implicit in reading psychological literature (Sardello, 1975). Finally, this transformation may occur through the appropriation of that viewpoint from film, media, and other expressions of social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Prior to this appropriation the psychologically naive person may not distinguish his experientiation in these terms.

Finally, the distinction between what is conscious and dynamically unconscious is also expressed culturally, and not reducible to an internal distinction within the individual's field of awareness. That is, those possibilities for experientiation which are prohibited and denied at the institutionalized social level are correspondingly found as themes of the individual's dynamic unconsciousness.

For example, among the interpersonal, social theorists both Horney (1937, Vol. 1) and Sullivan (1953) recognize this reciprocal relationship between individual and society. Sullivan, in fact, was a politically active psychiatrist who recognized that a world free of tension and conflict must

be sought at both individual and social levels (Hall & Lindzey, 1970).

From another angle, Schachtel (1959) has shown the correspondence between those meanings prohibited and denied in a culture's social reality and their prohibition and denial in the individual's sensory experience and memory. For example, smelling, tasting, and touching are heavily utilized proximal modalities of experience during early childhood. These sensory modes of communication between person and world reveal meanings which often are culturally prohibited in adult everyday life. In development, however, these modes decline in use and are functionally displaced by the distal sensory modes like seeing and hearing. Schachtel's point is that with the relative replacement of the proximal senses, memories associated with them also recede from functional importance and use. In short, these functionally denied memories are directly associated with culturally denied themes. Hence, the distinction between the permitted and denied possibilities in a culture shows some correspondence to the person's awareness and insentience of himself, other people, and the world.

Other psychologists have supported this view in their work. For example, Van den Berg (1971, p. 347) explicitly calls the unconscious "a sector of social existence" to illustrate this reciprocity between disallowed meanings within social reality and those expressed through a person's dynamic insentience. He argues that neuroses must be re-defined as socioses to indicate that

The society provides the factors which induce

neurosis; these factors will influence every individual in that society, but only those, already by nature predisposed, will become manifestly ill. Neuroses is a social disease.

Connie Fischer (1973) also supports this position in her clinical understanding. She points out that psychopathology is always situated within the context of cultural values which specify some discrimination of what is abhorrent or incomprehensible in a society. These forms of psychopathology "... are not, in the person, but between the person and his milieu. And they are identified not by pre-given criteria discovered by science, but by conflict with constituted societal values" (ibid., p. 25).

In summary, a distinction between conscious and unconscious has at least three bases in a revised psychology of dynamic insentience. First, perceptual experience distinguishes gradations of awareness and unawareness. A typology of generic unconsciousness was presented. Second, dynamic unconsciousness is both initially and regularly present to a person through dialogue with literally and insentiently present other people. Finally, this distinction is also culturally referenced and reciprocally present in both social reality and individual person.

Freud's manner of distinguishing the dynamic unconscious from the rest of the perceptual field raised a related question: does the dynamically unconscious person express no knowledge of or reference to the insentient perspectives of

his life? In other words, is dynamic insentience about oneself an absolute unawareness?

The dynamically unconscious individual expresses a relative, operative awareness of what he is unconscious of in this revised psychology of unconsciousness. This is in contrast to the before-mentioned thematic significance in the perceptual experience of the clinician. For example, the dynamically unconscious person's action often expresses some operative awareness of the insentient complex. This is disclosed through how the person conspicuously orients himself away from directly encountering these insentient meanings in himself, others, and the world. Schachtel (1966, p. 43) supports this view through his characterization of the repressed person's activity in the Rorschach situation. He says:

... the person who represses much of his own inner reality equally has to shut out by selective inattention or other mechanisms of avoidance those aspects of reality outside him which might touch on that which he represses.

This same pattern of avoidance and constriction in a person's Being-in-the-world is highlighted elsewhere. Merleau-Ponty (1966a, p. 178), for example, suggests that the whole attitude of the person toward his insentient complex is one where he "avoids thinking about it in order not to have to integrate and be responsible for it." Here, the person does not explicitly recognize that he is avoiding, and certainly is unable to identify what he is avoiding. However, this avoidance is often

disclosed as an operative knowledge visible through the experience of the other person(s). Through this operative knowledge "he can evade his deficiency only because he knows where he risks encountering it," and he "...knows what he does not want to face, otherwise he would not be able to avoid it so successfully" (Merleau-Ponty, 1966b, p. 80). From a different perspective, Hilgard (1974) supports the concept of an operative knowledge expressed through forms of unawareness in his term the "hidden observer." For example, in hypnotic experiments Hilgard gave suggestions of analgesia, which were experimentally confirmed through self-reports of many experimental subjects. However, through the later use of so-called automatic writing and talking procedures those same experimental subjects unknowingly contradicted their previous reports of analgesia and affirmed their prior pain sensitive experience. Accordingly, these subjects expressed an operative knowledge of self despite the unawareness characteristic of hypnotic induction.

In short, the reviewed descriptions and findings suggest that these considered modes of insentience are most effectively viewed when taken as relative rather than absolute unawareness. This recommendation is consistent with a view of perceptual experience as possessing gradations of awareness and unawareness. Accordingly, this revised psychology of unconsciousness conceives both repression and dynamic insentience in these terms.

The final point in this revision is how to conceive the issue of influence in an account of dynamic insentience. The

psychoanalytic psychology of the unconscious was shown to have understood this issue in causal terms. Influence was understood as cause, with unconscious instincts having this deterministic role. Empirical problems were identified in this account, then directly examined and revised through a phenomenologically approached psychology.

Given this work, the issue of influence will be understood in at least two ways. First, influence is approached through making explicit the bi-temporal, contextualizing influences of both biographical and future intending horizons on a person's present experientiation. Second, these influences are both mutable and differentially expressed in specific situations. Accordingly, the fixed designation "the unconscious" will be deleted and replaced by an account of dynamic insentience in keeping with its adjectival, adverbial expression in human activity. Here, it will be shown that the phenomenological concept of structure effectively describes how unconsciousness exists in this revised psychology of this theme. These two points will be taken one at a time.

One way that this psychology accounts for influence is through considering it as the contextualizing influence that horizon provides for figure in human perceptual experience. These contextualizing influences are always bi-temporal, functioning as historical and future horizons to contextualize the perceptually existent (Giorgi, 1970; Keen, 1975). Human experientiation, also, is informed by both biographical influences as well as future intentions. For example, the very writing of this work is, generally speaking, the result of a biographical

preparation and intentions and ambitions that extend to the future. Accordingly, in this psychology of unconsciousness, insentient influences do arise from the horizon of our histories and from our intentions, goals, and ambitions toward the future. This bi-temporal contextualization of the present is in marked contrast to the reduction of the present to our histories, as emphasized in the genetic viewpoint of psychoanalytic psychology.

Select literature has recognized these bi-temporal influences to be an essential feature in a psychology of the unconscious. For example, Jung (1966, Vol. 7) maintained that understanding expressions of the personal unconscious entailed having recourse to both that person's history and his imagination toward the future. He also referred to this protentive quality of collective themes through his concept of the transcendent function. In a similar way, Sartre's (1956) reformulation of psychoanalysis holds to a bi-temporal understanding of influence. Sartre argues that unconscious influences are present through both our biographical histories and unfolding life-projects. Finally, Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 180) also supports this contextualization of unconsciousness. Speaking to the protentive aspects of unconsciousness, he says:

This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our "consciousness," but in front of us, as articulations of our field. It is "unconscious" by the fact that it is not an object, but it is that through which objects are possible,

it is the constellation wherein our
future is read.

Accordingly, in practice, this revised psychology of the unconscious is capable of integrating the contextualizing influences of biographical and future intending horizons. The clinical examples of Keen (1975) and Van den Berg (1972) are noteworthy in this respect.

This view of influence also suggests the necessity for changes in a psychology of motivation, for motivation is also bi-temporally contextualized. Some basis for this viewpoint is already established in the psychological literature (Atkinson, 1978; Fischer, W., 1971; Von Eckartsberg, 1975). This view is in contrast to a psychoanalytic account of motivation which emphasizes a reduction of the latter to antecedent historical and bodily conditions (Hilgard, 1956; Von Eckartsberg, 1975).

A second implication in this contextualized approach to dynamic insentience is the recommendation that its noun-like, systematic designation "the unconscious" be deleted in this revised psychology of unconsciousness. This point is consistent with the criticisms of other psychologists (Boss, 1963; Binswanger, 1975; Schafer, 1976; Skirbekk, 1976). Recourse to the foregoing examination, criticism, and revision of Freud's psychology of the unconscious should make evident that unconsciousness is not most effectively understood when conceptualized in the thing-like terms of the natural attitude. For example, presuppositions that led to a characterization of unconsciousness as timeless, immutable, indestructible, and

omnipresent were shown to go unsupported when examined with an approach predicated on the evidence of experience. Schafer (1976, p. 243) also supports this position through his belief that "... unconscious is not a state, a quality, or a place; it is a mode of action, and so its force is adverbial ('unconsciously')." Hence, from the viewpoint of Schafer's (ibid) descriptive action language approach the thing-like designation of dynamic insentience as "the unconscious" goes unsupported by a faithful description of the activity of the clinical client.

In contrast, a phenomenological approach was shown to understand influence as contextualized rather than causal. Influence is contextualized within the unity of Being-in-the-world and expressed both differentially and mutably within a face to face or insentient inter-personal relationship. Hence, human unconsciousness is most effectively depicted in this approach by the term structure, a psychological concept introduced by Merleau-Ponty (1966a) and expanded by Giorgi (1970, 1973b, 1973c, 1975a, 1975b). Accordingly, the following final summary of this psychology of human unconsciousness will present it as a significant structure of human experiention.

4.8 Summary of human insentience as structure

The aim of this summary is not to make explicit the general structure and style of human unconsciousness, as, for example, an empirical research effort would attempt (Giorgi, 1975b). This is a subject for later research of a different nature.

Instead, the emphasis throughout this work has been to offer an empirically faithful account of how unconsciousness, particularly dynamic unconsciousness, may be conceived. This aim was supported and referenced by an approach which commits to the primacy of perceptual experience as evidence for its psychological investigations, theorizing, and practice. Accordingly, in what follows I will present the concept of structure to act as a model for summarizing the differentially present, mutable manner through which dynamic insentience is disclosed.

The concept of structure has already been extensively defined and discussed in the literature (Colaizzi, 1973; Giorgi, 1970, 1973b, 1973c, 1975a, 1975b; Merleau-Ponty, 1966a). In addition, specific structures of experiention such as anxiety, prejudice, anger, and learning have been empirically investigated and reported (Fischer, W., 1974; Giorgi, 1975b; Romanyshyn, 1970; Stevick, 1971). Through these works psychological structures are defined as stable, equilibrated essential forms which are disclosed through a person's experiential relationship to the world. Structures retain their formal essence despite variations in lived space and time for the same and different person(s). Nevertheless, structures are situated within these contexts and empirically co-defined by those people present in and to those conditions. The concept of structure has been depicted as an empirical-theoretical refinement of the Gestalt psychology term configuration (Giorgi, 1975a). Accordingly, structure is an overriding descriptive concept well suited to express the perceptually grounded,

situationally contextualized, interpersonally defined nature of a person's dynamic insentience of something. Moreover, as Giorgi (1970) points out structure is not to be confused with cause.

A summary of how dynamic insentience exists is consistent with the situated, mutable, differentially present status of lived-experiential structures. For example, this form of unconsciousness is always present through a human interpersonal situation, and disclosed thematically through the viewpoint(s) of the literal or insentient other person(s). This unconsciousness exists when, in particular situations, a person's experience of himself is disjunctive from the perceptual viewpoint(s) of those other person(s). The term "rupture of intersubjectivity" was used to indicate the empirically referenced existence of this divided existence. Ambivalent existence was another term used to emphasize how dynamic insentience is co-defined interpersonally, and exists in a spatially neutral way between the participants. The presence of this structure, accordingly, is referenced by its appearance in the describable experience of those viewpoints present.

Moreover, this experiential determination of dynamic insentience is, like all perception, finite and perspectival. For example, in practice, the clinical recognition of insentient experiential action is always grasped from a particular viewpoint and disclosed through certain perspectives. This recognition also takes place at a point in time in a situation having specific interests co-defined through the interexperience of the participants. Hence, dynamic insentience is never fully disclosed,

but, like all structures, perceptually adumbrated over time and situation.

What a person-is-unaware-of is known through relatively different gradations of awareness and unawareness, depending on the viewpoints of the people present. For example, the insentient person's unawareness of something can be known directly as thematic through the perceptual viewpoint(s) of the other person(s). In turn, a dynamically unaware person's conduct often reveals his operative awareness of those meanings insofar as he orients his life activity around them. Therefore, dynamic insentience is relatively inaccessible, again depending on the viewpoints present.

This form of unconsciousness is, also, differentially present in some situations rather than others, at some times rather than others. Moreover, these insentient meanings are potentially mutable over these conditions. This differential presence and mutability extend to describe memories. In this psychology of unconsciousness memory is intimately connected with lived-experience as its necessary precursor. Furthermore, memories no longer serviceable to ongoing human development are often transformed, and functionally recede from appearance and use. Hence, a genuine forgetting is possible in this psychology. By contrast, repression is the persistence of former, outmoded relationships with the world, and these repressed meanings have an operative significance for the person.

Insentient influences on a person's experiention, however, are by no means reduced to the influence of repression. In

this psychology unconscious influences on experiaction are viewed as the influences provided by bi-temporal historical and future-intending horizons. Thus, a person's lived-through biography as well as his future intentions and ambitions influentially contextualize the lived present.

Finally, as understood in this overall approach, dynamic insentience is a structure of a person's ongoing activity and presence in the world. While the essential structure of this insentience may remain invariant, its specific expressions through experiaction may vary with differing conditions and people. Hence, its very nature defies comparison with a thing-like mode of existence.

V. REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction and review

This work has come full circle in its examination of how unconsciousness, particularly dynamic unconsciousness, may be best empirically conceived. In what follows, I will first aim to recover some of the main themes of this movement through a general summary of this work's overall structure. Second, important implications of this work for clinical psychological activity will be offered in the context of this summary as background. Here, I will seek to depict how the priority on experience in this psychology places both different and additional responsibilities on the practicing psychologist. For reasons of continuity, specific implications for clinical practice and theorizing were often presented immediately following criticized or revised points. For instance, often while a point was fresh in consideration I wanted to directly indicate the consequences of a criticism or revision on a psychology of unconsciousness. Accordingly, these implications were immediately shown in the context of the discussion. For this reason, I will not duplicate this material here.

The beginning of this work pointed to the controversial status of dynamic insentience within the field of psychology. On the one hand, an interest in this theme was shown to have persisted throughout history, and however defined, continues

to be included as central to many areas of personality theory, psychopathology, psychological assessment and psychotherapy. On the other hand, severe criticism has often accompanied this historical persistence of this theme, and stimulated controversy over its empirical, scientific value for psychology.

Much of this criticism was shown to be directed at Freud's psychology of the unconscious. His version of this subject was depicted as unique among the pre-Freudian theories up to his time. In addition, Freud's psychology of the unconscious has become the most influential and institutionalized model of dynamic unconsciousness in psychology and the culture at large. Nevertheless, the scientific merit of psychoanalysis and its concept of the unconscious have received considerable criticism. Accordingly, a number of steps were taken to clarify this controversy, and make explicit the nature of these criticisms.

First, a view of scientific activity itself was presented and defined through Giorgi's (1970) interpretation that all scientific activity is composed of an approach-method-content structure. Approach was presented as the implicit, pre-scientific vision of the phenomenon, and comparable in some respects to Kuhn's (1970) concept of paradigm.

Second, the psychoanalytic unconscious was shown to be intimately situated within the approach and theoretical superstructure of psychoanalysis. Accordingly, some existing criticisms of psychoanalysis were examined in order to determine the nature of the revisions advocated by these critics.

Results of this investigation documented that the scien-

tific, empirical status of psychoanalysis was generally under question. This was shown to be the case with many behavioral psychologists, logical empiricist philosophers of science, many psychoanalysts, and phenomenological psychologists. Specifically, criticisms coming from the first three groups emphasized empirical revisions in psychoanalysis at the method-content levels, leaving the approach relatively unexamined. In contrast, phenomenological psychologists and many theoreticians of psychoanalysis singled out the implicit approach, the pre-scientific psychoanalytic vision of the phenomenon, as the crucial issue leading to empirical-type problems. Here it was shown that psychoanalysis was informed by a dated, natural scientific approach, which appeared speculative, deterministic, reductionistic, and without a basis in the evidence of experience.

The problems arising from this approach were shown to compromise the empirical effectiveness of psychoanalysis, and were later shown to be reflected also in Freud's psychology of the unconscious. Accordingly, it was recommended that the examination and revision of the psychoanalytic unconscious through an approach drawn from lived-experience would allow a human centered, intersubjectively shared basis of evidence to support a revised psychology of the unconscious. In this way, such problems as empirical uncertainty over clinical interpretations and results, and inconsistencies between approach and theory, theory and practice could be overcome, and clinical practice improved.

Toward this end, a phenomenological approach was presented

and used in at least four ways. First, this approach was used as a contemporary statement of the phenomenological position. For example, since Husserl and Heidegger, phenomenological thought has progressed through numerous changes and developments. The contemporary approach presented in Chapter III sought to integrate and present those changes. Second, this approach was used as a basis for examining and revising some features in the psychoanalytic approach and resulting conception of the unconscious. Third, both pre-Freudian and select, earlier phenomenological psychologies of the unconscious were examined, criticized, and revised through this approach. Finally, the presentation of a contemporary phenomenological psychology of dynamic insentience was directly based on this approach, and shown to avoid many of the empirical problems inherent in earlier psychologies of unconsciousness.

5.2 Discussion

On reflection, one theme consistently interwoven through the fabric of this work is the emphasis placed on lived-experience for the determination and understanding of dynamic insentience. This emphasis on experience has important implications for the professional activity of the psychologist. For example, this psychology begins and ends with lived experience as its empirical reference point. In the practical clinical situation, empirical certitude about what is going on is not guaranteed, in vacuo, by the mastery and use of a predetermined method which may be found in "systematic schools of thought." For example, a phenomenologically oriented

clinician would not presume that the empirical meaning of Rorschach's card IV is always an unconsciously expressed attitude toward the father, for he knows that to do so is to perceptually fall asleep to the already present evidence available through explicating lived-experience. The same is true of the phenomenological psychotherapist. For example, a person's ambivalent existence is not always between thinking and an insentient feeling as with Rogers, or its reversal with Albert Ellis. Here again, the a priori determination of the meaning of another's experiention by hypothetical, unvarying variables occludes the evidence of lived experience, and therapeutic interpretations of the situation always remain ambiguous. This clinical alertness to the novelty of a situation, considered in its own terms, places a special set of responsibilities on the psychologist, for as Merleau-Ponty (1963) has remarked, a person must become acquainted with and know a position without ever standing completely at home in it. I will now turn to consider some of these responsibilities as possible implications of this work. Five points will be covered.

First, the clinician is faced with greater responsibilities when the social contextualization of dynamic insentience is recognized. For example, this form of unconsciousness is always situated in a particular socio-economic-cultural milieu, and is defined in relationship to it. Accordingly, one implication of this view is the need for a greater knowledge and inclusion of these horizons in psychological work. This position suggests that the psychologist should keep close contact with these

areas, and include their possible influences within his or her considerations. This is recommended because in this psychology of unconsciousness emancipation is potentially both personal and cultural.

Let me clarify this statement by a comparison with psychoanalysis. For example, Freud's ultimate reduction of the unconscious to biology permitted psychoanalysts to make a relative by-pass around serious consideration of this social contextualization of unconsciousness. This, I believe, is one reason why Freud saw emancipation as a near-exclusive personal emancipation, and showed little consideration to the influence of the cultural context. The reduction to bodily instincts made any cultural considerations superfluous. Accordingly, Freud took for granted the conditions of institutionalized social reality, and defined successful analysis largely in adaptive terms.

This present revised psychology, however, asks the psychologist to actively consider this context, for dynamically insentient themes are reciprocally present between individual and social reality. Some contemporary clinicians have recognized this (May, 1972; Wheelis, 1959). They point out that the clinician's position in work with people allows a privileged access to both personal and culturally institutionalized norms, many of which are no longer serviceable to the interests in adaptation and further growth. Hence, it would seem that if clinical psychology no longer totalizes the person's growth within a psychology of naive adaptation, then the psychologist needs both a better knowledge of and dialogue with the insti-

tutionalized structures of socio-cultural reality. This is an issue at the level of approach that directly affects practice, and suggests directions for the politically active psychologist.

The second implication flows from the affirmation of the basically exteriorized nature of lived-experience, and affects what data clinicians deem significant. For example, in this psychology of dynamic insentience an insentient theme may be equally expressed through a client's experience of himself, others, and the world. What is being expressed by that person is that these particular meanings are a concern for him or her, where ever they are being expressed. This flows from the finding that dynamic insentience is relatively neutral with respect to "inner" or "outer" localization. Hence, this psychology would emphasize that insentient meanings are not "projected" as much as they are discovered in the client's relationships to the world. Pathology, in turn, is not in someone. It is exteriorized through a person's experiaction in the world. This is why the suggestion was offered that the study of psychopathology and its transformation might more effectively take place through an equal consideration of a person's experience of his lived-body, others, and the world (Van den Berg, 1972).

This recommendation would alert the clinician to be responsive to multiple expressions of a dynamic theme as a structure of insentience, and avoid the constricted data source obtained through such techniques as "mental status" reports. Toward this end, psychoanalysis must be credited with taking

seriously the exteriorized nature of lived-experience. However, this psychoanalytic focus on exteriorization is technically circumscribed to an analysis of the client's dynamically insentient relationship to the therapist. Implications from this revision would suggest that other sources as well are available for examination in the clinical determination and transformation of experientially disowned meanings. This possibility, however, would appear to require greater scope and responsibility on the part of the psychologist.

The third implication suggests a greater cooperative relationship between clinician and client than has been traditionally acknowledged. For example, earlier it was shown that the determination of a person's manner of psychological functioning, including problematic insentient relationships, is an issue that exists between clinician and client. Clinical problems are, accordingly, co-experienced, co-defined, through the explicated interexperience of these participants. Therefore, the emancipatory effort to identify and transform the limits set by dynamically insentient structures of experience is a shared responsibility. Here, the client is actively engaged with as a source of data. Connie Fischer (1973) has depicted this stand in the area of psychological assessment. However, specific recommendations for the practice of psychotherapy from this approach have yet to be detailed.

The emphasis on dialogue in the client-focused clinical arena is equally expressed in the structure of the clinical supervision session. Within this situation, a number of implications arise when the psychologist takes experience as

evidence in a psychology of dynamic insentience.

One implication points to the role of the clinical supervisor as one who may possibly offer a clarifying and intersubjectively confirming or disconfirming function towards the clinician's case-load experience. This function flows from the nature of the approach in this psychology of dynamic unconsciousness. For example, earlier it was argued that all data arising from the clinical setting are co-constituted, co-defined, and co-clarified through the dialogue between clinician and client. Clinically presented issues exist between them, and are, accordingly, open to intersubjective inspection. This essence of the relationship extends to include the supervisor-clinician relationship. Here, all data exist between the participants as potentially intersubjectively shared issues.

From this viewpoint, the supervisor may pursue multiple roles. One is to present a different viewpoint on the phenomena in addition to the therapist's. Here, the supervisor may function as co-worker in adumbrating significant other perspectives of the specific clinical issues. His viewpoint also allows the presented data to be inter-subjectively examined and evaluated, so that the clinician's understanding of a client may be confirmed or disconfirmed at stages along the way. Another possibility for this supervisor is to participate in the clinician's ongoing dialogue between his experience of a particular problem, his reflective understanding of it, and his clinical practice. The empirical fidelity and continuity of a psychologist's activity (approach-method-content)

is dependent on this perpetual dialogue in the interest of the client. This particular aspect of clinical supervision would appear to be more inclusive than traditional forms of supervision which take for granted the question of approach in psychological activity. Finally, supervision may function to help the clinician disengage from his or her biographical and cultural presuppositions through clarifying them. This service of the supervisor may help the clinician distinguish those perspectives of his experience having genuine informational value for the client from personal biographical-cultural influences which may be at cross purposes with the client's overall welfare. These possibilities for supervision appear to flow from the priority of lived experience in this psychology of dynamic insentience.

Lastly, the necessity to maintain a dialogal relationship (Strasser, 1969) with the insights and findings of other psychological orientations, human arts, and sciences is strongly implied by this study. This implication flows from the approach to the phenomena in this psychology. For example, throughout this study both the approach and revised psychology have hinged on a view of how people exist as the subject matter for psychology. The approach presented in this work views people as richly multiperspective, radically situated within numerous contextual horizons, and always in the process of change and becoming. Hence, it would appear that the psychologist must adopt a broader, multidisciplinary attitude and knowledge in his work. This study, for example, specifically depicted this socio-cultural relatedness of dynamic insentience from a view-

point seeking to escape the reductions and determinisms of natural attitude psychologies. Here, it was shown necessary to go beyond the traditional categories of these psychologies in order to allow the meanings of lived-experience to act as original psychological data. Accordingly, the psychologist appears obliged to become better acquainted with and actively utilize this multiperspective knowledge in his or her work.

These implications for clinical practice appear as possible consequences of a phenomenological approach to the unconscious.

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